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This thesis presents a late-Durkheimian theoretical framework on civil society as a sphere of 
solidarity and applies it to the development from modern society to an „information society‟. 
The framework is used to identify the cultural codes that exist in different information 
societies and to show their role in integrating or dividing the members of civil society. The 
framework is applied to South Korean civil society entering an information age coincident 
alongside processes of democratisation. Three policy debates relating to information are used 
as case studies to show the coexistence of, and conflicts between, a „developmental code‟ 
based on economic growth and anti-communism deriving from the authoritarian period of 
state-sponsored capitalism, and a later „democratic code‟ based on human rights. The three 
cases are: the Electronic National Identification Card, the National Education Information 
System and the credit information system.  The thesis argues that the values of a „democratic‟ 
code are becoming more dominant in recent South Korean society, despite continuous 
challenge for its validity. The cases provide evidence that democratisation and informatization 
can operate in tandem to establish the dominance of the democratic code in public discourse 
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After the 1987 Democracy Uprising in South Korea, it was in 1992 that the first civilian 
president was elected. Then, two consecutive democracy fighter-turned-president 
governments (1998-2007) followed. No doubt South Korean civil society was entering a 
newly democratized phase. However, it did not automatically guarantee that values and norms 
in the authoritarian regimes would be replaced by democratic ones, as shown in the following 
example.  
 
In the transition toward democracy, a liberal newspaper survey in 2005 revealed that two 
thirds of the total respondents chose Park Chung Hee of the authoritarian military regime as 
the president with the best capability of administrative management of state affairs
1
. 
Managerial capacity for addressing the national economy was scored as the most important 
requirement for a president. Ironically, it is this policy for economic growth that brought the 
Roh Moo-hyun government face-to-face with pan-national and massive protests in July 2006. 
The government put an emphasis on the role of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement in the 
development of a competitive edge for the Korean economy and the prospect of higher 
economic growth. However, opponents argued that the democratically elected government 
promoted the agreement in an undemocratic and nontransparent way. They condemned the 
government for refusing to publicize details of the negotiations and for not to using a 
domestic consensus-building process before negotiations. Regardless of intensifying 
opposition, continuing negotiations between Korea and the U.S. resulted in a free trade 
agreement on the 2th of April 2007. Civil organizations urged the president to step down. 
 
What motivated Koreans to call for democracy, even though they tended to lean toward the 
nostalgia of the economic growth miracle during the Park Chung Hee authoritarian regime? 
                                                 
1
 The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1 January 2005. It is called ―Park Chung Hee nostalgia.‖ 
3 
 
How can ‗developmental‘ revivalism be explained in Korean society in the transition toward 
democratisation? What made the progressive government put a priority on the ‗economy first‘ 
over democratic rights? Why did the ―participatory‖ government fail to achieve even a 
procedural democracy, not to mention substantive democracy?  
 
Existing studies provide a limited answer to these questions. Since the 1987 Democracy 
Uprising, various theories on democratization have been applied to explain the democratic 
transition in Korea
2
. Broadly speaking, the approaches can be divided into two perspectives: 
the strategic choice theory and the social movement theory
3
 (Kim S. , 2007). 
 
Strategic choice theory focuses on elite calculations and interactions as contributors to 
democracy. For instance, Im Hyug-Baeg (1990) suggests that the determinants of the 
democratic transition in 1987 were strategic negotiations and pacts between softliners within 
the ruling elite and moderates among the opposition. He maintains that after democratization, 
the mediation of public interests with the state was brought about by ―institutional civil 
                                                 
2
 Turning to the 1990s, perspectives on democratic transition received much attention. Entering the 2000s, 
democratic consolidation became an important research topic. The reason for this was that despite the transition 
to democracy, Korean society had a tendency to show continuous and intensified conflicts between conservative 
forces and democratic forces and accordingly social and political instability. For this trend, Choi (2005) assessed 
the quality of Korean society as worsening after democratisation. The other reason is related to the emergence of 
nostalgia for economic growth led by authoritarian regimes. It is well represented by the phrase, ―democracy 
doesn‘t put bread on the table.‖  
3
 In addition, the regulation approach and modernization theory are applied to explain democratic transitions 
(Sonn, 1996; Jhee, 2008). From the regulation approach, what is crucial to democratization is structural changes 
as well as strategic choice perspective (Kim H. K., 1995). It maintains that the change in accumulation system of 
Korea from Taylorism to peripheral Fordism eventually led to democratization. Democratization in 1987 is 
interpreted as the result of negotiations between the ruling bloc and the opposition. Modernization theory 
emphasizes Korea's rapid economic development as a structural factor in democratization. For instance, Mah 
(1993) argues that economic growth produced the structural foundation of democracy by reducing the 




society‖ which consists of civic associations (Im Hyug-Baeg, 2009). However, he points out 
that the delay in democratic consolidation was caused by the excessive growth of rent-seeking 
civic associations. The strategic choice theory has the strength in explaining the dynamic 
process of democratisation. However, it does not provide an explanation of structural factors 
surrounding strategic negotiations: why softliners started to negotiate with moderates among 
the opposition. It is not clear why even the government after democratisation propelled public 
policies using the same process by which earlier industrialisation polices had been driven. To 
understand the reason for this requires an identification and analysis of the structural 
constraints that governments faced during the democratic transition.       
 
Contrary to the elite-centered approach of strategic choice theory, the social movement theory 
is a mass-centered approach, suggesting that civil society groups formed a pro-democracy 
alliance and forced the authoritarian regime to move toward democracy (Song, 1994; Kim S, 
2000). Cho (2007) argues that ―the driving force of democratic transition and democratic 
consolidation comes from oppositional activation of the civil society and self-empowerment 
of the people.‖ As such, the social movement theory pays attention to the growth of civil 
society. However, it did not address why mobilisation in 1987 succeeded while it failed in 
1980. Furthermore, it is unclear why civil society at one point supports a government-led and 
developmental oriented policy, while a similar policy is rejected by civil society at another. 
Hence, it needs more analysis of what guides people‘s actions in civil society.  
 
This thesis applies a late-Durkheimian theoretical framework to investigate into Korean 
society in the transition toward democracy. Sociology as a discipline takes its inspiration from 
understanding problems of modern society. Durkheim (1963 [1912]; 1984 [1893]), for 
example, described the social change from traditional societies to modern societies in terms of 
5 
 
the transformation of modes of solidarity. He asserted that modern society develops a new 
form of organic solidarity based on the process of modernization. This theoretical perspective 
is further developed by Parsons, Alexander and other scholars in the tradition of late-
Durkheimian studies. Parsons (1964; 1971), for example, points out that the evolution of 
modernity is characterized by the establishment of a societal community providing integration 
in the complex system of modern society. According to Parsons (1971), the integration of a 
differentiated social system is accomplished by institutionalizing cultural values and norms 
that are socially accepted. Alexander (1991; 1997; 1998a; 2001a) asserts that the potential 
divisions within society deriving from increased complexity can be reconstructed through a 
broadened idea of civil solidarity to include processes of civil repair. For Alexander, the 
starting point to understand the structure of civil society is that of the symbolic structure of 
codes and how these symbolic codes are used not only to define members of civil society and 
their inclusion and exclusion. 
 
Castells (1996; 2001; 2006) also argues that civil society in the information age is a network 
society in which individuals are reconstructing the pattern of social interaction with the help 
of new technologies. This observation provides the motivation for this research: what do 
people in an information society draw on to create categories of inclusion and exclusion, and, 
furthermore, how does this society become both differentiated and integrated in the 
information age. 
 
This raises the question of whether any information society should be characterized as a new 
type of solidarity based on the process of informatization: specifically, it raises the question of 
what cultural codes exist in (different) information societies and how cultural codes play a 
role in integrating (or dividing) the members of civil society. To answer these questions, this 
6 
 
research attempts to analyze discourses in an emerging information society, that of Korea. 
Korea offers a good case study in that the civil society of Korea is not only entering the 
information age, simultaneously with industrialisation, but is also a newly democratized 
society.  
 
In recent decades, Korea has experienced dramatic and rapid changes, such as economic 
development through industrialisation, successful democratisation and the development of 
information technology. During the period of authoritarian regimes (1961-1987), Korea 
adopted export-led industrialisation strategies to establish the legitimacy of the regime and 
used economic growth as a political excuse for the postponement of democracy and the 
suppression of civil society. With the situation of the division of the Korean peninsula, 
ideologies of security and anti-communism gave the military authoritarian regimes legitimacy 
for their seizure of power. However, after the democratic movement in 1987, Korea 
experienced progress toward democratisation, which took place alongside the promotion of 
informatization. Reforms to remove the authoritarian legacies of military regimes were 
implemented and informatization was also emphasized to improve national competitiveness in 
an era of globalization. Furthermore, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the first transfer of 
power from the ruling party to the opposition party provided a new turning point to 
implement social and economic reforms and to put high priority on informatization as a new 
engine of economic growth. Korea made fast progress in informatization, as shown in a steep 
increase in Internet users from 3 million in 1998 to 33.01 million in 2005. Twenty-six million 
users of Cyworld, founded in 2001, have invited friends (ilchon) to their mini-homepages 
(Minihompy) to share daily lives, private thoughts and journals. This informatization helped 
the development of democratisation by providing new tools for participation in public issues 




In sum, in its economic aspect, Korean society has transformed not only from an agricultural 
society to an industrial society and then to an information society but also in the political 
aspect, from authoritarian governments, associated with the military dictatorship, to civilian 
governments as a result of the success of democratisation.  
 
During these changes, Korean civil society has not only become more differentiated, but has 
also become more integrated. In particular, the advent of the information age has led to ‗the 
networked society‘ (Castells, 1996) where the differentiation and integration of civil society is 
dynamic and takes on new forms. Following the sociological tradition of the analysis of 
symbolic codes, these changes in Korean society suggest the possibility of tension between 
different sets of symbolic codes. This tension is revealed in controversies over various social 
issues and policies which have arisen during the last two decades. In this context, the research 
outlined in this thesis attempts to identify a set of symbolic codes and their tensions in recent 
Korean society. 
 
What is noteworthy is that informatization in Korea was propelled by the same process that 
industrialisation was driven. With this in mind, this research suggests that the controversies 
over various social issues and policies which have arisen during the last two decades can be 
taken as indications of such tensions in Korea and can be exemplified through the 
controversies over information-related policies. Hence, the disputes over information-related 
policies are analyzed as arenas in which existing values in civil society are not only clearly 
exposed, but also can undergo change through symbolic conflict over new values. The 




First, what are cultural codes that operate within Korean civil society? Studies in the late-
Durkheimian perspectives (Baiocchi, 2006: Edles, 1995: Jacobs, 1996a; 1998; 1999: Ku, 
2001: Lockwood, 1996: Rabinovitch, 2001: Smith, 1991; 1998: Swidler, 1986) have shown 
that multiple codes can be present deriving from various traditions and cultures. More specific 
questions to address are i) whether the code in Korea is single or multiple as in less-
established civil societies, ii) what codes instruct action and speech in civil society and iii) 
what the codes are associated with and what are they derived from. 
 
Second, how does the tension among codes take place and how is it resolved in the transition 
toward democratised and informatised society? The studies in the late-Durkheimian 
perspectives show that the conflicts of different codes can be more apparent in less 
established civil society and seemingly less-effective codes in the competition for hegemony 
do not disappear, but remain inside of civil society. More specific objectives to be identified 
are i) what code becomes more dominant in the transition toward democratic and information 
society, and  ii) if less-effective codes do not disappear how their effects are manifested. By 
answering these questions, this research aims to provide a framework for understanding 
questions identified earlier, namely  i) how Koreans were motivated to call for democracy, 
even though they tended to lean toward the nostalgia of the economic growth miracle during 
the Park Chung Hee authoritarian regime, ii) how developmental revivalism can be explained 
in Korean society in the transition toward democratisation, iii) what made the progressive 
government give a priority to the ‗economy first‘ over democratic rights, and iv) why the 





The answers to the above questions are addressed through the comparative investigation of 
three related cases. The first is the dispute over the Electronic National Identification Card at 
the beginning stage of the transition toward democracy and informatization, that is, between 
1995 and 1999. The second is the controversy over the National Education Information 
System in the new democratic government between 2000 and 2003. The final case is the 
debate over credit information which took place across the period covered by the other two 
cases, that is, between 1995 and 2007.  
 
Chapter 1 discusses civil society, culture and social change. It provides the theoretical 
framework for this research. For the general background, Parsons‘ discussions about 
modernity are summarized: how mature modernity emerges in modern society, the nature of 
the system of modernity, and the role of the societal community as a distinctive component of 
modernity. Extensions of Parsons‘ account of societal community, including by Alexander 
and Lockwood, are discussed. Then, the Castells‘ theory of network society is reviewed. This 
provides an introduction to the new issues of the societal community in post-modern society.  
  
Chapter 2 sets out the changes in politics, social structure and civil society in Korea since 
partition. It provides the context for subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 sets out issues of methodology and research design. An overview of the three 
disputes over information-related policies in Korea is presented. This provides a general 
account of the cases and the justification of their selection. A general discussion of case study 
methodology is provided, including issues of the generalisation of a case study and the 
usefulness of a case study approach. A brief review of a narrative approach follows, which 
focuses on its features in explaining the dynamics of civil society. Then, the concept of 
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discourse and its role in civil society is discussed from a critical discourse analysis 
perspective as well as from a conventional view. After addressing the role of the media in 
civil society, the nature of data to be collected is presented. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the controversy over the Electronic National Identification Card 
between civil society organizations and the Korean government. In the sense that the debate 
period was between April 1995 and February 1999, it showed how existing codes underwent 
change at the beginning stage of the transition toward democracy in Korea.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the controversy over the National Education Information System from 
2000 to 2003. The dispute of the National Education Information System hit its stride after the 
first accession to power by only democratic forces without any coalition in 2002. However, 
while the Electronic National Identification Card was scrapped, the National Education 
Information System was implemented after some revision. Hence, the focal point of this 
chapter is whether the democratic code had failed to become fully sedimented in civil society 
as the dominant code. 
 
Chapter 6 analyzes the debate about credit information, which was conducted for a longer 
period (1995-2007) encompassing the previous two debates. In the sense that the previous two 
debates showed the confrontation of two codes for dominance, this chapter acts as a 
supplement to the previous chapters and shows the articulation of two codes in a context that 
potentially favours the code deriving from an emphasis on economic growth and industrial 
development. Nonetheless, the ‗democratic‘ code still has important effects, reinforcing a 






















With the rise of modernity, the way in which it emerges and its central problems became core 
interests of the classical sociologists. From the nineteenth century, the three founding classical 
sociologists, Karl Marx (1818-1883), Émile Durkheim (1858-1971), and Max Weber (1864-
1920), tried to clarify the main features of modernity and the future of modern societies from 
different angles and ideas.  
 
For Marx, the core of modernity was class. From Marx‘s view of social change, the key to 
understanding a particular society was its mode(s) of production and the corresponding 
relations of production between the owners of the means of production and others, for 
example, in capitalism, the workers, the sellers of their labour power. According to Marx, in 
modern society, the capitalist mode of production generates capitalists and wage-earners. This 
class structure forms two groups; a dominant group, having property rights and power, and 
the subordinate classes who lack them, except in their capacities to labour. This leads to the 
capitalist class‘s exploitations of the labour of its employees by paying lower wages than the 
market value of the products. Thus, he claims that this contradiction of capitalism brings class 
conflict to the fore in modern societies. He expected that this problem of modernity, caused 
by the contradiction of production relations, would bring about the collapse of capitalism.  
 
Whereas Marx recognized class antagonism as the main feature of modernity, Durkheim 
concentrated on the patterns of social solidarity representing moral consensus and normative 
regulation. He described the social change from traditional societies to modern societies in 
terms of the transformation of modes of solidarity. Compared to traditional societies, 
identified as mechanical solidarity based on similarity, modern societies are characterized as 
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organic solidarity formed by differences organised through a complex division of labour. 
Mechanical solidarity implies a form of social cohesion that ties people through conformity to 
norms, especially in traditional societies. Organic solidarity is the desirable form of social 
cohesion that binds people in societies of greater and specialised complexity. For Durkheim, 
the process of modernization is the process of differentiation. However, he suggests that a 
decline of moral authority, increased complexity in social roles and rules, and the 
development of the division of labour risks anomie as the main problem of modernity. For 
Durkheim, anomie which has resulted from the lack of social integration describes the 
situation showing the decline of the sense of collective identity and the increase of individuals‘ 
independence from social norms. Nevertheless, ―modes of solidarity are seen by Durkheim as 
structures because they are experienced by human actors as external constraints on their lives‖ 
(Holton, 1996, p. 32).  
 
Weber, for his part, tried to explain the emergence of modern society in terms of the 
development of rationalisation. He argued that the change from pre-modern to modern society 
involved an increase of rational modes of thought and organization. For Weber, the 
rationalization of the modern institutions of administration, especially bureaucracy, is the 
fundamental feature of modern societies. Weber recognizes the bureaucratic specialisation of 
tasks as the most important feature of capitalism rather than the class system (Giddens, 1971, 
p. 234). However, he claims that the rationalisation of modern life results in being the ‗iron 
cage‘ within which people are increasingly imprisoned.  
 
The emergence and problems of modernity, then, are identified differently by classical 
sociologists. These classical traditions were synthesized by Talcott Parsons around the idea of 
modernity. For him, the development of modernity is the establishment of the system of 
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modern society.  His principal focus is mature modernity. This means that Parsons gives more 
significance to Weber and Durkheim than to Marx because Parsons believes that class issues 
are more likely to be a problem of the emergence of modernity and not its mature forms. In a 
similar vein, the Marxian concept of civil society as class society and Gramscian account of 
civil society as ―all those institutions that we commonly think of as non-state and non-
political‖ (Woodiwiss, 2005, p. 96) were challenged because of the change of class structure 
and the emergence of new social movements. 
 
However, mature modernity has to be seen not only in terms of the development of industrial 
society but also in post-industrial society. Nowadays, society has changed from an industrial 
society to an information society (Castells, 1996; 2001; 2006), where what Parsons terms the 
‗societal community‘ can be understood as a network and mature modernity also can be 
recognized as networked modernity.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, the general backgrounds of Parsons‘ 
discussions about modernity are summarized: how mature modernity emerges in modern 
society, what the system of modernity comprises, and the nature of the societal community as 
a distinctive component of the system of modernity. Second, the extensions of Parsons‘ idea 
of the societal community by authors such as Alexander are discussed. Finally, Castells‘ 
theory of network society is reviewed and developed in the context of Parsons and 
Alexander‘s approach. This provides an account of the societal community in post-modern 





1.2. The system of modernity and its societal community 
 
If Durkheim and Weber illustrated the change of modern society when modernity emerged, 
Parsons elaborated their theories when modernity had been established. Parsons was not only 
greatly influenced by Durkheim‘s differentiation theory, but also took some points from 
Weber‘s change theory (Alexander, 1992b). He made an influential contribution to synthesize 
classical theory within the idea of modernity. For him, the development of modernity meant 
the establishment of a new kind of societal community located in the system of modern 
society.     
 
In contrast, Marxism identifies civil society as class society (Alexander, 1997b, p.120) which 
is rooted in the contradictions of the capitalist economy as the source of its main 
determinations. Reflecting the economic structure of capitalist society, civil society is defined 
as an association of equal citizens in theory, but in reality an association in which the 
bourgeoisie is dominant. In an attempt to overcome this Marxist dualism, Gramsci redefines 
civil society as ―all those institutions that we commonly think of as non-state and non-
political‖ (Woodiwiss, 2005, p.96) and ―the realm of political, cultural, legal and public life 
that occupied an intermediate zone between economic relations and political power‖ 
(Alexander, 1997b, p.121). Gramsci suggests that ―civil society itself would have to be 
challenged, and transformed independently of the economic base‖ (Alexander, 1997b, p.121). 
At the same time, he explains that winning hegemony based on consensus in civil society is a 
way to achieve working class acceptance of capital‘s rule, an acceptance that, unlike Marx, he 
suggests can be relatively stably reproduced. In this way, Gramsci moves closer to a more 




The concept of civil society attracted attention precisely because of the change in the meaning 
of class, the change of class structure and the emergence of new social movements. Increasing 
social mobility and the growing size of the middle-class led people to vote ―as individuals 
rather than a member of a class‖, indicating that ―class has become an ever less dependable 
predictor of how people will vote‖ (Woodiwiss, 2005, pp.131-132). The class structure has 
shifted ―from a pyramidal to a diamond form.‖ New social movements emerged in the 
struggle ―not for socialism but for democracy, solidarity and the independence of individual 
rights‖ (Alexander, 1997a, p. 224).  
 
In this regard, the eighteenth century concept of civil society was revived (Alexander, 1997a, 
p.224). In particular, using the concept of societal community, Parsons tried to explain ―how a 
sphere of solidarity can in fact be differentiated from both market and state as well as from 
more specifically ideational and emotional spheres like religion, science and the family‖ 
(Alexander, 1997a, pp.224-225).  For Parsons, it is the problem of order rather than alienation 
that is the most basic social problem in an individualistic society. He attempted to answer the 
question of ―how societies are generally orderly rather than chaotic, despite being aggregates 
of intrinsically competitive individuals‖ (Woodiwiss, 2005, p. 111). For Parsons, there is no 
set of latent (and oppositional) group solidarities that are latent within the economic structure 
of society. Group solidarity is formed of processes intrinsic to the societal community or civil 
society itself. 
 
1.2.1. The evolution of modern society 
 
Parsons illustrates the process of social change in terms of ‗evolutionary universals‘ in his 
essay ‗Evolutionary Universals in Society‘ (1964). It is a good starting point to understand the 
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process of the development of the societal community as the result of modernization. He 
maintains that fundamental evolutional universals have four aspects: religion (as the most 
basic aspects of culture); language (for communication); kinship (for social organization); and 
technology (as a synthesis of empirical knowledge and practical techniques) (Parsons, 1964, 
pp. 341-2). This is very similar to Durkheim‘s term of mechanical solidarity as a main feature 
of traditional society (Holmwood, 2006, p. xxv). The next stage in the development of the 
evolutionary universals is the intermediate level which is characterized by two organizational 
complexes, social ―stratification, involving a primary break with primitive kinship ascription, 
and cultural legitimation, with institutionalized agencies that are independent of a diffuse 
religious tradition‖ (Parsons, 1964, p. 356). These universals give foundations for the process 
of social change which is from intermediate to modern societies. The basic aspects of 
structure of modern societies are shown by four complexes: ―bureaucratic organization4 of 
collective goal-attainment, money and market systems, generalized universalistic legal 
systems, and the democratic association with elective leadership and mediated membership 
supported for policy orientations‖ (Parsons, 1964, p. 356). To Parsons, the last two 
evolutionary universals, of generalized universalistic norms and democratic association, are 
so important that these not only ―define and regulate power structures and their 
administration‖, but also ―regulate market relations and the resources represented by money‖ 
(Holmwood, 2006, p. xxvi). Therefore, modernity, for Parsons, can be seen as 
―institutionalization of pattern of modern values‖ and simultaneously, recognized as ―the 
outcome of an evolutionary process that leads to a higher level of organized social complexity‖ 
(Lechner, 1991, p. 177).     
 
                                                 
4
 Holmwood points out that ―like Weber, Parsons was convinced that bureaucracy was the most efficient form 
yet invented of administration, and the only form capable of organizing the specialized operations of a modern 
society‖ (Holmwood, 2006, p. xxvi). 
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As such, Parsons constructed the notion of societal community in terms of the development of 
modernity.  
 
The United States‘ new type of societal community, more than any other single factor, 
justifies our assigning it the lead in the latest phase of modernization (Parsons, 1971, p. 114).  
 
In other words, the societal community is defined as an independent solidarity sphere of 
society, which has been established in the process of modernization, such as increased market 
relationships, political participation, and religious activism (Alexander, 1991, pp. 167-8). 
With more mobility, intermarriage, migration, education and new forms of mass media 
accordingly there is a greater quantity and quality of interaction and the more the societal 
community grows. Mayhew points out, in this respect, ―Parsonian theory is primarily a theory 
of solidarity,‖ (1984, p. 1277). In this context, modernizing social change in stratification 
terms implies increasing inclusion via the social community, as well as a shift in the economic, 
political and value spheres to facilitate that inclusion (Alexander, 1991, pp. 168-9). 
  
 
1.2.2. The emergence of the societal community 
 
Parsons suggests that the societal community is differentiated from the economy, the polity, 
and the cultural sphere. It is ―a synthesis of the liberal concept of civil society as differentiated 
from the state with the stress on social integration, solidarity, and community‖ (Cohen & 
Arato, 1992, p. 119). 
 
We have suggested that it (societal community) synthesized to a high degree the equality of 
opportunity stressed in socialism. It presupposes a market system, a strong legal order 
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relatively independent of government, and a ―nation-state‖ emancipated from specific 
religious and ethnic control (Parsons, 1971, p. 114).  
 
According to Parsons, in modern Western history, the main point of the differentiation of 
societal community is the appearance of the nation and its association with the societal 
community. He points out the following three aspects of the emergence of the nation, based 
on the American case: 1) ―the establishment of associational criteria‖ which form the 
standard for being part of the nation from the membership of primitive, or ‗primordial‘ groups 
such as the family or religious groups 2) the nation‘s differentiation from its government, 
which implies the growth of political independence by associations within the societal 
community 3) ―the differentiation of the societal community as nation as a shift of the 
integration of the three elements, community, ascriptive bases, and government, in the 
direction of a synthesis of citizenship and territoriality‖ (Parsons, 1967b, p. 425).  
 
This differentiation of the societal community from the cultural, economical, and political 
subsystem is attributed to three modern revolutions namely the industrial, the democratic and 
the educational revolution (Parsons, 1971, pp. 86-98). In particular, Parsons stresses the 
educational revolution which brings equality of opportunity. 
 
The educational revolution has been considered as a crucial innovation, especially with 
regard to the emphasis on the associational pattern, as well as on openness of opportunity. 
(Parsons, 1971, p. 114).  
 
Accordingly, the membership of the societal community is formulated on a different basis, 
compared to the previous society. The membership of the community in primordial society is 
based on the particularism of kinship and blood. Instead, that of the societal community is 
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established on the universalism of simple humanity and participation in a nation-state. 
Parsons asserts that the conditions of modern societies are connected with ―the process of 
differentiation which has produced pluralistic social structure‖ (1967b, p. 429). This 
pluralism means, for Parsons, that ―not only are there many subcollectivities within the 
societal community, but the typical individual participates through membership in an 
increasingly wide variety‖ (1967b, p. 429). Accordingly, universalistic association of 
community is emphasized and every member is equally regarded as worthy of respect 
(Alexander, 1991, p. 168).  
 
1.2.3. Societal community as a distinctive component of the system of 
modernity 
 
According to Parsons, the societal community is the integrative subsystem of society. In other 
words, the societal community is located in the system of modern society and serves to 
provide the binding against any ‗centrifugal‘ tendencies of its other parts. The integration of 
differentiated social systems is accomplished by institutionalizing cultural values as norms 
that are socially accepted and applied.  
 
··· We have stressed the importance of cultural legitimation of a society‘s normative order 
because it occupies a superordinate position. It operates in the first instance through the 
institutionalization of a value-system, which is part of both the societal and the cultural 
systems. Then its sub-values, which are specifications of general value patterns, become 
parts of every concrete norm that is integrated into the rights and obligations of various 
collectivities and their members not only with each other, but also with the bases of  




The prototype of an association is the societal community itself, considered as a corporate 
body of the citizens holding primarily consensual relations to its normative order (Parsons, 
1971, p. 24).  
 
In this context, the societal community can be defined in terms of the two dimensions: 
―normativity‖ and ―collectivity‖ (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 126). Normativity is a system of 
legitimate order produced by the institutionalization of cultural values. Collectivity is the 
aspect of society as a single, bounded, organized entity. In particular, the meaning of the 
boundedness of societal community is related to political institutions (rather than economic 
institutions considering the tendency of the economic sub-system to extend beyond the 
boundaries of a nation state). 
 
Parsons emphasizes that the basic problem of integration to modern societies is the balance 
between equality and functional inequalities
5
. For the solution for this problem, he suggests 
that the institutionalization of accountability and the institutionalization of equality of 
opportunity could become the means of reconciliation (Parsons, 1971, pp. 119-20). The 
integration between claims for equality and other claims for pluralism is determined by a 
special mechanism involving prestige; that is, ―through which various factors essential to the 
integration of the societal community can be evaluated, balanced, and integrated in an output, 
namely influence‖ (Parsons, 1971, p. 121). The concept of influence which can be operated 
through persuasion has a ―structural role in Parsons‘s theory of the differentiation of the 
societal-community‖ (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 113). Influence, like money and power, is 
recognized as a generalized symbolic medium of societal interchange which acts on collective 
interest and mutual solidarity (1971, p. 14).  
                                                 
5
 Parsons referred the classification ―competence—economic efficiency—collective effectiveness‖ as the bases 




Integration is the focus of emerging institutions of stratification ··· The basis is not ··· 
national or ethnic membership. It is neither aristocracy in the older sense nor class in the 
Marxian sense. ··· The integration of such a societal community must depend upon 
mechanisms that center around the attachment of generalized prestige to specific groups and 
to the statuses that they occupy, including the office of bearers of authority in collectivities 
··· The exercise of influence by one unit or set of units can help to bring other units into 
consensus by justifying allocations of rights and obligations, expected performances, and 
rewards in terms of their contributions to a common interest. The common interest is that of 
the society conceived as a community (Parsons & Platt, 1982, p. 337). 
 
As such, with the concept of ―societal community‖, Parsons stresses social integration rather 
than the possibility of social conflict. For example, Habermas points out that Parsons‘ theory 
depends on social integration where: ―culture supplies societies with values that can be 
institutionalized and socialized individuals contribute motivations that are appropriate to 
normed expectations‖ (1987, p. 140). Indeed, Parsons attempts to show how a differentiated 
society can be successfully integrated and all subsystems of the society can play their function 
in this modern period. Furthermore, he tries to synthesize the normative claims of tradition 
with those of modernity, by showing how a new normative order functions in relation to a 
modern social system.  
 
However, Parsons‘s conceptualization of a societal community needed to be augmented 
because of theoretical lacunae and the gap between ‗concept‘ and ‗real‘ society (see, 
Alexander, 2005). According to Jeffrey C. Alexander, the concept of societal community 
tends to ―confuse rather than clarify‖ the distinction between integration and solidarity 
(Alexander, 2005, p.97). He maintains that Parsons‘s approach to a societal community could 
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lead to integration without justice or solidarity in the sacrifice of justice. The reason for this is 
that from the perspective that ―basic tenets of justice are equality and recognition,‖ demands 
for justice ―often leads to conflict, increasing rather than decreasing disorder and immediate 
social strain‖ (Alexander, 2005, p.99). Furthermore, for the subgroups outside the community, 
integration may be a not voluntary but coerced cooperation which is ―secured only by 
repression not by influence or normative control‖ (Alexander, 2005, p.101). This indicates 
that the search for integration could produce exclusion rather than inclusion (Alexander, 2005, 
p.103). 
 
Jeffrey C. Alexander also contends that Parsons is not able to explain how the United States 
accomplished both integration and justice (Alexander, 2005, p.98). Parsons‘s solution to the 
contradiction between integration and justice is an evolutionary theory that a nondemocratic 
societal community evolves into a democratic one (Alexander, 2005, p.103). The problem is 
that evolutionary theory is not able to explain ―the continuing repressiveness and exclusionary 
qualities of contemporary societies‖ (Alexander, 2005, p.104). 
 
Besides the above theoretical lacunae, social turmoil in the late 1960s and the early 1970s 
seemed to be inconsistent with Parsons‘s concept of a societal community. The appearance of 
social consensus was torn down by a considerable class tension in the industrial sector and 
intergenerational tensions after the war in Vietnam ―to produce a whole raft of initially youth-
oriented, middle-class social movements pursuing such goals as women‘s liberation, gay 





1.3. Civil society and political culture 
 
After Parsons, a number of writers have paid attention to the cultural importance of 
constructing political actions. Jeffrey C. Alexander has made significant contributions to the 
study of public discourse within cultural studies. On the basis of Parsons‘ societal community, 
the concept of social solidarity was combined with a civil society approach. In this context, 
Alexander insists that it is necessary to develop a theory ―not only of facilitating inputs but of 
destructive intrusions that trigger social movements for civil repair‖ (Alexander, 1997a, p.227; 
2005, p.107). He also suggests that ―principles argued by Parsons to be mutually 
interdependent can be mutually contradictory‖, allowing that ―institutions can be founded 
upon functions which logically can either express mutual necessity or mutual antagonism‖ 
(Holmwood, 1996, p.90). 
 
Since the 1980s, Jeffrey C. Alexander has developed the notion of civil society through a 
series of works which contains the relationship between democracy, culture and civil society 
(1988a; 1988b; 1991; 1992; 1997; 1998a; 2001; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Alexander & Jacobs, 
1998; Alexander & Smith, 1993). It leads to the framework where members of civil society 
are understood to participate in binary discourses of good and evil, which provide feelings of 
membership.  
 
Alongside Weber‘s universalistic communities, Durkheim‘s idea organic solidarity, and an 
understanding of the voluntaristic bases of American democracy, T. H. Marshall‘s model of 
citizenship is one of the bases of Parsons‘ concept of societal community (Alexander, 1997a, 
p.223). According to T. H. Marshall, citizenship is ―a status bestowed on those who are full 
members of a community‖ (Marshall, 1950, p.18) and is ―a principle of equality‖ (Marshall, 
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1950, p. 20). Along the same lines, Parsons considers citizenship as a sufficient foundation of 
solidarity (Parsons, 1971, p.22) and as ―linked to a primary feature of social integration‖ 
(Sciortino, 2010, p. 240). Using T. H. Marshall‘s concept of citizenship, Parsons shows that 
―the primordial solidarity of traditional society could be transformed into the moral 
bindingness of inclusive citizenship‖ (Alexander, 2005, p.97). T. H. Marshall‘s citizenship 
extending process of civil-to-political-to-social rights is demonstrated in American history 
(Lechner, 1998, p. 182). 
 
However, as claimed by Lockwood (1996), social and economic inequality can make a 
difference between institutionalized citizenship and an ideal form of citizenship, an argument 
that was subsequently taken up by Jeffrey C. Alexander. ―The contradictory and fragmented 
nature of real civil societies‖ received more emphasis from Jeffrey C. Alexander (Morris, 
2009, p. 366). 
 
The arguments concerning civil society and social change in the information age are further 
developed by Castells in his important trilogy; The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture - The Rise of the Network Society (1996), The Power of identity (2004c) and End of 
Millennium (1998). According to Castells, the new society is made up of networks (2000, 
p.695), where a network society is defined as ―a society whose social structure is made of 
networks powered by microelecronics-based information and communication technologies‖ 
(2004a, p.3). What is noteworthy is that ―networks were historically useful for personal 
interaction, for solidarity and for reciprocal support‖ (2000. p.695), placing them directly as 
aspects of civil society. In particular, he states that the Internet makes an important 
contribution to ―the new pattern of sociability based on individualism, that is networked 
individualism‖ (2001, p.130). In other words, networked individualism emerges as ―the 
27 
 
synthesis between the affirmation of an individual-centred culture, and the need and desire for 
sharing and co-experiencing‖ (2004b, p.223). 
 
Like Jeffrey C. Alexander‘s perspective on civil society, Castells maintains that the network 
society has ―a contradictory structure and a conflictual practice as all societies in history have 
been‖ (2004b, p.223). He insists that conflicts and social change are caused by contradictions 
among networks (2000, p.697). Furthermore, he points out that the essential struggles in the 
network society ―lie in the redefinition of cultural codes in the human mind‖ (2000, p. 695) 
and social movements ―are essentially mobilized around cultural values‖ (2001, p.140). In this 
context, it can be concluded that Castells‘ network society is considered as a networked 
societal community and can be investigated from the perspectives of cultural tradition.   
  
1.3.1. Civil society as a realm of solidarity: Jeffrey C. Alexander 
1.3.1.1. Civil society as a sphere of solidarity 
 
In the light of social and political struggles in the 1980s, Alexander suggests that to 
understand the social conditions upon which democracy depends, civil society needs to be 
defined as a sociological concept (1997b). He maintains that civil society is not only different 
from markets, states, and other non-civil areas like religion, family and science (1997b) but 
also is understood to be analytically different from the sphere of political power, economic 
production, or cultural life (1991, p. 168). 
 
He defines civil society as a sphere of solidarity where every member of a society has the 
potentiality of being integrated with the feeling of ‗we-ness‘ and connectedness to one another 
(1997b). Members of civil society are not only independent and individually responsible for 
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their own actions but also are constrained by collective solidarity (1998a). In this way, civil 
society is generated from collectivism as well as individualization (1997b). Solidarity 
―affirms the sanctity of the individual and these individuals‘ obligations to the collectivity‖ 
(Alexander, 1997b, p. 115). At the same time, it implies that civil society is a place where 
‗abstract universalism and particularistic versions of community are tensely intertwined‘ 
(Alexander, 1992a, p. 289). 
 
As such, every person is potentially a member of civil society as well as a participant in 
various institutions. Alexander calls this a form of ―dual citizenship‖ (1997b, p. 129). All 
institutions are linked both to personal experience and to the values of other spheres;  
 
Persons can be members of civil society and participants in differentiated social institutions 
at the same time. When people participate in the corporation, the state, the church and the 
family, if they are citizens they do so also as members of a civil society. Because of such 
dual membership, participants in these discrete and more particularistic institutions are 
connected to persons, experiences, norms and sanctions outside of their specific spheres. 
(1997b, p. 129). 
 
Even though groups can be excluded or marginalized from institutions, they may gain 
incorporation and recognition in the public sphere through their potential membership in civil 
society. The institutions and their decisions are informed by a specific set of codes. 
(Alexander & Smith, 1993, p. 161). These symbolic codes provide structured criteria about 
inclusion and exclusion (1992a). Thus, Alexander insists that to understand the structure of 
civil society, it is important to find out the symbolic structure of the applicable codes. In this 




In addition, citizenship theory also gives some insights into the mechanism of how modern 
societies can institutionalize the status of citizen within the societal community. Marshall‘s 
citizenship theory is important in the sense that it shows that the main component of modern 
status systems involves certain equalities rather than inequalities associated with older status 
orders (Lockwood, 1974, p. 364).  
 
Lockwood further elaborated the concepts of citizenship by arguing that citizenship is the 
generalisation of status from an ascriptive form to a universalistic form. According to 
Lockwood (1974), Marshall‘s idea of citizenship made a significant advance in terms of the 
treatment of class conflict and anomic disorder as developed in the writing of Weber and 
Durkheim. Lockwood points out that Marshall succeeded in two senses. First, Marshall shows 
that ―the most distinctive property of modern status system entails certain equalities and the 
development of these citizenship rights forms the historical context in which class relations 
and the other forms of status discrimination have to be located‖ (1974, pp. 364-5). Thus, 
Marshall could illustrate ―how the process of the dissolution and reconstitution of the status 
order is related to changes in economic power and class formation,‖ which Weber could not 
explain (p. 366). Second, as Marshall asserts that ―the source of solidarities is integrated in the 
structure and ideology of citizenship‖, the concept of citizenship gives an answer to the 
Durkheim‘s question: what is the main component of the organic solidarity of modern 
societies (1974, p. 365). For Lockwood, citizenship stresses ―equality of condition‖ and thus 
is situated ―in the direct opposition to class and market forces‖ (Rose, 1996, p. 389).  
 
In this context, Lockwood (1996) tries to get an answer to ―the questions of how inequalities 
of class and status affect the institutionalization of citizenship and thereby its integrative 




At the most abstract level the unity and coherence of market, bureaucratic, and citizenship 
relations is to be found in the manner in which they combine to create a social universe of 
individual actors who are subject to impersonal rules which at the same time legitimate both 
the inequalities in the rewards attaching to (principally occupational) positions and the 
allocation of individuals to these positions. ··· The way in which civil and political 
citizenship equalizes status is complemented by the tendency of bureaucracies also to ‗level‘ 
– by impersonal rule application – those they administer; and the very same principles are 
reproduced in the civil rights defining the formally free and equal status of parties to 
contractual market relations (Lockwood, 1996, pp. 534-5).  
 
He argues further that ―much of the legitimating effect of an equal status of citizenship stems 
from the role of bureaucracies that oversee the inequalities and rewards attaching both to 
occupational positions and to the delivery of citizenship rights, by the application of 
impersonal rules (as through the tax and welfare system)‖ (Morris, 2006, p. 80).  
 
Lockwood suggests two key axes of inequality; the existence, or the lack, of rights, and the 
possession of moral and material resources. Based on these two axes of inequalities, he 
elaborates four main types of ‗civic stratification‘; civic exclusion, civic deficit, civic gain, 
and civic expansion (1996, pp. 536-543). ―Civic gain and deficit refers to the enhanced or 
impaired implementation of rights, civil exclusion refers to the formal denial of rights, while 
expansion may refer to either the expanding claims of particular groups, or the expanding 
terrain of rights more generally‖ (Morris, 2006, p. 81). The different types of stratification are 
classified ―through their different capacities to exercise various rights, their social 
categorization by the rights themselves and by their motivation to extend and enlarge them‖ 




Parsons was himself sympathetic to T. H. Marshall‘s analysis of rights of citizenship. 
However, its later elaboration by Lockwood develops a typology of status inequalities that has 
direct connections with Jeffrey C. Alexander‘s ‗post-Parsonsian‘ account of civil society and, 
especially, his idea of ‗civic repair‘. 
   
1.3.1.2. Multiple spheres, modes of incorporation in civil society 
 
In his later works, Jeffrey C. Alexander has elaborated a more complicated model of civil 
society bounded by non-civil spheres. He recognizes that ―in a plural and differentiated 
society, there will always be multiple and fundamentally different spheres of culture and 
practice – market economies; private families; scientific institutions; minority sexual, racial, 
and ethnic communities‖ (Alexander, 2001, p. 374).  He states that the components of civil 
sphere form contradictory relations with the non-civil domains that surround the civil sphere. 
He calls them boundary relations:  
 
In my model, I call these the ―boundary relations‖ between civil and noncivil spheres, and I 
believe that they have assumed three ideal-typical forms. The activities of noncivil spheres 
can be seen as providing ―facilitating inputs‖ to the civil sphere or as presenting ―destructive 
intrusions‖ into it. In the former case, the existing boundary relations between civil and 
noncivil spheres will be left intact. In the latter case, by contrast, the norms and practices of 
the noncivil sphere will be criticized on the grounds that they endanger the integrity of the 
civil sphere. It is this construction that stimulates the third possible boundary relation, which 
is the actively reconstructive route of ―civil repair.‖ Through communicative, legal, and 
organizational intervention, the offending practices, whether sexism, racism, or economic 
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exploitation, are symbolically polluted and reconstructed to one degree or another 
(Alexander, 2001, p. 375). 
 
As civil societies are often contradictory and fragmented, the possibility of civil repair can be 
created (Alexander, 2006a, p. 7). Jeffrey C. Alexander asserts that divisions within society 
can be reconstructed with the idea of civil solidarity which can be broadened through the 
process of civil repair. According to him, for instance, the civil rights and feminist 
movements are not for the special interests of racial and gender groups but for the 
reconstruction of social solidarity, for its expansion and repair (Alexander, 2006a, p. 7).   
 
1.3.1.3. The relative autonomy of culture: ―Discourse of civil society‖ 
 
As mentioned above, Jeffrey C. Alexander argues that the structure of symbolic codes is 
really significant in constructing ―the very sense of civil society for those who are within and 
without‖ (1992a, p. 290). He suggests that these symbolic codes, which are constructed in the 
ideals of democracy and democratic association, may be characterized as the binary normative 
codes of the sacred and profane. These codes are used to formulate a ―discourse of civil 
society‖, where civil society is composed of actors, relationships between actors, and 
institutions (Alexander & Smith, 1993). In the case of the United States‘ civil society, 
Alexander & Smith classify the codes into democratic code and counter-democratic code; 
while the democratic code consists of the discourse of liberty, the counter-democratic code 
compromises the discourse of repression. Actors can use these codes to divide people into 
inclusion and exclusion, namely those who deserve the right (citizen) and those who do not 
(enemy). As such, the conceptualization of the discourse of civil society in the United States 
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outlines the structure of discourse, based on a classification of democratic versus counter-
democratic codes arranged in binary form (Alexander & Smith, 1993).  
 
Meanwhile, ―civil society membership is defined in terms of certain ‗timeless‘ qualities of 
personal motivation, social relationship, and group organization‖ (Alexander & Jacobs, 1998, 
p. 24). Accordingly, the binary discourse can be postulated at three levels: the social motives, 
social relationships and social institutions (Alexander, 1992a; 2006b; Alexander & Smith, 
1993). As shown in Table 1-1, these three sets of discursive structures are linked together.  
According to Alexander and Smith‘s elaboration (1993, pp. 161-167), the code of liberty 
assumes that democratically minded persons are symbolically constructed as rational, 
reasonable, calm and realistic in their decision making, and are regarded as being inspired by 
conscience and a sense of honour. At the same time, the qualities of a democratic personality 
are shaped as those which allow open, trusting, and straightforward relationships. In contrast, 
anti-democratically minded persons are not only aroused by pathological greed and self-
interest but also they are assumed to tend to make irrational and unrealistic decisions. 
Counter-democratic persons are associated with secretive, conspiratorial dealings in which 
deceit and Machiavellian calculation play an important role.  
 
This discursive structure of motives and civil relationships spreads out to the social, political 
and economical institutions. For instance, if members of the community are irrational in 
motivation and suspicious in their social relationships, they are assumed to create institutions 
that are arbitrary rather than rule governed, that use brute power rather than law, and that 
exercise hierarchy over equality. Such institutions are inclined to be exclusive rather than 
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In the framework, the structured binary codes instruct action and speech in civil society. In 
other words, symbolic actions in civil society rely on the application of the code of liberty. At 
the same time, the codes provide ―the structural categories of pure and impure into which 
every member, of civil society is made to fit‖ (Alexander, 1992a, p. 290). The unique set of 
codes is used to inform the institutions of civil society, and their decision (Alexander & Smith, 
1993, p. 161). Civil society has its own institutions, such as ―parliaments, courts, voluntary 
associations and the media,‖ which supply ―the forum in which crises problems are resolved‖ 
(Alexander & Smith, 1993, p. 161). Thus, the codes in civil society can be noticed most 
distinctly in times of crises when civil society struggles to remove threatening elements.  
 
For instance, according to the case study of the crisis around Watergate, both opponents and 
supporters of Nixon brought out the same symbolic codes to persuade the American public for 
different purposes. During the debates, opponents tried to connect Nixon to the profane and 
counter-democratic part by stressing his motivation: he was irrational, self-directed, and 
greedy, which cannot go with the democratic ideals. Nixon‘s supporters attempted to link him 
to the sacred, democratic elements. They tried to highlight his patriotic motivation and the 
importance of the stability of the president‘s office (Alexander, 1988a; Baiocchi, 2006, p. 
288). 
 
In addition, the symbolic codes tend to be shown clearly in the symbolic practices of the mass 
media. Alexander stresses the importance of the media where the symbolic practice of 
discourse of civil society can be revealed. Following Parsons‘ recognition (1971) that ―civil 
society is a sphere of influence and commitment, mediated through public opinion,‖ he insists 
that the media plays an important role for ―public influence, identity and solidarity‖ 
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(Alexander & Jacobs, 1998, p. 26). Through empirical researches (1988a; 1993; Alexander & 
Jacobs, 1998), he has shown how the media is involved in the construction of common 
identities and universalistic solidarities.  
 
While the precise meaning of civil society is far from settled, one thing is certain: the mass 
media has an extraordinary impact on its forms and functions. While organizational 
structures are essential, the ―currency‖ of civil society is influence and commitment, in the 
form of a symbolically powerful public opinion. Because most theories of civil society focus 
primarily on its boundary relations – its autonomy from the state and economy, and powerful 
regulative institutions, such as law, which draw these boundaries in a sanctioned way – they 
fail to consider how civil society works as a communicative space for the imaginative 
construction and reconstruction of more diffuse, but equally important, collective identities 
and solidarities (Alexander & Jacobs, 1998, p. 23) 
 
As such, he points out that the communicative institutions of civil society are composed in 
part by the mass media. Furthermore, he emphasizes that mass media institutions not only 
respond to opinion but also structure and change it. For instance, he notes that public polls are 
regarded as an instrument by which to measure public opinion in a scientific way, but actually 
public opinion is also constructed by mass media institutions in a palpable way (Alexander, 
2006a, p. 5).  
 
1.3.2. Multicultural understanding of political culture 
 
One way to extend the framework which recognizes civil society as an area of solidarity is to 
consider whether this framework is applicable to the different societies from the American 
civil society which Alexander analyzes. Another way is to investigate how to understand the 
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tension of codes coming from multiple discourses and multiple civil spheres which constitute 
civil society. First, some researches which have investigated the possibility of application of 
Alexander‘s framework to different societies are reviewed. Then, some studies on the 
working of different codes in multiple civil spheres are described.    
 
1.3.2.1. The extension of the framework of ―discourse of civil society‖  
 
As discussed above, Alexander‘s studies on the cultural structure of civil society have 
concentrated on the American society. However, he also recognizes that there are different 
forms of symbolic structures according to other nations and traditions (Alexander, 1992a; 
Baiocchi, 2006, p. 289).  
 
Many different historical movements contributed to the emergence of democratic discourse 
and practice and that, indeed, each is responsible for the particular emphasis, constructions, 
and metaphors that make every national and even regional configuration of democracy 
unique (Alexander, 1992a, p. 301). 
 
He also states that the symbolic structure from different nations can generate ―the historical 
residue of diverse movements in social, intellectual, and religious life‖ (Alexander, 1992a, p. 
291). However, although Alexander clearly indicates the diversity of national backgrounds 
and the different symbolic structure‘s effect on the various movements, the most important is 
the generalized symbolic system: 
 
The cultural implications of these variegated movements have been drawn into a highly 
generalized symbolic system that divides civic virtue from civic vice in a remarkably stable 
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and consistent way. It is for this reason that, despite divergent historical roots and variations 
in national elaborations, the language that forms the cultural core of civil society can be 
isolated as a general structure and studied as a relatively autonomous symbolic form 
(Alexander, 1992a, p. 291). 
 
It may be illuminating to examine the possibility that the framework of the ―discourse of civil 
society‖ is applicable in different historical backgrounds in two ways; first, by investigating 
how different political situations or events can be understood with the same logic of 
democracy, second, by clarifying whether political changes in different countries with 
different historical tradition can be explained in the tradition of codes. 
 
Philip Smith‘s researches about war (1991) and fascist and communist societies (1998) are 
good illustrations of how the framework of discourse of civil society can be extended in a 
different political situation. In the study on war, he illustrates that war which seems very 
instrumental is also a ritual process at the cultural level. In this regard, he tries to demonstrate 
how culture operates in specific, concrete historical sequences
6
. Smith explains that in the 
case of the Falklands War, the demand for this cluster of values which could correspond to a 
―civil religion‖ made the war possible. Specifically, he interprets that British society 
recognized the invasion of the Falklands as a threat to certain key values of society rather than 
a threat to economic and geographic interests (Smith, 1991, p. 114). Furthermore, he finds a 
similarity between the codes which the rhetoric used in 1982 and those deployed in the 
Second World War. As a result, he concludes that ―whatever its origins, it would appear not 
only that the Falklands rhetoric is founded upon cultural structures with a long tradition, but 
also that it provides strong evidence of a continuing trend of secularization, rationalization, 
                                                 
6
 Even though he stresses the importance of cultural structure to develop a theory of war, he designates that this 
is for compensation of the economic and political explanation of war.  
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and generalization in the content of wartime ideologies in Britain (Smith, 1991, p. 128).‖ As 
such, to specify the war as ritual in concrete historical sequences, he uses an analogically 
organized code which defines sacred and profane elements (Smith, 1991, p. 132).  
 
While the above research about war aims to explain how seemingly rational incidents like war 
can be understood by the cultural dimension, the subsequent research comparing the discourse 
of Fascism, Communism, and Democracy attempts to demonstrate how much civil society 
discourse in democratic society is similar to the dichotomous cultural structures of the fascist 
and communist movements (Smith, 1998). He shows that a similar civil society discourse can 
be used for all three political systems, despite some semiotic inversions in communist codes 
and fascist codes and a slightly different emphasis in some binary pairs (Smith, 1998, p. 119).  
 
Second, many studies in this tradition have elaborated the forms of discourse by exploring 
how the framework of discourse of civil society is applicable to different nations with 
different traditions and political situations. A symbolic framework relating to the discourse of 
civil society has been used as a tool to understand how the transition to democracy can be 
successful. A study by Edles (1995), for example, analyzes the Spanish transition to 
democracy and finds that its success was accomplished by the fact that a democratic, 
symbolic framework not only came to emerge but was also sustained during the Spanish 
transition. He explains that Spanish elites worked to ritualize the shared symbolic framework 
in which civil war was symbolically evil opposed to sacred democracy and national 
reconciliation. He notes that the newly emerging Spanish press also tried to educate people in 
a democratic way and as a result the symbolic framework of democracy and reconciliation 




Baiocchi‘s research (2006) about Brazil‘s transition to democracy is another case which 
explains political crises in civil society within the ―civil religion‖ tradition. Baiocchi shows 
the usefulness of the codes approach by two case studies of national crises and debate in 
Brazil during its transition to democracy. In the national debate on crime and violence of the 
late 1970s before transition to democracy, he shows that the non-individualist corporate code 
was dominant in Brazil. However, he finds that the dominant discourse became based on the 
liberal code in a later national debate on corruption in 1990s (Baiocchi, 2006, pp. 305-6).  
 
From the East Asian context, Ku (2001) argues that the cultural dimension can help to explain 
the democratic struggles from the vantage point of the public sphere in the case study of a 
credibility crisis in Hong Kong, which she called a capitalist, yet under-democratic (or 
partially democratic) non-Western society. In this study, she proposes that ―the ‗public‘ would 
constitute a meeting point for the discourse of community and the discourse of democracy, 
discourses which the hegemonic groups and the challenging forces could draw upon and 
rearticulate in political struggle (2001, p. 123).‖   
 
1.3.2.2. Tension of codes from multiple discourses and multiple civil spheres  
 
Some research has investigated multiple discourses and multiple codes within civil society. 
Alexander (2001) suggests that multiple and different spheres of cultures and practices would 
exist in a plural and differentiated society. He also refers to ―market economies, private 
families, scientific institutions, minority sexual, racial, and ethnic communities (2001, p. 374)‖ 
as different public spheres. Many studies (Baiocchi, 2006; Jacobs, 1996; 1998; Ku, 2000; 
2001; Rabinovitch, 2001; Swidler, 1986) have elaborated on the framework of ―discourse of 
civil society‖ to find out the multiple discourses and multiple public spheres which constitute 
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civil society. They can be categorized into two groups. One group has tried to explain the 
possibility of different civil spheres in a specific society. The other has attempted to show the 
tension of codes from the multiple discourses. 
 
Regarding the first group, Ronald Jacobs (1996a; 1998) shows the racial discourse of civil 
society. He makes a significant contribution to the theory by demonstrating how the 
dichotomizing semiotic structure of civil society enables it to accept a racialised form. In the 
study of the Rodney King crisis and its interpretation by the Los Angeles Times and Los 
Angeles Sentinel, he (1996a) presents how the cultural construction of social problems in civil 
society appear in multiple media which are connected with different communities of discourse. 
At the same time, he shows that both meaning and outcomes of the crisis are determined by 
the interaction between events and their narrative understandings. In a later study (Jacobs, 
1998), he analyzes the principle African-American and white majority newspapers in Los 
Angeles during the civil disturbances in the city‘s south central area during 1960s and 1990s. 
In this way, he proposes that the binary form of democratic and antidemocratic discourse 
provide a model which can explain the dynamics of the severe struggle for hegemony and 
legitimation that was secured between police, politicians, community groups, and 
communicative institutions during the crisis periods (Alexander, 1998b, p. 15). Through these 
researches, he demonstrates that ―the history of racial exclusion and its narrative employment 
into the multiple public spheres of civil society, combined with the continued demand of 
excluded groups for the inclusion promised to them by the utopian discourse of civil society, 
creates a ‗racial discourse of civil society‘ (Jacobs, 1998, p. 157).‖ In this way, he contributes 




As for the second group, some studies have shown the tension of codes from the multiple 
discourses. Rabinovitch (2001), for example, shows that a discourse of compassion or 
affection was the main symbolic structure in the female-led, maternally themed social 
movements of nineteenth century America. He suggests that a discourse of affection and 
compassion plays the same role as ―the discourse of civil society‖ for women in the 
nineteenth century to gain a systemic integration into American public sphere. Furthermore, it 
is suggested that these two universal discourses may remain incompatible and the tensions 
between the discourse of liberty and that of affection are intrinsic and systemic (Rabinovitch, 
2001, p. 367).  
 
These tensions between different codes might be obvious in less developed civil societies, 
particularly during the political transition period. As Swidler (1986) asserts, although in the 
settled period, culture seems to shape action only in that the cultural repertoire limits the 
accessible range of strategies of action, in the unsettled period, not only is cultural meaning 
more highly articulated and explicit but also belief and ritual practice directly build action for 
the community that attach to a given ideology  (p. 284). In the case study of before and after 
political transition to democracy in Brazil, Baiocchi (2006) demonstrates that there are two 
groups of actors: some are those who support ―the code of liberty and its valuation of the 
freestanding citizen‖ and others are those who defend ―the corporate code and its valuation of 
the collectivity over the individual‖ (p. 285). He documents that in political crises, actors try 
to draw upon two different but interrelated codes and at the same time, they attempt to 
establish one or another as dominant. Furthermore, he finds out that while the liberal code has 
been more powerful in public voices since the 1990s, namely the period of transition to 
democracy, corporate codes have not disappeared and remain as an influential residual legacy 
(Baiocchi, 2006, p. 306). Ku (2000; 2001) also proposes a case of civil sphere in which two 
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sets of discourses exist in the studies of post-colonial Hong Kong. She describes that there are 
two sets of discourses, namely discourse of community and that of democracy, which are 
analytically distinct but overlap with each other in empirical situations (Ku, 2000, p. 234; 
2001, p. 123). On the basis of this point of view, she (2001) explains the transition of Hong 
Kong as competing and changing interpretations of the public by offering specification of two 
analytically distinct codes of discourse.  
 
In summary, from the above studies, the following implications can be drawn: 1) the tension 
among different codes may be more apparent in less established civil society 2) in political 
crises, the different codes in civil society may be competing 3) less-effective codes may not 
disappear and remain within civil society where they continue to have some influence.     
 
1.4. Networked societal community: Manual Castells 
 
How is civil society changing in the post-industrial or information age? Through major works 
from the late 1990s, Manuel Castells has made significant contributions to the understanding 
of the changes associated with the coming of the Information Age: his three volumes -The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture - The Rise of the Network Society (1996), 
The Power of identity (2004c) and End of Millennium (1998) – cover all issues concerning 
changes in the Information Age. In his later work The Internet Galaxy (2001), in addition, he 
demonstrates how the Internet, which he called ―a technology of communication (p. 5)‖, 
contributes to the changes of our society and what we can do by transforming the Internet
7
. 
                                                 
7
 Castells maintains that not only does ―the Internet transform the way in which we communicate‖ and ―our lives 
are deeply affected by this new communication technology‖, but also ―by doing many things with the Internet, 
we transform the Internet itself (2001, p. 5).‖  
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Through all these works, he provides an important conceptual framework to understand the 
Information Age.  
 
According to his analysis on the characteristics of civil society in the information age, the new 
type of society brought by the rapid development of information technology can be 
understood as a networked societal community. The characteristics of networked society in 
the information age can be identified within the idea of societal community. For example, 
Parsons‘ assertion that ―the prototype of an association is the societal community itself, 
considered as a corporate body of the citizens holding primarily consensual relations to its 
normative order‖ (1971, p. 24) is still valid in the networked society as described by Castells. 
Castells asserts that in the network society, the new type of communication is marked by its 
inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of all cultural expressions (1996, p. 374) and the 
development of the Internet has a significant role in the expansion of networked individualism 
as the dominant form of sociability (2001, pp. 130-1). In addition, persons in the network 
have dual membership of different institutions, which, as Alexander points out, implies that 
―persons can be members of civil society and participants in differentiated social institutions 
at the same time‖ (1997, p. 129). Thus, Castells‘ network society would be another name for 
the societal community in an information society. In the information age, the development of 
networked modernity can be recognized by the establishment of networked societal 
community located in the system of the information society. 
 
In this regard, to recognize the features of networked societal community, Castells‘ theory of 
the network society and the Internet as the material support for the networked individualism 
needs to be discussed. In addition, the new social movements in the Information Age that 




1.4.1. The network society and the Internet as the material support for 
networked individualism 
 
Castells‘ viewpoint about change of recent society is well represented in his following 
description. 
 
We are indeed living in a period of historical transformation. In my analysis, this process 
involves the interaction of three features that, though distinct, are related to each other. The 
first is the revolution in information technology that started in the 1970s and then expanded 
all over the world. The second is the process of globalisation, which incidentally is not only 
economic. There has also been globalisation of the media, as well as cultural and political 
globalisation, etc.  The third feature is the emergence of a new form of organization that I 
call networking. This is not just any kind of networking, but the specific kind of power 
networking that works through information technology. This power networking is changing 
the way we perceive, organise, manage, produce, consume, fight and counter-fight – 
embracing practically all dimensions of social life. The interaction between the revolution in 
information technology, the process of globalization, and the emergence of networking as 
the predominant social form of organisation constitutes a new social structure: the network 
society (Castells, 2002, p. 548). 
 
He suggests three driving forces behind the network society as a new social structure; the 
development of information technology, the globalization which is processing in economic, 




In particular, from his early work, he stresses the importance of the network around which the 
dominant functions and processes in the Information Age are organized. He asserts that 
―networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of 
networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of 
production, experience, power, and culture‖ (1996, p. 469). He defines a network as ―a set of 
interconnected nodes‖. Accordingly, the distance between social positions in a network is 
shorter than those which are not part of the network (p. 470). Furthermore, the characteristics 
of networks, such as open structures, limitless expandability and adaptability, tend to promote 
the dynamics, the openness and the innovations of a network-based society (p. 470). 
 
Also, Castells stresses the importance of the relationship between network and culture. He 
insists that the processes of social transformation which are emerging in the network society 
affect culture and power by going beyond the relationship of production. Moreover, he 
suggests that technologies transform culture through change in the mode of communication.  
 
Cultural expressions are abstracted from history and geography, and become predominantly 
mediated by electronic communication networks that interact with the audience and by the 
audience in a diversity of codes and values, ultimately subsumed in a digitized, audiovisual 
hypertext (Castells, 1996, p. 476). 
 
He explains that the new system of communication, which is based in the digitized, 
networked integration of multiple communication modes, is marked by its inclusiveness and 
comprehensiveness of all cultural expressions (1996, p. 374). Along this line, he asserts that 
―the inclusion of most cultural expressions within the integrated communication system based 
in digitized electronic production, distribution, and exchange of signals, has major 
consequences for social forms and processes‖ (p. 374). For example, the inclusion of cultural 
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expressions within the communication system reduces the symbolic power of traditional 
senders. At the same time, as the new communication system changes the meaning of space 
and time, ―the space of flows and timeless time become the material foundations of a new 
culture that transcends and includes the diversity of historically transmitted systems of 
representation‖ (pp. 374-5). In summary, he explains that the main factor of social 
organization is information and social structure is established on the basis of flows of 
messages and images between networks, namely symbolic communication. As such, the 
Information Age is distinguished by the autonomy of culture (pp. 477-8). 
 
In terms of social relationships, Castells (2001) emphasizes the rise of individualism
8
 as the 
major trend in societies; ‗new pattern of sociability in our societies is characterized by 
networked individualism‘ (p. 129). In other words, he maintains that social relationships are 
centred on individuals. He explains that this individualized relationship to society is caused by 
the individualisation of the relationship between capital and labour, the crisis of 
patriarchalism, the new patterns of urbanization, the crisis of political legitimacy and the 
Internet. In particular, he insists that the development of the Internet has a significant role in 
the expansion of networked individualism as the dominant form of sociability (2001, pp. 130-
1). In other words, the networked individualism emerges as ―the synthesis between the 
affirmation of an individual-centred culture, and the need and desire for sharing and co-
experiencing‖ (2004b, p.223). He explains that on-line social interaction not only increasingly 
takes part in social organization but also the development of a communication hybrid cause 
both physical place and cyber place to function as the material support of networked 
individualism (2001, p. 131). The online networks become the forms of social interactions (p. 
                                                 
8
 He also explains the cultural point of the individualism emerging in our society as follows: ‗it is cultural in the 
sense of material culture; that is, a system of values and beliefs informing behaviour that is rooted in the material 
conditions of work and livelihood in our societies‘ (Castells, 2001, p. 129). 
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132). In summary, Castells points out that ‗individuals are in fact reconstructing the pattern of 
social interaction, with the help of new technological affordances, to create a new form of 
society: the network society‘ (p. 133).  
 
1.4.2. Social movements in the Information Age 
 
In the second volume of his trilogy, The Information Age ([1997] 2004), Castells investigates 
―the contradictory relationship between a new global social structure – network society – and 
resistance to the forms of domination implicit in this social structure‖ (2004c, p. xv). The 
main focus is placed on the social movements, which he (2004c) defines as ―purposive 
collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and 
institutions of society‖ (p. 3) and ―which provide people with central elements of their identity‖ 
(Webster, 2006, p. 109). In other words, he explores the question of how identities can be 
formed when traditions are threatened by the globalising trend of the network society 
(Webster, 2006, p. 109). He addresses, for instance, that while the social movements are very 
different and have diverse social and cultural bases, ―they all challenge current processes of 
globalization, on behalf of their constructed identities, in some instances claiming to represent 
the interests of their country, or of the humankind as well‖ (2004c, p. 166).  
 
He shows that globalization is a big challenge to the nation-state. ―The more the states 
emphasize communalism, the less effective they become as co-agents in the global system of 
shared power. The more they triumph on a planetary scene, the less they represent their 




After a decade of development of a new, global economy and of the decline of the nation-
state in its transitions to institutions of global governance, societies around the world have 
claimed their right to assert control over the emerging institutions. What started as resistance, 
based on identity, and preservation of the economic status quo, evolved into a multiplicity of 
projects, in which cultural identity, economic interests, and political strategies have 
combined in an increasingly complex pattern: the canvas of social movements in the 
networked society. ··· the transformation of this rejection into the reconstruction of new 
forms of social control over new forms of capitalism, globalized and informationalized, 
requires the processing of social movements‘ demands by the political system and the 
institutions of the state. The ability, or inability, of the state to cope with the conflicting 
logics of global capitalism, identity-based social movements, defensive movements of 
workers and consumers, and alternative projects of globalization, will largely condition the 
society of the twenty-first century (Castells, 2004c, pp. 166-7). 
 
―The nation-state not only loses its ability to integrate its own constituency, but also the 
policy process disappears into an increasingly abstract arena of international organizations‖ 
(Stalder, 1998, p. 305). It indicates that globalization potentially causes a crisis for political 
liberal democracy. The traditional institutions of democracy are captured in a fundamental 
contradiction (Stalder, 1998, p. 305).  
 
In this globalizing situation, Castells (2004c, p. 163) suggests that cultural communes as 
collective identities play an important role: ―for those social actors excluded from or resisting 
the individualization of identity attached to life in the global networks of power and wealth, 
cultural communes of religious, national, or territorial foundation seem to provide the main 
alternative for the construction of meaning in our society‖. He shows, for example, that 
feminist and sexual identity movements cause a decrease of patriarchy which is ―a founding 
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structure of all contemporary society‖ (p. 192) and challenge heterosexuality as a hegemonic 
norm. Furthermore he maintains that the process of transformation of personality resulted 
from the change of family structure and of sexual norms represents ―how the interaction 
between structural change and social movements transforms us‖ (p. 196). As Stalder (2006) 
explains, for Castells, the revival of social movements not only transform culture, in the sense 
of codes of behaviour and embedded values, but also helps to ‗figure out‘ the network society 
by developing new social values and institutions as self-defined interpretations of overall 
social development (p. 201). 
 
Regarding social movements which have emerged in the Information Age, Castells points out 
their three main features (2001, pp. 140-3). First, social movements in the Information Age 
are organized around cultural values. Second, ―social movement in the Information Age have 
to fill the gap left by the crisis of vertically integrated organizations inherited from the 
industrial era‖ (p. 140). While the role of mass political parties, trade unions and formal civic 
associations are waning, the emotional movement triggered by media or a major crisis and the 
Internet‘s role as the essential medium of expression and organization are likely to be 
important. The reason is that ―these are movements to seize the power of the mind, not state 
power‖ (p. 141). Third, social movements tend to be globalized. The need for constructing 
global coalitions and dependence upon global information networks causes the movements to 
rely on the Internet (p. 143). 
 
As such, Castells (2001) recognizes the Internet as a vehicle that fits with the basic features of 
these kinds of social movements. In other words, in the sense that the Internet is not only a 
communication medium like the pubs but also a network like the factory (2001, p. 139), he 
maintains that the Internet is an important component of social movements emerging in the 
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network society. Furthermore, he suggests that the internet is a good tool to strengthen 
democracy. As the Internet provides a horizontal, non-controlled, cheap communication 
channel, people, such as journalists, political activists and so on, are able to use the Internet as 
a medium to spread political information and rumours and possibly to deepen the crisis of 
political legitimacy by supplying a place for the politics of scandal. Furthermore, the Internet 
can transform the political dimension of people‘s lives. Castells suggests, for example, that 
the Internet is able to contribute to democratisation because it can provide a public agora to 




The above discussion shows i) Parsons conceptualizes societal community as a distinctive 
component of modernity, ii) T. H. Marshall‘s citizenship model provides one of bases of 
Parsons‘ societal community in terms of analysing the sufficient foundations of solidarity and 
iii) Castells‘ network society gives a significant insight to understanding post-industrial 
society within the idea of societal community, suggesting networked society community. 
 
Parsons, influenced by Durkheim and Weber, tried to synthesize classical sociology within 
the idea of modernity. He attempted to show how a differentiated society can be successfully 
integrated and all subsystems of the society play their functional part in the system of 
modernity. Furthermore, he tried to synthesize the normative claims of tradition with those of 
modernity. For Parsons, the development of modernity can be recognized by the 
establishment of a societal community located in the system of modern society. He 
maintained that the societal community, which is differentiated from the economy, the polity, 
and the cultural sphere, is the integrative subsystem of society. In addition, the integration of 
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differential social systems is accomplished by institutionalizing cultural values as norms that 
are socially accepted and applied. Thus, the societal community can be regarded as a 
distinctive component of the system of modernity. The establishment of the system of modern 
society brings out the mature modernity. This mature modernity has been seen in post-
industrial and information society as well as in the industrial society. In the information age, 
the societal community can be understood as a network and mature modernity can also be 
recognized as networked modernity.  
 
On the basis of Parsons‘ societal community, Alexander introduces the conception of social 
solidarity to a civil society approach. He (1998a) asserts that members of civil society are not 
only independent and individually responsible for their actions but also are constrained by 
collective solidarity. Thus, every person is a member of civil society as well as a participant in 
various institutions, which is a form of ‗dual citizenship‘. Furthermore, Alexander asserts that 
the division of society can be reconstructed with the idea of civil solidarity which can be 
broadened through the process of civil repair. Through discussions on civil society as a sphere 
of solidarity, he suggests that the structure of civil society depends upon a cultural structure. 
Hence, for Alexander, the starting point to understand the structure of civil society is to find 
out the symbolic structure of codes. It leads to the framework where members of civil society 
participate in binary discourses of good and evil, which gives them a feeling of membership. 
 
Following this sociological tradition, many studies in the late-Durkheimian perspectives have 
elaborated the relationship between political culture and civil society in the tradition of codes. 
Broadly speaking, they have developed the framework to explain different societies with 
various historical backgrounds in two ways. On the one hand, with a single code, namely 
democracy, they have investigated how different political situations or events can be 
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understood. In addition, they have attempted to clarify whether political changes in different 
countries with different historical traditions can be explained. On the other hand, multiple 
codes and multiple discourses in civil society have been studied. These researches have 
explored not only the possibility of multiple discourses and multiple spheres but also the 
tensions of codes from multiple discourses. According to above studies, the following 
implications can be drawn: the tension of different codes is more apparent in less established 
civil society; in political crises, the different codes in civil society are competing and trying to 
get superior position; less-effective codes do not disappear and remain inside of civil society.  
    
In addition, Castells‘ theory of network society gives significant insight to understanding 
post-industrial society within the idea of societal community. Castells asserts that in the 
network society, individuals are reconstructing the pattern of social interaction with the help 
of new technologies. Also, the Internet is used as a medium to spread political information 
and rumours and possibly to deepen the crisis of political legitimacy. As such, the Internet can 
transform the political dimension of people‘s lives by contributing to democratisation. In the 
information age, the development of networked modernity can be recognized by the 
establishment of networked societal community located in the system of information society: 
the network society which was caused by the development of information technology, the 
globalization and the emergence of power networking.  
 
In conclusion, it can be suggested that the theme of civil society based on solidarity can be a 
useful tool not only to understand various types of society in terms of different political 
traditions, but also newly emerging information societies. Hence, the above discussion 
provides significant insight into South Korean civil society which is quite newly democratized 

















South Korea has experienced dramatic changes since the Second World War in terms of 
economic development through industrialisation, the success of democratisation, and the 
development of information technology. From 1945 to now, in the economic aspect, South 
Korean society has transformed not only from an agricultural society to an industrial society 
and then to an information society but also in the political aspect, from authoritarian 
governments associated with the military dictatorship to civilian governments as a result of 
the success of democratisation.  
 
A good starting point for the understanding of the above transformation of South Korea may 
be a brief sketch of Korea‘s history since 1945. For convenience, the post Second World War 
period can be divided into three parts according to the significant events in both economic and 
political aspects: the pre-industrialisation period (1945-1960), industrialisation and 
authoritarian regime period (1961-1986) and democratisation and informatization period 
(1987-2007).  
 
The distinctive features of the pre-industrialisation period (1945-1960) are liberation (1945), 
division (1948) and the Korean War (1950). After the Second World War, Korea was 
liberated from Japanese colonial rule with the collapse of Japanese imperialism. After 
liberation, Korea was divided into the Capitalist South and the Communist North by the 
occupation of Soviet and U.S. troops. Under the cold-war world system, Korea experienced 
the disastrous Korean War in 1950. These series of events produced influential anti-
communism, underdevelopment and poverty, and a strong military group with political 




The second period can be characterized by the military coup (1961), government-driven 
industrialisation (1962-1986), the assassination of the president and the military coup (1979). 
After the Korean War, the April 19 Student Uprising in 1960 against the authoritarian 
dictatorship caused the Syngman Rhee government (the First Republic) to fall. However, the 
May 16 military coup in 1961 and the military coup after the assassination of Park Chung Hee 
resulted in military dictatorship from 1961 to 1987. During the period of authoritarian regimes, 
export-led industrialisation strategies were adopted to establish the legitimacy of regime and 
were used as a political excuse for the postponement of democracy and suppression of civil 
society.  
 
The characteristics of the last period can be summarized as the democratic movement (1987), 
the financial crisis (1997), and power transfer to a democratic reforming force (1997). The 
strong demands for direct presidential elections against the military regime spiked a huge 
democratic movement in 1987. With the trend of globalization, the reform to remove 
authoritarian legacies of military regimes was implemented by Kim Young-sam, the first 
civilian president after military regimes. At the same time, informatization was emphasized to 
improve national competitiveness in the globalization era. Furthermore, in 1997, the Asian 
financial crisis and the first transfer of power from the ruling party to the opposition party 
provided a new turning point to implement social and economic reforms, such as in labour 
sector and in conglomerates (chaebol), and to put high priority on informatization as a new 
engine of economic growth.   
 
These changes connote the possibility of coexistence and conflict between authoritarian social 
values based on economic development and anti-communism and the values of democracy. 
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This conflict has been revealed in the controversies over various social issues and policies 
which have arisen during the last two decades. In this context, it can be suggested that the 
controversies over the information-related polices reflect conflicts between the industrial 
values and the democratic values.  
 
Because this study aims to investigate information-related polices, the main focus is on the 
period from 1987. However, to understand the full picture of the origins of the conflicts 
between the different forces and the values of civil society in South Korea requires 
understanding of the industrial period ruled by the military dictatorship. Consequently, this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 will summarize the change of politics in South 
Korea according to regime change since 1945 and will identify the characteristics of the 
regimes. At the same time, the response of civil society to the change of politics will be 
described. In section 3, the changes of political structure, economic structure and government 
policies will be presented. Section 4 will explain the interactions between informatization and 
civil society and discuss how to see the information-related policies.  
 
2.2. Politics in South Korea in the post-war period 
 
2.2.1. The historical change of Korean governments  
 
Japan‘s defeat in the Second World War brought to Korea independence from the Japanese 
colonial regime (1910-1945). However, the cold-war world system did not allow the Korean 
people to establish an independent political system after liberation.  Korea was occupied by 
Soviet Union and U.S. troops and divided along the thirty-eighth parallel as a part of U.S.‘s 
post-war global strategy (Lowe, 1997, pp. 18-20; Cumings, 1983, pp. 11-16; Paul, 1983; Hart-
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Landsberg, 1998, pp. 90-111). Jang-Jip Choi maintains that ―By creating a separate regime in 
the South (the First Republic, 1948), the U.S. military government privileged the 
establishment of a capitalist market economy and an anti-Communist state over the 
establishment of a democratic political order‖ (1993, pp. 14-19). With the support of the U.S., 
the First Republic, the Syngman Rhee government, was established in 1948 in South Korea 
(Matray, 1985, pp. 135-150; Hart-Landsberg, 1998, pp. 81-87). 
 
The most extreme case of confrontation in the cold war with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 
Korea was the Korean War (1950-1953). Its legacy was huge. Most of all, apart from the 
heavily damaged economy, anti-communism permeated the South Korean psyche through the 
experience of the Korean War and it became a significant tool for the authoritarian 
governments to legitimize their ruling.  
 
The president of the First Republic, Syngman Rhee‘s scheme to prolong his rule through a 
fraudulent election made him resign the presidency as a result of the April 19 Student 
Uprising in 1960. The Second Republic (the Chang Myŏn government) which was established 
in April 1960 after the student uprising was unable to reconcile the conflicting demands from 
the Left and the Right (Haggard & Moon, 1993, pp. 64-65). The Second Republic was 
subverted by the May 16 military coup in 1961 led by Park Chung Hee. 
 
After the power seizure of Park, repressive rule lasted for a quarter of a century in South 
Korea. During that period, government-led industrialisation could progress rapidly while 
democracy was delayed. The authoritarian government, which had its foundation in the 
division of the Korean peninsula, strongly promoted economic development. It was based on, 
what I shall call, the ‗development ideology‘ that economic growth had to be achieved first, 
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rather than democracy. During the Park Chung Hee government, which was a strong 
authoritarian regime, the dictator tried to extend his presidency through the revision of the 
constitution and illegal campaigning, as well as oppressing people who opposed his policies. 
Due to this political condition, even though the dictatorial government succeeded to 
accomplish the economic development, there were constant pressures and conflicts which led 
to a strong demand for democracy in South Korean civil society.  
 
The assassination of Park Jung Hee (26 October 1979) gave Korean society a period of 
political liberation, but the chance of democratisation disappeared with another military coup 
led by Chun Doo Whan (12 December 1979).  The strong political confrontation between 
people who wished democratisation and the military regime was maintained during the Chun 
Doo Whan regime. Even though the Gwangju Democratisation Movement to reject the 
military rule resulted in massacre, the Chun Doo Whan regime suffered from weak legitimacy  
(Choi, 1993, pp. 35-36). From the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, the worker-student 
alliance (Roh-hak yŏndae) became a powerful force for challenging the regime. In this context, 
student activists began to move into the factories to set up connections with the labour 
movement. Furthermore, as Hagen Koo (2002, p. 40) maintains, economic development was 
one of causes of the growth of civil society as the wealth which was accumulated with the 
rapid industrialisation resulted in the expansion of middle class. This middle class gave an 
impetus for a mass campaign in 1987 to revise the constitution.  
 
During the massive anti-government street protests, the death of a student after police torture 
and Chun‘s public declaration of opposition to the constitutional amendment caused middle 
class opinion to turn drastically against the regime (Choi, 1993, pp. 37-8). It was the big 
democratic movement in June 1987 that provided momentum for the breakdown of the long-
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lasting authoritarian regime. Significant protests were held by students, a large number of 
white-collar workers and other citizens. Particularly, because an alliance of students, the 
opposition party and citizens demanded direct presidential voting, the military became 
divided and yielded to their demand in June 29
th 
(Im H-B., 1994). As Sunhyuk Kim (1997, p. 
1136) suggests, ―most civil society groups regarded the June 29th announcement as a 
surrender statement from the ruling regime, a symbol of their long overdue victory.‖ 
Subsequently, two elections—the December 1987 presidential elections and the April 1988 
National Assembly elections— were conducted.  
 
Despite the success of the democratic movement, however, the result of the presidential 
election was the success of Roh Tae-woo, Chun‘s chosen successor and former General, who 
was a presidential candidate of the Minjeong party (Democratic Justice Party), which was the 
ruling party of the military government. The biggest reason was the split up of the democratic 
forces. As the two major opposition figures, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, ran for 
election, the opposition vote was divided and Roh Tae-woo could win the presidency with 
less than 37 percent of vote: the two Kims together received 54 percent of the vote with 27.5 
percent for Kim Young-sam and 26.5 percent for Kim Dae-jung.  
 
Although Roh Tae-woo was elected as president and inaugurated in February 1988, Roh‘s 
regime struggled against strong opposition and did not attain strong ruling power. Civil 
society groups continued their anti-government movement and in the National Assembly 
elections held in April 1988, Roh‘s ruling Democratic Justice Party took 125 seats, whereas 
the three major opposition parties won a total of 165
9
. The anti-government struggle of civil 
                                                 
9
 The formation of a political configuration called yŏso-yadae (a small government party-large opposition party, 
or more commonly, a minority government) (Kim S. , 1997, p. 1137). The yŏso yadae composition of the 
Assembly in 1988 was: ruling Democratic Justice Party, 125 seats; Kim Dae-jung‘s Party for Peace and 
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society in this period had two big agendas. One was that civil society could not accept Roh 
Tae-woo as a leader of democratic government because he was the person who was the 
greatest beneficiary of the past authoritarian regime as a close friend of Chun Doo Whan and 
an official successor of Chun. The other was the breakdown of unity between Kim Young-
sam and Kim Dae-jung who were the most powerful leaders of the opposition Reunification 
Democratic Party. As mentioned before, the failure to present a single candidate in the 
presidential elections of December 1987 enabled Roh to win the president election and liberal 
forces in civil society were disappointed at the political settlement and prepared to confront 
both state and political society (Kim S. , 1997, pp. 1138-9).  
 
In early 1990, the weakness of Roh‘s regime led to the political merger of Roh‘s Democratic 
Justice Party with two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party led by Kim 
Young-sam and the New Democratic Republican Party led by Kim Jong Pil (Kim S. , 1997, p. 
1140; Choi, 1995, pp. 187-99).   
 
At the presidential election of December 1992, Kim Young-sam was elected as the first 
civilian president after 30 years military governments. However, Kim‘s success was based on 
the merger of political parties supported by authoritarian military forces and by one 
democratic party excluding the other democratic party. Thus, he only attained the presidency 
through the form of political defection, leaving the opposition and joining the ruling party. 
However, the regime had historical significance in that it was the first civilian government. At 
the early stage of the government, strong political and socioeconomic reforms
10
, the so called 
―New Korea‖ reform programmes, were implemented in 1993-94. Most civil society groups 
                                                                                                                                                        
Democracy, 71 seats; Kim Young-sam‘s Reunification Democratic Party, 59 seats; and Kim Jong Pil‘s 
Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 35 seats (out of a total 299). 
10
 To get more details of the reforms see Cha (1993). 
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suspected the government would not bring real democracy because it originated in 
collaboration with the authoritarian forces. However, the reforms to remove authoritarian 
legacies of past regimes were pursued under the name of making the government ―gentle and 
clean‖. Not only were corrupt practices of past authoritarian regimes dismantled, but also the 
previous two presidents, Chun Doo Whan and Roh Tae-woo were arrested for corruption. As 
a result, at the early stage, Kim Young-sam government gave new hope to South Korean 
people.   
 
However, the government did not purge corruption from its ranks and a son of Kim Young-
sam was involved in corruption and arrested. Furthermore, in the year 1997, South Korea 
experienced an exchange crisis and the International Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF) agreed 
to provide a $57 billion loan to South Korea (Kim S. , 2007, p. 62). The IMF bailout and the 
corruption of inner circles made Kim Young-sam one of the most unpopular presidents in 
South Korean history. As the financial crisis was due to the problem of economic policies 
implemented by authoritarian regimes which can be summarized as developmentalism, Kim 
Dae-jung, who stood for the democratisation force, could win the presidency against the 
conservative force which represented the industrialisation force at the presidential election at 
the end of 1997.  
 
It was only in 1997 – 10 years after the beginning of the transition to democracy – then, that 
Korea achieved its first transfer of power between the ruling and opposition parties. Although 
it was achieved through a coalition with the other conservative party, Kim Dae-jung became 
the first president elected from the opposition party in the history of the Republic. It was a 
significant turning point because Kim Dae-jung had been regarded as one of the most 




During the period of the Kim Dae-jung government, the conflict between the conservative 
forces which represented the industrialisation interests and the liberal reform forces which 
stood for democratisation deepened. One of the reasons was that the power of the 
conservative force did not disappear and maintained power in the National Assembly based 
on regionalism. The conservative force used a strategy of opposition to most of the 
government‘s policies to neutralize the power of the presidency. Thus, contentious politics, so 
called ‗the politic of confrontation‘, were structured into the political situation.  
 
Despite the political difficulty, however, during the period of the Kim Dae-jung government, 
many systems were introduced to guarantee the rights of labour, civil rights and to improve 
the relationship with North Korea. The historic summit meeting between President Kim Dae-
jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il in June 2000 promoted many projects between the South and 
the North. It could be interpreted as meaningful progress in that Korean society not only could 
escape the danger of war but also might overcome the strong sentiments of anti-communism.  
 
Meanwhile, to recover from the economic crisis the government promoted the development of 
information technology. In other words, the growth of information communication industry 
and fast diffusion of communication network was achieved by the strong support of 
government.  
 
During the presidential election in December 2002, Korean society had experienced the 
severe division between the conservative forces, that is to say the anti-communism industrial 
development forces, and the democratic-reform forces. However, the election ended with the 
dramatic success of the liberal reform force. It has been suggested that one of the biggest 
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reasons for the success was the diffusion of the Internet through the development of 
information technology, which caused the growth of new media on the Internet and 
participation of 20s and 30s‘ generations. The Roh Moo-hyun government was the first 
government attaining power by only democratic forces without any merging with parties or 
coalition. Also, at the National Assembly elections of 2004, the reform forces succeeded in 
acquiring the majority for the first time in Korean political history. However, during the 
period of Roh‘s government, the confrontation of the conservative forces and the reform 
forces persisted and the social conflict has been evident in most of the policies.  
 
2.2.2. Authoritarianism versus democracy 
 
The previous explanation about the change of regimes shows that the authoritarian 
governments before 1987 in South Korea can be characterized as pro-capitalist development 
and anti-communist. At the same time, it can be suggested that such ‗developmentalism‘ and 
anti-communism have been formulated and intensified by internal and external factors: the 
partition of Korea, the Korean War and U.S policy in the cold-war system. The authoritarian 
military forces in South Korea had constructed the ideologies of anti-communism for the 
purpose of seizure of power and regime maintenance. Regarding the anti-communist ideology, 
it has its origins in the national division under the cold-war world system. The ruling 
strategies of the military regime which captured power through the coup in 1961 were based 
on the division of the Korean Peninsula. In this context, the authoritarian force‘s need for 
acquiring legitimacy and the people‘s strong desire for the escape from poverty strengthened 




However, it is unique to Korea in the sense that Taiwan, which has a similar situation, does 
not have such an influential ideology. As mentioned above, the crucial contributor to reinforce 
the anti-communism ideology was the Korean War in 1950. Jang-Jip Choi (1993, p. 21) 
asserts that ―with the Korean War, the South Korean state was converted from an extremely 
unstable and fragile anti-communist state into a powerful bureaucratic one ruled by an 
authoritarian regime which was supported by a military force.‖ He explains that the South 
Korean state based on anti-communism not only could get its legitimacy as long as the North 
Korean regime existed, but also could control the economic sector by receiving and allocating 
foreign aid which came to help the economy devastated by the War (1993, pp. 21-24). 
Consequently, anti-communism may be founded on the fact that Korea is not only divided 
into parts but also had experienced the war in which Korean people of the same ethnicity 
killed each other (Lee H.-S. , 2002, pp. 12-13).  
 
The ideology of anti-communism which was used by the military regime to gain legitimacy 
and to maintain power could be operated owing to anti-communist consciousness that South 
Korean people had since the Korean War. As military regimes fixed the anti-communism and 
security as a national policy, the Anticommunist Law and the National Security Law were 
built up (31 December 1980) and the democratisation movement could be punished under the 
name of being in favour of communism. It can be noted that stress on anti-communism and 
security acted as the means for suppressing and cracking down on political dissidents in the 
political process (Jang, 2004). Through the consistent oppression and labelling by military 
regimes, democracy could be characterised as pro-communist.  
 
Another influential role in strengthening the ideology of anti-communism can be found in the 
U.S. policy during the cold-war period. For instance, as well-described in the Kennedy 
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administration‘s modernization theory for the Third World, the U.S. foreign policy in the 
1960s was that economic development could be one of the most efficient instruments against 
the threat of communism, particularly from internal disruption and subversion (Schlesinger Jr., 
1965, pp. 516-7). It argued that economic progress could be effectively pursued by strong 
political leadership. Along these lines, U.S. policies with regard to South Korea put the first 
priority on being the protector of the anti-communist State rather than the promoter of 
democracy (Johnson, 2000, pp. 109-110; Im, 2006, p. 159). Even though the objectives of U.S. 
policies sometimes collided with those of authoritarian governments, their role in Korean anti-
communism and developmentalism was pivotal not only because such ideologies provided the 
foundation for the maintenance of authoritarian regimes but also because their survival 
heavily depended on both U.S. military and economic aid (Kim Y. M., 1988; Im H. B., 2006; 
Chang J. , 2007). 
 
On the other hand, as described earlier, the breakdown of the cold-war system after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the series of measures by the Kim Dae-jung government 
including the summit meeting in 2000 and ―Sunshine (Hatbuk) Policy‖ were the momentum 
for Korean society to escape from the shadow of anti-communism. In particular, the Sunshine 
(Hatbuk) Policy emphasized peaceful cooperation and coexistence rather than confrontation 
and conflict. However, as shown by many critics of this Sunshine Policy, anti-communism 
remains an influential ideologies in South Korea. 
 
Also, the ideology of development was likely to be adopted in the least industrialized 
societies in Asia. This development ideology focusing on industrialisation and economic 
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growth had supported the long- term dictatorial seizure of power in many Asia countries
11
. 
But, it can be noticed that the development ideology in South Korea was not only used to 
secure the legitimacy of regime but was also combined with anti-communism. On the one 
hand, the military regime in South Korea tried to overcome the absence of legitimacy through 
economic development. The well known slogan was the modernization of the fatherland, 
which was used to mobilize people. The notion of modernization is that liberal democracy has 
to be reserved to modernize the fatherland (Jin, 2000, p. 386). In other words, the 
modernization notion, in Korean style, that the political development should retreat in favour 
economic development, was created. People who suffered from poverty after the war and 
during the colonial period were persuaded by the slogan of modernization of the fatherland 
and the plan for economic development which was started with the aid of U.S. (Sin, 2006, pp. 
14-5). The modernization notion, in Korean style, meant that democracy as a formal 
institution was introduced but it did not take root as part of the culture and social value (Lee 
H.-S. , 2002, p. 13). On the other hand, in South Korea, developmentalism was strongly 
joined with anti-communism and the principle of victory toward the North Korea (Lee B.-c. , 
1995). The military government not only tried to promote people‘s commitment to the growth 
of the economy but also to confirm their legitimacy with a superior position in economy 
compared to the North Korea. It meant that the government converted the political conflicts 
between the North and South into the economic competition in the situation of a divided 
country.  
 
                                                 
11
 Examples of this are president Park Jung Hee in Korea, prime minister Mahathir bin Mohammad in Malaysia, 
prime minister Lee Kwan-Yew in Singapore and president Ferdinand E. Marcos in Philippine. The development 
ideology in Asia countries gave the ideological legitimacy for the regime which pursues the economic growth 
but delays the political development for dictatorial long-term power. Furthermore, it had functioned as 




As a result, democracy was regarded as the counterpart of anti-communism and economic 
development in South Korea during the authoritarian regimes through anti-communism and 
developmentalism. As human rights and civil rights, which are basic characteristics of 
modernity, were suppressed by the logic of security and economic development, liberal 
democracy became defunct. Distribution and economic justice could not be requested in those 
days as those who argued for the re-distribution of wealth rather than growth were regarded as 
communist. It should be noted, too, that democracy had been judged as the obstacle of 
economic growth and national security by the military government, even though the real 
meaning of democratisation is an achievement of political and social democracy (Lee H.-S. , 
2002).   
 





 tenets of traditional Korean culture may also have left an 
influential legacy on Korean politics. Confucianism was adopted as the official ideology of 
the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910), which introduced Confucian institutions and practices. 
Since then, Confucianism has remained an influential source of values and norms in Korea 
(Koh B-i, 1996, p. 195; Yang J, 1999, p.228; Lew et. al., 2011, p.185). Grounded in the 
                                                 
12
 Woodiwiss finds the ur-form of familialism in Weber‘s patriarchalism which is defined as ―a strictly 
hierarchical political structure justified by a familialist discourse and resting on an economy and a wider set of 
social relations structured in large part by kinship‖ (Woodiwiss, 1998, p.2). Taking the nature of  contemporary 
state and economic forms into account, he redefines patriarchalism as ―a familialist discourse of rule that 
regardless of institutional context, both assumes the naturalness of inequalities in the social relations between 
people, and justifies these by reference to the respect due to a benevolent father, or father-figure or, sometimes, 
mother-figure, who nonetheless does not, ‗freely appropriate‘ all power to himself or herself, but exercises a 
‗joint right‘‖ (Woodiwiss, 2003, pp. 51-52).  
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ideology of the family as the basic unit of community, familialism is deeply embedded in 
Korean society. 
 
The key features of the Confucian ethic include ―the importance of family, concern for virtues 
and ethics, the primacy of the group over the individual, emphasis on unity or harmony, hard 
work, thrift, and the importance of education‖ (Park and Doh, 2006, p.343). For instance, 
Kahn assesses the Confucian ethic as a good mechanism which ―is superbly designed to 
create and foster loyalty, dedication, responsibility, and commitment and to intensify 
identification with the organization and one‘s role in the organization‖ (Kahn, 1979, p.122).  
 
Among the features of the Confucian ethic, two points need to be addressed in terms of their 
influence on Korean authoritarianism and democracy. One is that the family, rather than the 
individual, is emphasized in Confucianism. The concept of the family extends to the 
consanguineous village, community, and the state. In other words, the state is considered as 
an extended family. Furthermore, interpersonal relationships are defined as hierarchical. 
Along these lines, the essential ethical principles of Confucianism are clearly represented by 
loyalty and filial piety, ―which imply that individuals can be sacrificed for the family and the 
state‖ (Yang J, 1999, p.223). The other point is that education is strongly emphasized in 
Confucianism. The fundamental role of education in Confucianism is a process of personal 
cultivation and self-improvement. What is of interest is that its practical function is found as 
an instrument to cultivate bureaucrats and social mobility, as shown in the National Civil 
Services Examination (Kwa-keo) of the Choson Dynasty. Bureaucrats were recruited on the 
basis of merit. Hence, their significant and influential role in policy making tends to be widely 




The general expectation might be that this traditional Confucianism would fade out in the 
process of modernization. However, it was reformulated, reorganized, and reinforced by 
authoritarian and military regimes in the process of industrialisation (Lee S, 1997, p.14; Lew 
et. al., 2011, p.180). For instance, in the promotion of initiatives for economic development, 
the Park Chung Hee regime exploited the Confucian ethic which places a high value on 
education and importance of the family. One distinctive case is the Charter of National 
Education which was proclaimed in 1968 and which all students were forced to memorize.  
 
We have been born into this land, charged with the historic mission of regenerating the 
nation. ··· We do hereby state the proper course to follow and set it up as the aim of our 
education ··· encourage the willingness of the people to participate and serve in building 
the nation ··· The love of the country and fellow countrymen together with the firm 
belief in democracy against communism is the way for our survival ··· (Lee Y. D, 1974, 
pp.18-19) 
 
The Confucian tradition of high value on education stimulated by the government had a 
profound influence on Korean society, particularly when it was combined with the Confucian 
emphasis on the family. It was usual for unmarried sisters to leave their rural hometowns to 
get jobs and send their meagre wages back to their family for their siblings‘ education (Koh 
B-i, 1996, p.195). Even low-income families were willing to spend large amounts of money 
on their children‘s education so that they could climb the social ladder through education 
(Lew et. al., p.184). In sum, partly because the Confucian ethic provided the ideological 
rationale for government policies on education, the government achieved the cultivation of 




Another example of the Park Chung Hee authoritarian government‘s usage of Confucianism 
can be found in various government-driven plans and movements for economic development. 
In 1962, a five-year economic development plan was established and renewed every five 
years until the 1990s. This government-led economic development plan could be successfully 
implemented partly because it was based on the public‘s Confucian perception of virtuous 
government and accordingly its general acceptance of the government‘s strong leadership in 
economic development. The government‘s direct intervention in markets and industrial affairs 
was widely accepted under the form of ―government instructions‖ (Cho L-J, 1994, p.15). In 
1972, the ―New Village Movement (Saemaul-undong)‖ was launched with the slogan and 
song of ―Let‘s try to be better-off.‖ Its core values were ―diligence, self-reliance, and 
cooperation‖ which appeal to the Confucian ethic of hard work and collectivism. 
 
Other Confucian ethics, such as the importance of family, harmony and cooperation, were 
also utilized to galvanize workers to be self-sacrificing labourers despite low wages and to 
obey managers‘ orders. For instance, the Park Chung Hee regime urged employers and 
employees to form their industrial relationships on the basis of the family as a metaphor for 
the company, such as ―treat employees like family‖ and ―do factory work like…[your] 
family‘s business‖ (Kim and Park, 2003, p.45). Private companies introduced a workplace 
incentive system in the form of seniority rule and lifetime employment, and tried to inspire 
company loyalty and collectivism (Kuk, 1997, p.45). In this way, familialism was extended to 
the workplace. In addition, many large companies had a family-oriented ownership and 
management structure. For 30 major company groups which were designated by the 
government in April of 1995, the average share holdings by large shareholders and their 
families amounted to 43.3% (Chun T-S, 1999, p.112). This Confucian tradition was also 
applied to the relationship between the government and private companies, and accordingly 
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strong leadership from the government was accepted between them. One example is monthly 
export expansion and promotion meeting, at which the president presides and private 
company CEOs as well as bureaucrats participate in to deal with the issues of export 
promotion. 
 
On the grounds of the above discussion, one possible conclusion is that the Confucian ethic 
was one of the major contributors to the economic growth of Korea (Kahn, 1979; Berger, 
1988; Vogel, 1991; Cho L-J, 1994; Song, 1997; Pye, 2000; Lew et. al., 2011), even though 
the result of debates on the contribution of Confucianism to East Asian economic 
development has been inconclusive
13
. However, it is particularly significant for this thesis that 
the Confucian ethic was easily combined with the developmentalism of authoritarian regimes 
in Korea.  
 
Another influence of Confucianism in the process of modernization in Korea can be discussed 
in terms of democracy. Regarding the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, 
two conflicting views exist (Shin and Chung, 2002, p.112). One view associates 
Confucianism with its authoritarian elements. In contrast, the other view argues the 
compatibility between Confucianism and democracy (Fukuyama, 1995, p.25).  
 
For Korea, it has been suggested that authoritarian regimes took advantage of Confucianism 
and familialism to gain legitimacy and to mobilize people for political purposes. One of the 
distinctive cases is the Park Chung Hee military regime. It placed emphasis on loyalty to 
                                                 
13
 It may be well shown in both Weber‘s argument against Confucianism and assertions for Confucian capitalism. 
It may reflect that Confucian ethic includes contradictory characteristics; positive factors in economic 
development, such as emphasis on the group, high value on education and dedication to work, and negative 
elements, such as lack of individual ingenuity. 
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contain civil society‘s request for political rights and stressed filial piety for the formation of 
familial authority to reinforce obedience and to repress the demand for freedom. To revitalize 
and inspire Confucian loyalty, military figures that had fought for the country throughout its 
history were praised and idolized (Kwon, 2001, pp.66-67). To extend the concept of filial 
piety from the family to the state, the president was symbolized as ―national father‖ and the 
first lady as ―national mother‖ (Kim M, 2010, p.335). Furthermore, stressing the respect for 
the Confucian ethic, including loyalty to the regime, the Park Chung Hee authoritarian regime 
propelled ―Korean-style democracy‖ (Lee, 1997, p.275) and utilized it to ―defend his highly 
repressive rule during the Yushin period‖ (Kim Y-M, 1997, p.1132).  
 
Another example where authoritarian regimes exploited the Confucian ethic for political 
stability can be found in the 1991 case of students who protested against a professor who had 
been designated as a Prime Minister
14
 by throwing flour and eggs. Relying on Confucian ethic 
of Gun-Sa-Bu-Il-Che
15
, the Roh Tae-woo regime blamed students for an immoral offence 
committed against a teacher.  
 
In the workplaces, authoritarian regimes and private companies also relied on the Confucian 
ethic, such as the priority of family, to repress workers‘ requests including reasonable 
compensation. The regimes and companies utilized familialistic authority to suppress labour 
union activities in the 1970s (Lee S, 1997, p.267).  
   
As such, because the Confucian ethic was utilized by authoritarian governments, 
Confucianism has been considered as anti-democratic in Korea. However, what is noteworthy 
is that some elements of Confucianism can have a positive effect on the development of 
                                                 
14
 He was a president of a university. 
15
 Its meaning is that King (Gun), teacher (Sa) and father (Bu) are to be respected the same. 
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democracy. For instance, the high level of education in Korea as a result of the Confucian 
emphasis on education may lead to higher participation in political issues. 
 
In sum, it can be concluded that the traditional Korean culture of Confucianism and 
familialism was exploited by authoritarian regimes to support their developmentalism in the 
process of industrialisation and to legitimize their anti-democratic power and policies in the 
transition to democracy. What is interesting is that the influence of Korean traditional culture 
has been weakened (Yang J, 1999, p.228). For instance, the change in the connection between 
the Confucian ethic and developmentalism has been observed in the transition toward 
democracy and informatization. One such change can be found in the workplace where 
familialism and a hierarchical culture have had a tendency to weaken. Along with the 
Democracy Movement in the late 1980s, workers‘ requests for reasonable compensation and 
better working conditions sharply increased. This trend is clearly reflected in the dramatic 
increase in strikes from 276 in 1986 to 3749 in 1987 (Lee and McNulty, 2003, p.39). During 
the financial crisis of 1997, lay-offs were introduced undermining the stability of lifetime 
employment and consequently the familial tradition in workplaces. Coupled with 
informatization which was promoted by the government, the information and communication 
industry boom in the early 2000s contributed to a change in workplace culture, such as the 
priority of individual ingenuity over harmony and performance over seniority. The boom 
intensified the trend that high-level managerial positions could be occupied by young and 





2.2.4. Changes in civil society 
 
It seems to be a dominant view among Korean scholars that a distinct civil society in Korea 
started to emerge in the second half of the 19
th
 century (Koo, 2002, p. 41). At that time, a 
hierarchical status system was transformed and the establishment and development of 
capitalism made progress in the economic area because of the power of foreign countries in 
developing the economy. Hitherto, the power of the state was overruled by power of foreign 
countries, especially by the imperialism of Japan. This indicates that the formation of civil 
society in Korea had been distorted by the intervention of a foreign country‘s power in a 
crippling manner from the beginning (Chung, Kim, & Yoo, 1995, pp. 271-4). After the 
liberation from Japan, the growth of civil society in Korea was still impossible. Hagen Koo 
(2002, p. 41) maintains that ―the contentious and unruly character of South Korea‘s civil 
society stemmed basically from the fact that subsequent political development in Korea 
continuously denied the Korean people opportunities to restructure state power according to 
their nationalist ideas and democratic values.‖ He argues that South Koreans were frustrated 
by the fact that they got another form of foreign domination, national division and the revival 
of the old power rather than real liberation. After that, the Korean War and strong U.S.‘s 
support contributed to the Rhee regime‘s power maintenance and even though the student 
uprising in 1960 brought new opportunities, Park Jung Hee‘s military coup negated it.  
 
It can be concluded that after liberation from Japanese imperialism, civil society in South 
Korea was suppressed by a succession of authoritarian regimes. In particular, repressive rule 
lasted for a quarter of a century after the first military coup in 1961. During that period, state-
led industrialisation progressed rapidly while democracy was postponed. Plutocracies were 
strongly tied to authoritarian state power in the period of authoritarian government-led 
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industrialisation. To achieve the development of the economy, governments not only 
supported some specific big companies intensively with finance rationing, but also restricted 
wages for labour (Sin, 2006, pp. 14-5). Hagen Koo states that ―the Korean capitalists‘ close 
ties with, and dependence, upon authoritarian state power prevented them from playing a 
leading role in promoting civil society, and instead became an object of antagonism from the 
emerging civil society‖ (2002, p. 42). He also asserts that the civil society in the 1980s 
consisted of labour groups and dissident intellectuals rather than autonomous associations and 
civic activities within a legal framework (2002, p. 44). It may be one of the reasons why, as 
mentioned in Section 2.2.2, their activities were easily painted as pro-communist and 
suppressed by various authoritarian regimes. As Jang-Jip Choi (2005, pp. 41-66) notes, the 
state‘s overdevelopment and civil society‘s underdevelopment was characteristic of South 
Korea before democratisation.  
 
Civil society in South Korea began to grow rapidly after the democratic transition that began 
in 1987. It was the big democratic movement in June 1987 that provided momentum for the 
breakdown of the long-lasting authoritarian regime. Massive protests on the streets by 
students joined by a large number of white-collar workers and other citizens made possible 
the political transition to democracy in South Korea. Consequently, the Democratisation 
Movement in 1987 and the development of democracy gave an important chance for South 
Korean civil society to grow.  
 
The flow of democratisation during last twenty years caused the positive cycle such as, the 
withdrawal of authoritarian regimes, the performance of direct presidential voting, the start of 
civil government and transfer of power by election. As these processes of democratisation 
were progressing, the suppression of civil society by the state was slowly reduced and civil 
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movements in various areas were activated.  In particular, attention has been given to new 
issues which had been neglected such as environment, education, gender, local autonomy, 
medical, traffic and human rights and South Korean civil society has been actively 
participating in the various areas, such as the protection of environment and women‘s issues 




As Chang Woo-Young argues (2006, pp. 53-4), voluntary and autonomous organizations in 
civil society have expanded owing to the result of democratisation. While legacies of 
authoritarianism still remained, the transition toward a democratic consolidation had been 
made (Kim H.-R. , 2000, p. 596). Also, Hagen Koo (2002, pp. 43-4) maintains that the 
dramatic growth of civil society movements in South Korea in the 1990s was led by the 
following factors: the public‘s participation and support to reform areas where there were 
many social problems, such as pollution, educational problem and traffic problems, which had 
been created during the process of rapid economic development, the dissatisfaction of the 
democratic process
17
, the support of civilian governments and international organizations. 
These factors have contributed to keep and intensify the political participation of civil society 
after democratisation. As Hyuk-Rae Kim (2000, p. 608) notes, ―the growth of NGOs in South 
Korea is both the result of the demise of authoritarian regimes and a further stimulus to the 
transition toward solidifying democracy.‖ 
 
                                                 
16
 Social movements started to be customized to various issues and major civil organization and social activities 
bodies began to monitor national polices and propose the alternative policies. As of 2000, more than three 
quarters of 20 thousands civil organization and social activities bodies were established before and after around 
the 1990s (Neotimes, 2000). 
17
 After the success of democratic movement, people were really dissatisfied with the existing political process 
and the problems in politic such as corruption, bossism, money politics and regionalism. In this context, the civil 
society movement was supported to change the previous bad practices. 
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Along with the progress of democratisation, the diffusion of information communication 
technology caused the growth of the civil movement and the active participation of citizens 
since the 1990s. On the one hand, the expansion of informatization has been effective for non-
government organizations to expand their issues and to communicate with the public. On the 
other hand, as it led to new online media, citizen participation and exchange of opinion to 
support the pursuit of political goals. The 2002 presidential election was a pivotal event for 
the online media (Chang, 2005a, p. 925). In this election, to liberal reform forces which 
represent democratic power, the active participation of ‗netizens‘ was a crucial contributor to 
win the election. As Armstrong (2007, p. 4) indicates, ―Grass-root mobilization was made 
even more rapid and efficient in the early of 2000s through the use of the Internet, as South 
Korea attained one of the world‘s highest per capita rates of broadband usage.‖ He also points 
out that netizens created a discourse of Korean democratisation. 
 
In sum, it could be noted that the democratisation and informatization are two main influences 
upon contemporary civil society in South Korea. The process of democratisation is closely 
linked to the rise of civil society as civil society in South Korea could grow together with the 
process of democratic movement and the entrance of civilian government. Also, the 
development of information technology facilitated the civic movements and contributed to the 








2.3 Social structure of the South Korea polity  
 
2.3.1. The change of economic structure 
 
The military regime before democratisation in South Korea can be categorized as a 
developmental state with government-led industrialisation. During that industrial period, this 
government-led industrialisation achieved economic growth at an average rate of 8.9% per 
year between 1962 and 1987, and for the years 1986 and 1987 at 12.6% and 12.3% 
respectively. At the same time, the composition of the South Korean labour force shifted from 
79% in the primary sector in 1961 to 70 % in the secondary and tertiary sectors in 1988 
(Johnson, 1989, p. 7).  
 
It has been suggested that there are a number of factors which have contributed to the success 
of the economic policies by the military regimes. The cold-war world system can be 
considered as a significant contributor to the economic growth of South Korea. Under the 
U.S.‘s support, the South Korean government was able to borrow from the World Bank the 
largest foreign loan ever given to any country from 1971 to 1981 and the preferential tariff of 
U.S. which was based on the cold-war system helped cheap Korean goods, produced by low-
wage labour to penetrate the American market. Second, the economic achievement was due to 
the strong politics of the military regimes. As the authoritarian regime in South Korea chose 
conglomerates (chaebol) for their political partners to develop the economy, the state not only 
supplied intensive financial support to selective companies it also controlled the wage 
demands of labourers (Sin, 2006, pp. 14-5). To sum up, it can be concluded that the success of 
industrialisation in South Korea was caused by the combination of domestic condition - that is, 
the strong state-led industrialisation - and the international situation - that is, the cold-war 
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world system. However, the economic growth strategies of the developmental state produced 
collusion between government and business, which became an obstruction to the South 
Korean economy in the 1990s, during the period of globalisation under neo-liberal policies for 
global institutions.  
 
Accompanying the change of international economic structure, Kim Young-sam government, 
the first civilian government, tried to reform under the Sekyewha policy (a total globalization 
strategy) from November 1994 and South Korea joined the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (hereafter OECD) in 1996. Kim Young-sam government 
propelled liberalization and also drove economic reforms such as the weakening of 
government‘s control over finance and the alternation of foreign exchange control method 
from the fixed exchange rate system to a floating exchange rate system, which were very big 
changes in economic structure and policy in South Korea. 
 
However, under this trend of globalization, the developmental model in authoritarian regimes 
revealed its vulnerability to the international economic environment. Following Splichal, 
Calabrese & Sparks‘s argument (1994) 18  that globalization can reduce the validity of 
government-driven economic growth strategy, the growing integration of production and 
exchange in the world economy has rendered the strong authoritarian capitalism of South 
Korea inappropriate. In the situation of financial crisis, when the government could not 
                                                 
18  
Their suggestion that the growing globalization of production causes the decrease of the effect of the 
individual states‘ policies in the conditions for commercial success is applicable to the South Korean case. They 
maintain that in the past, the state was used as an instrument of national development to accomplish 
industrialisation but nowadays ―the growing integration of production and exchange in the world economy has 
rendered the autarchic model inefficient.‖ (Splichal, Calabrese, & Sparks, 1994, p. 2).  They also assert that the 




support the individual companies as previous authoritarian governments had done, companies 
became bankrupt, linked to the bankruptcy of banks lending money to the companies, 
precipitating a national crisis. At the same time, the big companies, such as chaebol, were too 
dependent on financial support controlled by the authoritarian government to adapt to the 
change in the international economy. Consequently, the foreign exchange crisis immediately 
led to massive bankruptcy of big companies (Sin, 2006). In this context, it was suggested that 
the economic crisis in 1997 was related to the maladjustment to the international economy. 
 
As the economic crisis proved a failure of the developmental model in authoritarian regimes, 
the authoritarian force lost power and this contributed to a transfer of political power from 
authoritarian industrial power to democratic reformist power. In the Kim Dae-jung 
administration, structural reforms were accomplished in the various sectors, including the 
labour market, financial industries, and chaebol. In this context, it has been suggested that 
democracy can provide a good opportunity to implement economic reform. The legitimacy 
and credibility of the government‘s reform can be obtained from democracy (Moon & Kim, 
2000, pp. 162-3).  
 
Meantime, as the Kim Dae-jung government, which started with the financial crisis, had to 
accept the requirement of the IMF to overcome the crisis, the neo-liberal policies became the 
mainstream of economic policies. Thus, while getting through the financial crisis, South 
Korea has been transformed from a developmental state system in which states take charge of 





However, during the last five years, the period of the Roh Moo-hyun Government, the neo-
liberal policies have brought out problems such as the intensification of class structure and the 
inequality of income (Choi, 2005, pp. 208-14). The new economic depression played a role as 
one of contributors to nostalgia for the era of authoritarian developmental state. At the same 
time, the discourses about economic growth having a priority over democracy have begun to 
reappear.   
 
2.3.2. The change of governmental policies 
 
As mentioned before, with the situation of the division of the Korean peninsula, the ideologies 
of security and anti-communism gave the military authoritarian regimes legitimacy for their 
seizure of power. The government-led development strategy was not only adopted to suppress 
the need for democracy, but also was closely connected with their seizure of power because 
the predominance of economic issues was an effective method to prove the excellence of the 
political system. In other words, economic success was an important tool to maintain the 
dictatorship in the period of the cold-war world system. With these strategies, the military 
regimes encouraged South Koreans to take part in economic development so successful 
industrialisation was achieved. As a result, the ideologies of development and anti-
communism were connected with these values such as national security, efficiency and 
development rather than peace, equality and redistribution. In this context, during the 
industrial period, the authoritarian governments‘ policies in South Korea were implemented in 
pursuit of such values. 
 
However, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the ideology of security and anti-communism 
has been less effective in South Korean society. In this post cold-war period, South Korea lost 
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its opponent in the competition between the systems of the capitalist South and communist 
North during the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, North Korea slowly worsened into economic 
disaster in the 1980s. In addition, since the famine of North Korea in the late 1990s, this 
country has been considered in need of aid rather than a country to compete with. The images 
of poor children in North Korea affect significantly the South Korean psyche and North 
Koreans are no longer regarded as belligerent neighbours ready to attack South Korea (Kim & 
Lim, 2007, pp. 75-8).  
 
Meanwhile, in company with the advent of democratisation‘s era, after the success of 
democratisation in the late 1980s and the establishment of civilian governments in the 1990s, 
the ideology of development does not have the strong influence in South Korea any more. 
Instead, various demands which had been suppressed in the authoritarian period started to 
arise including human rights and economic justice. 
 
To sum up, the change of international situation and the decline of North Korea helped South 
Korea to escape from the danger of war and the democratic movement to succeed on new 
terms. At the same time, the new civilian governments initiated new strategies to replace the 
old development model. 
 
The important change of government policies happened in policies relating to North Korea. 
The anti-communism which had played a significant role in repressing pro-democracy 
movements in authoritarian regimes is not effective any more. The collapse of the cold-war 
system and the advent of civilian governments which do not depend for their legitimacy on 
the division of the Korea peninsula brought out the change of relationship with North Korea. 
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Since the historic summit meeting in 2000, collaborative economic projects were drawn up 
and were implemented between the South and the North (Kim & Lim, 2007, p. 76). 
  
In terms of economic politics, globalization and informatization have become another name 
for industrialisation since the 1990s. The Kim Young-sam government started the Sekyewha 
policy (a total globalization policy) and tried to implement economic reforms. At that time, 
the government stressed the intensification of a national competitiveness to develop the 
economy in the age of globalization. The information-related policies were prompted as a 
method to improve national competitiveness which was necessary in that globalization period. 
For instance, the well-known slogan in the early 1990s was that ‗even though industrialisation 
was belated, let‘s go ahead with informatization‘. However, it also shows that informatization 
was propelled by a similar process to that of industrialisation.  Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the problem of Korean style modernization would be revealed in the process of 
informatization led by government in the sense that governments have promoted the 
informatization with the same logic of industrialisation.   
 
Finally, the coexistence of democracy and development has been emphasized. The Kim Dae-
jung government asserted that democracy and a market-oriented economy can prosper at the 
same time. Kim‘s inaugural address shows a new direction of government policies (25 
February 1998).  
 
Now, the world is progressing from the industrial society in which material resources are the 
main source of economic development to knowledge-information society in which intangible 
knowledge and information become the motive power of economic growth. The information 
revolution is leading the change from national economy to world economy as the world 
becomes a global village. The information age heralds a period that at anywhere and anytime, 
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anyone can get and use information easily and cheaply. It is possible only in a democratic 
society (President Kim Dae-jung, inauguration address, 25
th 





In this context, the Korean government has strongly promoted informatization to get a high 
position in this field for the last ten years. As a result, during Kim Dae-jung‘s period, the 
information technology industry was nurtured and infrastructure like networks for information 
age was supplied. The slogan, ‗the World‘s best IT country‘, is a good example to express the 
economic success of South Korea.            
 
In sum, the information age, the world economy, and a democratic society represented the 
new alternative notion replacing the industrial society. In the period of post-democratisation, 
new civilian governments tried to overcome the previous authoritarian values and settle the 
democratic ones. They wanted to develop democracy and economy together and tried to 
connect the democracy and information age.  
 
 
2.3.3. The change of political structure 
 
During the industrial period, South Korea had been governed by a succession of authoritarian 
regimes until 1987 when the democratic movement made a big change. In the sense that 
authoritarian regimes had accomplished rapid economic growth with a strategy of 
government-led industrialisation while democracy was delayed, South Korea in the industrial 




Even though electoral democracy had started as a result of the success of the democratic 
movements, South Korea‘s democratic consolidation was not immediately established. The 
conservative forces of the authoritarian industrialisation period proved resistant to 
socioeconomic reform (Chang, 2005a, pp. 927-8). This is reflected in the fact that South 
Korea could achieve its first transfer of power between ruling and opposition parties only in 
1997 with the election of a president Kim Dae-jung who stood for the democratic reformist 
forces. This was ten years after the beginning of transition to democracy. 
 
After 1987, the politics of South Korea has been changed through conflicts between the anti-
communist conservative forces which were the main power group in the authoritarian regimes 
and the democratic reformist forces which led the democratic movement. The conservative 
forces were able to maintain their power during ten years.  
 
This phenomenon can be explained by the following arguments. One is related to the 
regionalism of Korea. It has been suggested that the regionalism in Korean history has had 
distinctive feature of a closed and exclusive provincialism (Kim S.-K. , 1988, p. 28), leading 
to the predominance of regional consideration in elections and an increase in regional 
economic disparities (Choi, 1993, p. 45; Lee & Brunn, 1996; Park, 2003). For example, in the 
presidential election in 1992, the president-elect and the ruling party secured 70 percent of the 
votes in the southeast region, while the opposition leader gained 91 percent of the votes in the 
southwest region. In this context, the National Assembly which was based on regional 
representation was the main focus for the conservative forces to gather supporters and to 
oppose the policies of the government (Sin, 2006, p. 31).  The other possible explanation is 
that the values which were based on economic growth by government-led industrialisation 
were not rejected by the South Korean people, although anti-communism had lost much of its 
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power because of the continuing efforts of the civilian governments to improve the 
relationship between North Korea and South Korea. The last explanatory factor is the 
conservative media‘s significant role in maintaining and intensifying the conservative 
monopoly. Democratisation enhanced the conservative media‘s autonomy and its social 
influence (Chang, 2005a, p. 928). The big media which has similar political and ideological 
views
19
 to the conservative forces has monopolized agenda and issues (Choi, 2005, pp. 35-8). 
As a result, the existing conservative media has increased its influence on the formation of the 
conservative elite groups who are opposed to the reformist governments and by persistent 
resistance to political reforms (Chang, 2005b, p. 394). Therefore, the media has helped 
conservative forces to keep their power in the National Assembly and maintain their identity 
as opponents to most of the government policies
20
 since the transfer of power in 1997. 
 
However, although the conservative forces resisted strongly, and the conservative media 
supported them, the democratic reformist forces were able to succeed in presidential elections 
in 1997 and 2002. One of the big reasons for the success was suggested to be the new online 
media which had emerged since the mid-1990s as a consequence of the development of 
information communication technology. Because the existing conservative media was 
regarded as ineffective as a vehicle via which the needs and opinions of civil society can be 
communicated to the political system, new online media has supplied the alternative room for 
reform-oriented netizens to disseminate their opinions and participate in social movements. 
With the rapid informatization of South Korea, online journalism has undergone three stages; 
the bulletin board system to discuss political issues, ‗parody‘ and ‗anti‘ sites to criticize the 
                                                 
19
 The three major conservative Korean newspapers—The Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Daily, and The DongA Ilbo—
dominate the newspaper market as they occupy around 75 and 80 per cent of newspaper readership (Chang W.-
Y. , 2005b, p. 394). 
20
 It is called ‗contentious politics‘. As objection for objection has been a major strategy of the opposition party, 
the confrontation and conflict became the ordinary culture of the National Assembly (Sin, 2006, pp. 31-2).   
88 
 
conservative newspapers, and alternative media
21
 (Chang, 2005a, p. 929). The development of 
online media and citizens‘ participation was caused by the growth of information technology 
which was promoted by civilian governments. The success of the reformist candidate in the 
2002 presidential election was a good example of the online media‘s achievement. With the 
strong support of the online community and the online media, Roh Moo-hyun was able to 
become the candidate for presidential election. Furthermore, through supporters‘ activities on 
the Internet and the use of mobile phones to encourage people to vote for the candidate
22
, he 
reversed the surprising withdrawal of the endorsement for him by Chung Mong-joon, who 
had given up his candidacy for him and campaigned with him, a few hours before the official 
end of the campaign. It may indicate that the growth of democratic reformist forces in South 
Korea has been achieved through informatization as well as democratisation. It can also imply 
that the democratisation of South Korea has been performed together with social change from 
the industrial age to post-industrial and information age. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the democratic reformist forces stands for the era of post-industrialised and the information 
society and embodies the values of democracy and peace, while the anti-communism 





                                                 
21
 Ohmynews and non-gaek (polemicist) websites are most representative online media.  
22
 After Chung‘s revocation, the discussion rooms of Ohmynews (a most famous online newspaper) were 
crowded with supporters of Roh. For about 10 hours until daybreak, 570,000 people accessed the articles on the 
new electoral development and the total number of pages read reached almost 20 million (Chang W.-Y. , 2005a, 
pp. 930-1) .     
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2.4. Civil society as information society 
 
2.4.1. The change of civil society 
 
As mentioned before, civil society in South Korea has expanded and has been playing an 
important role in the political changes after democratisation. The citizen‘s movement since 
1987 was very different from the class-based ‗minjung‘ movements in the military regimes in 
the sense that it was led by new organizations
23
 of the middle-classes who believed that 
peaceful and rational actions of citizens would be effective to deepen social and economic 
democracy (Kim H.-R. , 2000, p. 600; Koo, 2002, p. 44). During the last two decades, the 
expansion of civil movements and active participation of citizens has been an important 
impetus of political change.  
 
Meanwhile, as described earlier, this growth of citizens‘ movements was closely connected 
with the development of informatization as well as democratisation. Through the development 
of information communication technology and diffusion of the Internet, public issues could be 
addressed and social movements were easily organized in civil society.  
 
To understand how informatization affects the development of democratisation, it is useful to 
overview the present situation of informatization in South Korea. Much evidence shows that 
South Korea has the leading position in terms of diffusion of information technology and 
Internet usage. Since Korea‘s commercialization of the Internet in 1994, the number of 
Internet users in South Korea has rapidly increased with the launch of the broadband service 
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 Examples of such organizations are the citizens‘ coalition for economic justice, the league of anti-pollution 
movements, feminist groups to fight political corruption or to fight regionalism, pressure groups for ensuring 
responsive agencies, and so on (Koo, 2002, p. 42).   
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from 3 million in 1998 to 33.01 million by the end of 2005. The number of broadband 
Internet subscribers had reached 12.19 million in 2006 (National Computerization Agency, 
2006, p. 6). According to the research of National Internet Development Agency of Korea on 
June 2007, the rate of households with computer(s) is 80.0 percent and more than three 
quarters of households (79.9 percent) are found to be able to access the Internet at home. Most 
of the households with Internet access (82.4 percent) use the Internet by ‗ADSL‘. Internet 
usage rate of the population aged 6 and over is 75.5 per cent of the total population (National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea, 2007).  
 
South Korea‘s fast progress in informatization has been explained by various factors, such as 
geographical character, the government‘s role and cheap Internet access (Chang, 2005a, pp. 
928-9; 2006, pp. 56-7). Geographical character, such as metropolitan area and high population 
density, provide a favourable environment for informatization. For example, due to the 
pervasive accommodation type, such as apartments, the cost of Internet network installation 
could be reduced. The government also played a crucial role in promoting the development of 
information technology, such as building the information super-highway which was 
completed in 1997. For the cost of Internet access, Korea had an advantage over other 
countries. For example, in the case of Internet cafes, the hourly cost was US $1.40 compared 




Such an explosive increase in the spread of Internet usage caused the young generation and 
reformist forces who want to change the old order from authoritarianism to actively use the 
Internet to attain the reform. As Castells asserted (2001, p. 164),  
 
                                                 
24 
https://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/cost_of_cyberliving (accessed 7 January 2012). 
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The Internet offers extraordinary potential for the expression of human rights, and for the 
communication of human values. It cannot substitute for social change or political reform. 
However, by relatively levelling the ground of symbolic manipulation, and by broadening 
the source of communication, it does contribute to democratisation.  
 
For example, according to research (National Internet Development Agency of Korea, 2007), 
South Koreans who believe that the Internet allows ‗More liberal expression of personal 
opinions/views‘ and ‗Being able to influence public opinion by expressing their own opinion, 
participating in the internet poll, etc.‘ amounts to 49.0 per cent and 39.9 per cent respectively. 
 
Political utilization of the Internet by civil organizations and political parties has expanded 
and the alternative public sphere has been created by active participation of the public since 
1990 in South Korea. For example, the netizens participated in the 1997 presidential election 
by providing an active discussion on conservatism versus reformism, by producing reformist 
discourses and by disseminating various logical arguments for supporting the reformist 
candidate (Chang, 2005b, p. 399). The Internet was used as ―a communication medium with 
its own logic and its own language‖ and ―its communication is usually embedded in social 
practice‖ (Castells, 2001, p. 200). In addition, as mentioned earlier, during another 
presidential election in 2002, the Internet was an important tool to support the reformist 
candidate from the stage of nomination race to the presidential Election Day (Chang, 2005b, p. 
402). Therefore, it can be concluded that the diffusion of informatization has brought out the 
development of democratisation in South Korea since 1990.    
 
In sum, during the last two decades, civil society in South Korea has expanded and has 
actively participated in political events and social reforms. The growth of civil society was 
accomplished not only by social changes which are led by democratisation, but also by the 
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diffusion of informatization which caused the citizen‘s participation and development of 
alternative online media. In this context, it can be suggested that democracy in South Korea 
has been developing with the advent of the information age.    
 
2.4.2. How to see the Information-related policies  
 
Informatization in South Korea can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the diffusion 
of informatization helped the development of democratisation during last two decades. The 
development of communication technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones affects 
addressing public issues and organizing social movements in civil society. Informatization 
contributes to the expansion of online media which are powerful tools for communicative and 
participatory democracy. While the conservative forces still have strong power in the National 
Assembly and major media are seized by this conservative force, the democratic reformist 
forces could disseminate their values and arguments through an alternative public sphere in 
the Internet and the public could actively participate in the political process through 
mobilization by the Internet.   
 
On the other hand, the ―information society‖ is being pursued as a national development 
strategy. As mentioned before, the South Korean government strongly pushed the 
informatization promotion policy to gain profit from informatization. For example, the E-
government plan has been implemented and accomplished. It could be noted that as Korea 
needed to be modernized during the authoritarian regimes in the industrial age, civil 
governments in the information age need to be informatized. In addition, the usage of 
informatization is influenced by the term ―modernization‖ which was used as the ideology of 
development by the dictatorial governments. It indicates that there can be an innate tension 
93 
 
between the growth of civil society and the centralization of information by the government in 
the process of informatization. As discussed earlier, there would be conflict between the 
democratic values such as human rights and individual privacy, and the developmental and 
industrial values such as efficiency.   
 
Some of the controversies over information-related policies, which were revealed during last 
two decades, are good examples to show these conflicts of values in South Korea. First, the 
controversy over the Electronic National Identification Card between non-government 
organizations and the South Korean government from 1995 to 1999 initiated the dispute 
between administrative efficiency and democratic value such as individual privacy. Through 
the dispute, civil society could realize the fact that information-related policies implemented 
by a government, would invade human rights and the plan was withdrawn because of the 
strong opposition. Second, the dispute over the National Education Information System 
started with a conflict between administrative efficiency and human rights like the case of ID 
card. However, during the debating period, it was transformed to a conflict between a 
conservative force supporting developmental code from efficiency and anti-communism and a 
reformist force arguing for the protection of privacy so the system was able to operate after 
some revision. In addition, the revision process of the Use and Protection of Credit 
Information Act which is related to the collection, sharing, and registration of personal credit 
information would be another example to show the conflict between economic efficiency and 
individual privacy. The process of revising the law has brought constant debates between civil 
society organizations, financial institutions and the government over the distribution and 






In the industrial period and authoritarian military regimes before 1987 in South Korea, anti-
communism and developmentalism had a tremendous effect on civil society and government 
policies. Particularly, the development ideology was connected with anti-communism for 
political motivation to prove the excellence of the political system. Consequently, the 
development ideology was used to gain legitimacy for the regime and to suppress the need for 
democracy during the industrial period, even though economic development eventually 
increased the size of the middle-class which was to play an important role in social 
movements for democracy. In this context, democracy was regarded as the counterpart of 
anti-communism and developmentalism in South Korea.  
 
However, since the post-industrial period and information age, the influence of anti-
communism and developmentalism has been reduced. After the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union and the continuing efforts of the civilian governments to improve the relationship 
between North Korea and South Korea, the ideology of security and anti-communism has 
been less effective in South Korean society. For developmentalism, the advent of the 
democratisation‘s era after the success of democratisation in the late 1980s and the 
establishment of civilian governments in the 1990s weakened its effect.  
 
What is noteworthy is that government-led industrialisation was not rejected completely by 
the South Korean people. Globalization and informatization became other names for 
developmentalism and industrialisation as methods to improve national competitiveness. The 




On the other hand, this informatization has also helped the development of democratisation 
during the last two decades by providing efficient tools for participation in public issues and 
social movements, such as alternative online media. This indicates that informatization in 
South Korea can have both democratic values and developmental values. In this context, 
informatization in South Korea would have innate tension between democratic values such as 
human rights and individual privacy, and developmental and industrial values such as 
efficiency. Some of the controversies over information-related policies are good examples to 



















Since the Second World War, the civil society of Korea has experienced dramatic and rapid 
changes, such as economic development through industrialisation, successful democratisation 
and the development of information technology. During these changes, Korean civil society 
has not only become more differentiated, but has also become more integrated. Furthermore, 
the advent of the information age has led to a ‗the networked society‘ (Castells, 1996) where 
the differentiation and integration of civil society is dynamic and takes on new forms. 
 
According to Parsons (1971), the integration of a differentiated social system is accomplished 
by institutionalizing cultural values as norms that are socially accepted. Alexander, who 
follows Parsons, suggests that the structure of civil society can be understood by investigating 
a set of symbolic codes. These symbolic codes are used not only to define members of civil 
society and their inclusion and exclusion, but also define the character of civil society. For 
instance, he conceptualizes the structure of the discourse of civil society in the United States 
around a classification of democratic versus counter-democratic codes arranged in binary 
form (Alexander & Smith, 1993). The supplementing of Alexander with late-Durkheimian 
perspectives (Baiocchi, 2006: Edles, 1995: Jacobs, 1996; 1998, 1999: Ku, 2001: Rabinovitch, 
2001: Smith, 1991; 1998: Swidler, 1986) has also shown that multiple codes and spheres can 
be present in various traditions and cultures and that, accordingly, the tensions of a number of 
different codes can be present in civil society. 
 
As discussed in the chapter 2, Korea has shown the possibility of coexistence and conflict 
between multiple symbolic codes such as, ‗developmental‘ and ‗democratic‘ codes. The 
former involves authoritarian social values based on economic development and anti-
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communism and the latter on the values of democracy. I shall suggest that the controversies 
over various social issues and policies which have arisen during the last two decades can be 
taken as indications of such coexistence and tensions in Korea and can be exemplified 
through the controversies over information-related policies. The above two opposing codes 
may play significant roles in the integration of a differentiated civil society by being 
mobilised in the conflicts. 
  
Specifically, to understand when and how the tension of such opposing codes takes place and 
is resolved, this study attempts to analyze the disputes over information-related policies as a 
significant process in which existing values in a civil society are not only clearly exposed but 
also can undergo change through symbolic conflict through new values.  
 
The disputes over information-related policies are good examples of present conflicts over 
different codes in Korean society. This may be so partly because of the characteristics of 
current Korean society and partly because of the specific features of informatization policies 
in Korea. To begin with, the distinctiveness of Korean society is that it is not only a society 
entering the information age, simultaneously with industrialisation, but also a newly 
democratized society. That is, Korean society has two unique features in terms of 
informatization. One is that the informatization in Korea is not only closely connected with 
the development of the national economy, but also has provided the basic tools for the 
expansion of democratisation during last two decades. The other feature is that Korea is one 
of the countries where the information communication technology has been highly developed 




The informatization policies promoted by the Korean government have also contained two 
different values rooted in civil society. On the one hand, the Korean government has 
promoted information-related polices as a national development strategy based on 
developmental values. On the other hand, during the last two decades, informatization has 
contributed to the development of democratisation as it has supplied the basic tools for 
citizens to participate in the debates over public issues and in social movements. In this regard, 
it can be noted that informatization has been supported by different values. Thus, disputes 
over information-policies serve as a good example to present the process of symbolic conflicts 
between different codes in Korean civil society. Some polices promoted by government may 
initiate the controversies based on the tension between developmental value and democratic 
value.  
 
For example, centralization of information by the government may help to improve economic 
efficiency and administrative convenience. However, it can impair privacy which is supported 
by democratic values. Hence, there would be conflicts between the developmental and 
industrial values such as efficiency, and the democratic values such as human rights and 
individual privacy. As a result, the analysis of the process of disputes can show how the 
different codes in Korean civil society are used symbolically during the debate and how 
members of civil society are divided over them. 
 
This research seeks to obtain its objective by using three disputes over policy as case studies. 
It raises some methodological issues, such as whether a case study is appropriate for the aims 
of the research, whether the use of three similar cases is repetitive and how the mechanism of 
the conflict between codes can be examined in each case. In this regard, this chapter attempts 
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to discuss such issues one by one: specifically, a case study as testing theory, narrative as a 
tool to study the dynamics of civil society and discourse as a device to show cultural codes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised into two sections. Section 2 presents the overview 
of three disputes over information-related policies in Korea. It provides a general background 
of the cases for the selection of an appropriate and effective methodology. In Section 3, 
methodological issues are discussed. The first is a general discussion of a case study, 
including the generalisation of a case study and the usefulness of a case study approach. A 
brief review of a narrative approach follows, which focuses on its features in explaining the 
dynamics of civil society. Then, the concept of discourse and its role in civil society is 
discussed from a critical discourse analysis perspective as well as from a conventional view. 
After addressing the role of the media in civil society, the nature of data to be collected is 
presented.  
 
3.2. Overview of disputes over information-related policies in 
Korea 
 
This study selects three controversies over information-related policies: the Electronic 
National Identification Card (hereafter electronic ID card), the National Education 
Information System (hereafter NEIS), and the Use and Protection of Credit Information Act 
(hereafter Credit Information Act).  
 
The three cases have different political contexts. The controversy over the electronic ID card 
started in the first civilian government and ended after the first transfer of power between the 
ruling and opposition party. The main debate of the NEIS was conducted in the period when 
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conflicts between conservative forces and reform forces were severe. The period of revision 
of the Credit Information Act encompasses the above two periods (for the details, see 
Appendix 3-1). Thus, through the investigation of these three cases, how the change of 
political structure in the transition toward democratisation affects the value structure of 
Korean society can be examined.  
 
Second, the three cases involve the collection of different information. The case of the 
electronic ID card is connected with the collection of personal information and the NEIS is 
related to the collection of education information while the revision of the Credit Information 
Act is an issue of the collection of credit information. As most citizens are closely involved in 
issues of personal and educational information, the controversies of the former two cases 
occurred publicly and unfolded in a way that was greatly affected by public opinion. The third 
case was conducted in relatively formal legislation processes and debates between civil 
society organizations, the financial sector, and the government over the distribution and 
protection of credit information. These three cases are related to different types of information, 
but all three cases are conflicts between administrative efficiency and human rights. 
 
3.2.1. The dispute over the Electronic National Identification Card 
 
The controversy over the electronic ID card was conducted between non-government 
organizations and the South Korean government from 1995 to 1999. According to the plan, 
the electronic ID card was to encompass information from seven different sources; certificate 
of residence, medical insurance, driver‘s license, national pension certificate, resident register, 
certificate of seal impression and personal fingerprints. Since the plan for the electronic ID 
card was related to the collection of personal information it affected all citizens in Korea. The 
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plan was announced in April of 1995 without opposition, with an emphasis on administrative 
efficiency and huge interest from the press for being the first of its kind in the world. 
However, after an international seminar which was held in August of 1996, civil society 
organizations and movements started the rumblings of dispute between the government and 
civil society. The civil sector‘s claims of invasion of privacy were in direct opposition to the 
government‘s assertions of efficiency and personal convenience, and the long-running 
argument finally culminated in the termination of the system in December of 1998.  
 
As such, it initiated a dispute between administrative efficiency and democratic values such as 
individual privacy in Korea. At first, the plan was implemented and supported by the 
developmental code. But, as citizens started to recognize that the plan would impinge upon 
democratic values, members in civil society tried to exclude the plan from their community. 
In other words, through the dispute, civil society came to realize that information-related 
policies implemented by a government would invade human rights and the plan came to be 
withdrawn because of the strong opposition. 
 
3.2.2. The dispute over the National Education Information System 
 
The debate over the NEIS was conducted from 2000 to 2003. The NEIS keeps track of student 
information ranging from grades, health and attendance records to consultation records. 
Planners aimed to build up the system by March of 2002 and implement it in all schools a 
year later. However, just before March of 2003, questions started being asked about 
information rights, invasion of privacy, and data security. The argument between civil society 
organizations and the government spurred a revision of the initial plans, helped by advice 
from the National Human Rights Commission. In the end, even though it contains lots of 
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educational information, most medical information has been excluded outright from the NEIS, 
and it now carries minimal parent-related information. 
 
The controversy over the NEIS resembles the one over the electronic ID card in 1997 in the 
sense that both are based on the conflict between administrative efficiency and protection of 
privacy. However, the big difference is that the NEIS has come into force after some revision 
while the electronic ID card was terminated outright. The reason seems to be that during the 
debate period, the initial controversy between administrative efficiency and protection of 
privacy evolved into the conflict between conservative values including anti-communism and 
reformative values.  
 
3.2.3. The dispute over the credit information system  
 
The revision process of the Credit Information Act is related to the collection, sharing, and 
registration of personal credit information. The process revising the Credit Information Act 
from 1995 to 2007 has brought continuous debates between civil society organizations, the 
financial sector, and the governments over the distribution and protection of credit 
information. 
 
Matters concerning the collection, sharing, and registration of personal credit information in 
Korean society are laid out in the Credit Information Act, enacted in 1995. In the financial 
sector, the Agreement on Management of Credit Information outlines specific matters such as 
credit delinquents, criteria for registering and removing bad credit information, the range of 
use of credit information, the access to and deletion of credit information, and its retention 
period. The corresponding law has been revised over ten times according to the alterations in 
the financial environment as the information wave has gained in power. The scope of 
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exchangeable credit information has fluctuated over time and the related agreements have 
been modified according to the revision of the law.  
 
Individuals classified as credit delinquents in Korean society have received limitations on 
their financial activity, affecting their life in the workplace and effectively placing them under 
social and economic constraints. As a result, the debate over collection and sharing over 
individual credit information heated up even more as the number of credit delinquents reached 
4 million in 2004. At first, the debate was limited to the financial sector and the government. 
However, along with the development of civil society and aggravating problems of credit 
delinquents, civil society organizations started to participate in the debates for revision of the 
law. 
 
3.3. Research methodology  
 
By using disputes over a policy as case studies, this research attempts to test the late-
Durkheimian perspective on civil society conflict, namely the coexistence of multiple cultural 
codes in civil society and the symbolic conflict between them. The information-related 
policies in Korea are employed because they are representative and outstanding cases which 
show multiple cultural codes. Particularly, following Bryman (1988, p. 88), this research tries 
to enhance generalization through case studies by using three related cases and comparing the 
results from them.  
 
Each case can be thought of as containing a narrative structure and, furthermore, all three 
cases as events can be thought of as constituting one narrative in the process of 
informatization policy in Korea. Narrative has been used as a tool to study the dynamics of 
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civil society. The reason for this is that narratives play a significant role in constructing 
identities and, thereby, allows the analyst to consider the significance of events from the 
perspective of actors (Jacobs, 1996a, pp. 1240-1). As narrative guide social practice, goals 
and movements, it likewise guides members of civil society to understand what is good and 
what is bad. In this regard, by presenting the overall narrative of three cases of disputes over 
information-related policies in Korea, this research attempts to show when the tension of 
opposing symbolic codes in Korean civil society takes place and by which mechanism 
members of civil society attend to the process of symbolic conflicts.  
 
Discourses in three cases also well reflect cultural codes, their changes, the corresponding 
social action and social change, and the dialectical relationship between them. In particular, 
the media plays a critical role as a space to solve political disputes through discourse and 
accordingly as a sphere for public influence, identity and solidarity.  For this reason, the main 
data for this research are drawn from narratives and discourses in media and are 
complemented by other data from alterative sources. 
 
3.3.1. Case studies for testing theories 
 
This research uses three Korean cases related to the disputes over information policies. Hence, 
the starting point is a general discussion of the case study as a methodology, such as how a 
case can be generalised and how a case study can be a useful tool to test theories. 
 
Generally speaking, a case study attempts to conduct a detailed description or intensive 
examination of a particular occurrence. It indicates that it is not based on random sampling or 
large samples. This results in a standard argument against the use of a case study to test 
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hypotheses and produce theories. A typical one of such arguments is that a case study cannot 
be effective for generalisation and accordingly is not suitable for hypotheses testing and 
theory building even though it may be useful for generating hypotheses in the first stage of a 
total research process.
25
 A basic logic behind this is a positivist view that the development of 
social sciences can be built upon the methodological apparatus and procedures of natural 
sciences, such as statistical inference and a generalization from many empirical and value-free 
observations. As Platt (1992a, p. 26) notes, Whitley argues that a generalization from the 
findings of a case cannot be held except in the event that a case ‗has characteristics common 
to a statistically large proportion of the population from which it is drawn.‖  
 
However, contrary to positivist views of social sciences as the quasi-natural science, social 
phenomena are more complex than natural phenomena. In a post-positivist sense, ―reality is 
assumed to exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable because of basically flawed human 
intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena‖ (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). As Alexander notes (1982, p. 20), it is suggested that ―there exists an 
interplay between the scientific knower and the object known.‖ Observations are considered 
as context-dependent rather than neutral and context-free. As such, post-positivism criticizes 
―both the status of law-like generalizations and the independence of empirical observations 
from theoretical statements‖ (Holmwood, 1996, p. 41). 
 
Along with this line, if a generalization is accepted in a post-positivist vision, it should be 
recognized as contextual (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Donmoyer, 1990; VanWynsberghe & Khan, 
2007). It indicates that generalizations are transitory, requiring continuous updating. In this 
                                                 
25
 See Flyvbjerg (2001; 2006) for the detailed discussion of misunderstandings about case-studies research.    
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regard, generalisability can increase by the repetition of cases (Bryman, 1988, p. 88) or the 
comparison of diverse cases. As Ragin (1992a) indicates,  
 
The audiences for social science expect the results of social scientific investigation to be 
based on systematic appraisal of empirical evidence. Use of evidence that is repetitious and 
extensive in form, as when it is based on observations of many cases or of varied cases, has 
proved to be a dependable way for social scientists to substantiate their arguments (p. 2).   
 
The results from the previous case can be strengthened by repeated cases and the robustness 
of the findings can be increased. As such, case studies can contribute to test theories via 
generalizations in a post-positivist sense.  
 
What is noteworthy is that a case study has further advantages in social inquiry. For example, 
Flyvbjerg
26
 maintains ―a purely descriptive phenomenological case study without any attempt 
to generalize can certainly be of value in this process and has often helped cut a path toward 
scientific innovation‖ (2006, p. 227). In this regard, he suggests complementarity between 
case studies and a conventional approach based on large samples and variable-oriented 
investigations:  
 
The advantage of large samples is breadth, whereas their problem is one of depth. For the 
case study, the situation is the reverse. Both approaches are necessary for a sound 
development of social science (2001, p. 87). 
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 In fact, he insists that ―one can often generalise on the basis of a single case‖ (2006, p. 228). He points out that 
generalizability can be obtained via the strategic choice of case, such as Foucault‘s ―Panopticon‖ as an extreme 






In addition, it has been suggested that case studies can link empirical evidence to theories 
(Ragin, 1992b; Walton, 1992). Ragin (1992b) maintains that cases play important roles in the 
relationship between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence. He effectively addresses how 
significant case studies are in the process of theory building, as follows: 
 
As researchers our primary goal is to link the empirical and the theoretical – to use theory to 
make sense of evidence and to use evidence to sharpen and refine theory. This interplay 
helps us to produce theoretically structured descriptions of the empirical world that are both 
meaningful and useful. Casing is an essential part of this process; cases are invoked to make 
the linking of ideas and evidence possible. Casing is an essential part of the process of 
producing theoretically structured descriptions of social life and of using empirical evidence 
to articulate theories. By limiting the empirical world in different ways, it is possible to 
connect it to theoretical ideas that are general, imprecise, but dynamic verbal statements. In 
this perspective a case is most often an intermediate product in the effort to link ideas and 
evidence (1992b, pp. 224-5). 
 
Furthermore, unlike the positivist approach assuming simplifications of social phenomena, 
case studies may be appropriate to explain the complexities and conflicts of real life. In the 
positivist vision, it can be argued that case studies are not useful because they are difficult or 
impossible to summarise. However, Flyvbjerg insists that summarising case studies may be 
undesirable and sometimes counterproductive (2006, p. 239). He explains that ―something 
essential may be lost by this summarising‖ (2001, p. 85).  
 
On the grounds of the above discussion, by using cases, this research attempts to test the late-
Durkheimian perspectives, namely the coexistence of multiple cultural codes in civil society 
109 
 
and the symbolic conflict between them. As discussed in Section 3.2.1., information-related 
policies in Korea are representative and outstanding cases which show multiple cultural codes. 
Particularly, this research tries to enhance a generalization by using three related cases and 




A general definition of a narrative is a story that describes a sequence of events. According to 
Ricoeur (1974, p. 293), narratives ―puts into play space, time and characters woven into story 
form.‖ Following Ricoeur, Kane (1997, p. 258) explains that ―narratives provide a particular 
symbolic understanding of events and thus a vehicle by which people can (but not always will) 
make metaphoric associations in the same particular direction.‖ Along the same line, Abbott 
maintains that ―a social science expressed in terms of typical case narratives would provide 
far better access for policy intervention‖ (1992, p. 79). 
 
Narratives can be a useful tool for explaining social process and social change. Specifically, 
Jacobs (1996a, pp. 1240-1) suggests two reasons for this: narratives play roles in constructing 
identities and allow the analyst to consider the significance of events. 
 
At first, narrative plays a role in constituting social identities and guiding social action 
(Jacobs, 1996a, p. 1241; 1998, p. 140). Kane (2000, p. 315) insists that narratives are ―stories 
that embody symbolic code.‖ He indicates that they are ―configurations of meaning, through 
which an individual and/or community comes to understand itself‖ (Kane, 2000, p. 315) and 
―can help individuals, organizations and associations, and communities to understand their 




One important kind of ―cultural structure‖ is the narrative. People, groups, and nations 
understand their progress through time in terms of stories, plots which have beginnings, 
middles, and ends, heroes and antiheroes, epiphanies and denouements, dramatic, comic, and 
tragic forms (1993, p. 156).   
 
Along this line, narrative analysis has been used to analyse the dynamics of civil society: class 
formation, collective mobilization and modern mass media (Hart, 1992; Somers, 1992; 
Steinmetz, 1992; Jacobs, 1996a, 1996b; Kane, 1997; 2000).  
 
Somers (1992) and Steinmetz (1992) present how narrative affects the formation of the 
working-class. Somers shows that during the labour movement in England from 1800 to 1850, 
a ―central‖ narrative guided multiple social practice, goals and movements (1992, pp. 610-6). 
She explains that this narrative theme was that ―working class had inviolable rights to 
particular political and legal relationships.‖ Steinmetz (1992) also states the importance of 
social narrative in the formation of the working-class. He notes that ―subjectivity is strongly 
structured around narratives, and that these narratives explain to individuals who, where, and 
―when‖ they are‖ (1992, p. 505). Hence, he maintains that ―successful class formation entails 
a whole array of such narrative discourses, operation at various levels and accounting for the 
different sorts of events that may be encountered‖ (1992, p. 505).  
 
Some studies (Kane, 1997; Hart, 1992) show that narrative plays an important role in 
constructing meaning in the process of social movement. Kane asserts that ―narratives provide 
a particular symbolic understanding of events and thus a vehicle by which people can make 
metaphoric associations in the same particular direction‖ (1997, p. 258). Hart (1992) using the 
case of the Greek resistance movement shows that narrative plays a role ―not only as a 
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methodological tool in understanding the features and process of a case, but also as a way that 
collective actors adapt, share and make sense of their political identities‖ (p. 661)27.  
 
On the other hand, Jacobs (1996a) suggests that the usefulness of narratives is that they 
provide an effective device by which the significance of events can be considered and 
accordingly the understanding of the dynamics of civil societies can be elaborated by 
narrative analysis. The significance of an event may be detected in a chronological, cause-
and-effect order of events. As noted by Jacobs,  
 
Depending how they are defined, how they are linked together in a story or plot, and what 
determines their selection or exclusion into a particular narrative, events can have important 
consequences for social identities and social actions (1998, p. 141). 
 
In such an order, some events are found to ―have the power to disrupt prevailing systems of 
belief and to change understandings about other events in the past, present and future.‖ 
(Jacobs, 1996a, p. 1241). What is noteworthy is that the order in which events are presented in 
a narrative is not always a causal order. It is partly because the causal links between events 
are not unitary but multiple. It indicates that ―the same event can be narrated in a number of 
different ways and within a number of different public spheres and communities. These 
competing narratives influence not only how individuals will understand an event, but also 
how they will evaluate different communities, including the idealized societal community 
described by Parsons (1971)‖ (Jacobs, 1996a, p. 1241).  
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 Hart (1992, pp. 633-39) suggests that narrative form has the following roles; ―1. Narrative is more than 
description; 2. Authors of narratives need not be intellectuals; 3.The narrative form may contain intelligence 
about political processes such as the motivations of mass publics to participate and of leaders to mobilize 
constituents; 4. Although segmented, the content of socially symbolic narrative is just as often synthetic.‖ 
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On the grounds of the above discussion, the following implications can be drawn. At first, it is 
found that the three cases in this research constitute narratives. Every case has a different 
narrative and furthermore, all three cases as events constitute one narrative in the process of 
informatization policy in Korea. As individual narrative, cases have space, time and actors. 
Actors and time for three cases can be summarized as follows:  
 
Table 3-1 Time and actors in three cases 
 Time Actors 
Dispute over the 
electronic ID card 
From April 1995 to February 1999. 
October 1996: the start of main 
debate 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of 
Information and Communication, 
Joint Struggle Committee to protest 
privacy rights and against integrated 
Electronic National ID card, President-
elect Kim Dae-jung, Scientific 
technicians, the Board of Audit and 
Inspection of Korea  
Dispute over the 
NEIS 
From January 2000 to December 
2003. 
2003: main period of the debate 
Ministry of Education and Human 
Resources Development, the Korean 
Federation of Teachers’ Association,  
the Korean Teachers and Education 
Workers’ Union, the National Human 
Rights Commission,  Education 
Informatization Committee 
Dispute over credit 
information 
From 1995 to 2007 Ministry of Finance, Korea Federation 
of Banks, the People’s  Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy, The National 
Assembly 
   
In every case, actors act for their goals. They exhibit various social action including media 
briefings, commentaries, manifestations, conferences, TV forums, events organized by actors 
and so on. In addition, as shown in Table 3-1, when policies for collection and storing 
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information are considered as one narrative, all three cases can be considered as significant 
events in the process of value change around informatization.  
 
These cases contain narrative structure. As the narrative guides social practice, goals and 
movement, it likewise guides members of civil society to understand what is good and what is 
bad. Therefore, to see the narrative of the process of disputes over information-related policies 
in Korea helps to show when the tension of opposite codes in Korean civil society takes place 
and in which mechanism members of civil society attend the process of symbolic conflicts. 
For example, in the case of the electronic ID card policy, the National Intelligence Service 
story served as an important interpretive filter through which people evaluate ID card policy. 
By linking the historical distrust of the secret services and authoritarian governments by the 
military dictatorship to the electronic ID card policy, the opponents of the electronic ID card 
attempted to add the democratic code of human rights to the sacred, resulting in intensive 
symbolic conflict in the process of policy. Considering three cases as one narrative about 
informatization policy in Korea, a tentative conclusion is that the dispute over the electronic 
ID card policy changed people‘s understanding of informatization and affected social actions 
in the process of the dispute over the NEIS. As such, by presenting the overall narrative of 
three cases, this research aims to show how the existing values in a civil society experience 




Discourse as the linguistic concept is ―passages of connected writing and speech.‖ The 
argument for this concept is that it could not explain the important social aspects of discourse. 
A general concept of discourse in social theory and analysis is a group of meaningful 
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statements. For example, discourse, Foucault asserted, is a group of statements which provide 
a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic 
at a particular historical moment‖ (Hall, 2001, p. 72). Such a concept indicates that discourse 
has the following characteristics: constitutive, practical and historical.   
 
First, a discourse constitutes the object of social life. The object of social life is produced, 
transformed and reproduced in discourses (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4). As shown in the example 
of ‗madness‘ as an object in the discourse,  
 
mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided 
it up, described it, explained it, traced its development, indicated its various correlations, 
judged it ··· (Foucault, 1972, p. 32).  
 
It indicates that discourse is related to reality actively rather than passively in the sense that it 
constructs meanings for reality (Fairclough, 1992, p. 42). Hence, it actively contributes to the 
construction of the topic and produces the object of knowledge.    
 
Second, a discourse involves discursive practice. Discourse does not only affect ―the way that 
a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about‖ but also the way that ―ideas are 
put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others‖ (Hall, 2001, p. 72). This view is 
well reflected in the Foucault‘s emphasis on the relationships between knowledge constructed 
by discourse and power. In contrast to the view that social identities affect social practice, it is 
suggested that discursive practice influences and shapes social identities. It implies that social 
identities are affected by the language and meanings which are chosen and used. As 




[The subject is] not an entity which exists outside of and independently of discourse …. 
Statements position subjects, for example, teaching as a discourse activity positions those 
who take part as ‗teacher‘ or ‗learner‘ ··· 
 
Finally, a discourse is historically situated. It does not only have a specific historical context 
but also is open to historical change. For example, Foucault explains, 
 
the object presented as their correlation by medical statements of the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century is not identical with the object that emerges in legal sentences or police 
action; similarly, all the objects of psychopathological discourses were modified from Pinel 
[1745-1826] or Esquirol [1772-1840] to Bleuler [1857-1939]: it is not the same illnesses that 
are at issue in each of these cases; we are not dealing with the same madmen (1972, p. 32).  
 
It indicates that a discourse is dynamic and ever-changing from period to period and ―a 
different discourse ··· will arise at a later historical moment, supplanting the existing one, 
opening up a new discursive formation, and producing···, new discourses with the power and 
authority, the ‗truth‘, to regulate social practice in new ways‖ (Hall, 2001, p. 74).  
 
The above view of discourse has been elaborated by Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter 
CDA). CDA describes discourse, that is to say language used in speech or writing, as social 
practice. It implies that discourse is viewed as ―a dialectical relationship between a particular 
discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The 
discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them.‖ (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 




By the same token, Fairclough (1992, p. 45) criticises the above view of social identities as an 
effect of discourse as a structuralist view. Instead, he points out a dialectical relationship 
between social identities and discursive practices. In other words, it is suggested that the 
subjects affected by discursive practices can have an influence on discursive practice. Hence, 
CDA suggests that discourse is not only socially constitutive but also socially conditioned 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, pp. 5-6). 
 
An additional emphasis in CDA is the role of discourse in social change.  For example, the 
change in discursive practices can be related to social change (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56). Along 
this line, Fairclough (1992, p. 65) asserts that discourse contributes ―to reproducing society 
(social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet also 
contributes to transforming society.‖ Hence, discourse is considered as ―constitutive both in 
the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it 
contributes to transforming it‖ (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 
pp. 5-6). 
 
Another important issue in CDA is the relationship between discourse and power. As well 
described by Fairclough and Wodak,  
 
Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. 
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and 
reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, 
and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things 




Hence, CDA aims to ―investigate how such [discursive] practices, events and texts arise out 
of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggle over power; and to explore 
how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing 
power and hegemony‖ (Fairclough, 1993, p. 135). van Dijk also stresses this by defining 
CDA as ―a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power 
abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the 
social and political context‖ (2001, p. 352). 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the relationships of discursive practices and social and 
cultural structures can be explored by the critical analysis of discourse. The above CDA‘s 
perspective for discourse provides a good tool for social researches to investigate dynamics of 
civil society in the process of political controversies because these political debates are mainly 
preceded by discursive practices, events and texts.   
 
3.3.4. Media as a public sphere for discourse 
 
As discussed above, political discourse plays important roles in the enactment, reproduction 
and legitimisation of power and domination. In this regard,  Ellingson asserts that ―discourses 
are situated within a field of debate wherein speakers struggle with one another to establish 
meaning, earn legitimacy, and mobilize consensus on belief and action‖ (1995, p. 107). 
 
Habermas ([1962] 1989) introduced the concept of a public sphere for private people as the 
public to solve political disputes through rational-critical discourse. In a modern society, the 
media is a significant public sphere in which critical discourse can be suggested, 
corresponded and debated. It is partly due to the publicity of the media. Furthermore, Ku 
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asserts that ―media discourse necessarily encompasses the whole citizenry as an ―imagined 
community‖ participating in the same discursive context‖ and hence ―media is a sphere of the 
public‖ (1998, p. 174). The importance of the media in civil society is also insisted on by 
Alexander and Jacobs (1998). They point out two roles of the media in civil society as follows:  
 
··· not only as a space where information is circulated so that citizens can be well-informed 
voters (through that is certainly important), but rather as a cultural space where actors and 
events become typified into a more general code (e.g. sacred/profane, pure/impure, 
democratic/antidemocratic, citizen/enemy) and more generic story forms which resonate 
with the society‘s culture ···News media plays a more immediate role, acting as a symbolic 
public forum for different individuals and groups, all battling for interpretive authority over a 
particular event. The role of binary oppositions is critical here; contrasts between purifying 
and polluting motives, relations, and institutions permeate news accounts, linking the 
presuppositions of civil society to the ongoing rush of social events. (1998, pp. 29-30).  
 
Particularly, following Parsons‘ (1971) view of civil society as a sphere of influence and 
commitment, mediated through public opinion, they maintain that the media plays a critical 
role in terms of public influence, identity and solidarity rather than as a provider of public 
information (1998, p. 26). As discussed in the previous chapter, such general codes may 
provide a stable system for evaluating actors and events and be used as rhetoric of persuasion 
in the process of debating.    
 
In addition, Alexander (1988b, p. 108) indicates that media can be ―a functional substitute for 
concrete group contact, for the now impossible meeting-of-the-whole‖ in modern society. In 
this regard, he argues that the media comes out in the process of social differentiation and ―the 
more modern a society the more important its media (1988b, p. 108).‖ Therefore, it can be 
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concluded that the development of communication media may be an integral part of the rise of 





The objective of this research is to show what cultural codes coexist in Korean society and 
how the tension of such codes takes place and is resolved, by investigating three debates over 
information-related policies in Korea. In chapter 2, it was suggested that Korean civil society 
has two distinctive codes, the so called developmental-industrial code and the democratic 
code. During political disputes, these codes are used as rhetoric of persuasion by actors. 
Therefore, the analysis of the process of disputes can show how the different codes in Korean 
civil society are used symbolically during the debate and how members of civil society are 
divided as the good or the bad. 
 
The discussions in previous sections indicate that such codes and their changes, the 
corresponding social action and social change, and a dialectical relationship between them are 
well reflected in narratives and discourses.  In particular, it is suggested that the media plays a 
critical role as a space to solve political disputes through rational-critical discourse and 
accordingly as a sphere for public influence, identity and solidarity.  
 
For this reason, the main data for this research are drawn from narratives and discourses in 
media and are complemented by other data from alterative sources. Specifically, for the 
dispute over the electronic ID card and the NEIS, news articles, editorials, interviews, letters 
to the editor from daily newspapers and weekly magazines are sampled. In addition, press kits 
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by actors, manifestations by civil society associations, source books published by actors, and 
conference source book are sampled. For the dispute over credit information, with the above 
data sources, relevant acts, decrees, rules and regulations are used as other data sources 




















One of the significant disputes over the information-related policies of South Korea is the 
controversy over the Electronic National Identification Card (hereafter electronic ID card) 
between civil society organizations and the Korean government. The dispute was centred on 
the invasion of privacy, in other words the surveillance of the private lives of people. The 
necessity of a large amount of personal information which the government‘s electronic ID 
card aimed to include and the possibility of leakage and abuse of the information stirred the 
debate. Accordingly, severe wrangling was inevitable between civil society organizations and 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (hereafter MOHA)
28
; the main body promoting the project of 
the electronic ID card (Lee Y. H., 1999, p. 182).  
 
The electronic ID card plan was promoted by the MOHA which was in charge of resident 
registration. The resident registration system was implemented in 1975
29
. The resident 
registration system under the Resident Registration Act is not only the most fundamental 
system among state-enrolled systems, but also collects the most extensive personal 
information. It aims to register and manage the information on the residence and movement of 
individuals on the basis of the place of residence. A resident registration number to identify an 
individual is assigned by the government regardless of his/her intentions as soon as the birth 
is registered and is not permitted to be changed except in special circumstances. 
                                                 
28
 As of 2012, it is equivalent to the Ministry of Public Administration and Security whose functions are as 
follows: 1. Planning and coordination office; 2. Organization management office; 3. Personnel management of 
office; 4. Informatization strategy office; 5. Disaster safety management office; 6. Local administration bureau; 7. 
Local finance and tax bureau. (http://www.mopas.go.kr/gpms/view/english/about/about10.jsp accessed 7 January 
2012)  
29
 A resident registration card was introduced in 1968 by Park Chung Hee‘s military government but the 
application for its issuance was not mandatory. In 1975, all Korean people whose age is not less than 17 years 
had legal obligation to apply for the issuance.    
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Fingerprinting is required to get the certificate of resident registration. To improve this system 
of resident registration and to change the existing certificate of resident registration was the 
objective of the planned electronic ID card (Jho W. , 2005b, p. 451). The basic plan was 
established in 1995 when the first civilian government, which was based on a political merger 
of authoritarian military forces and one democratic party, tried to improve the national 
competitiveness under the name of Sekyewha Policy (a total globalization policy). However, it 
was scrapped in 1999 as a result of severe debate between the government and social 
organizations. As such, the debate over the electronic ID card gives a good chance to explore 
what civil society would depend on for action and speech at the beginning stage of the 
transition toward democracy. 
 
From the perspectives of the trandition of the codes, such a debate involves intense signifying 
practices over the justification of a policy. In this regard, it is necessary to explore the cultural 
background to the introduction of the policy of the electronic ID Card, how the controversy 
started, according to what mechanisms the symbolic conflict of discourses around this dispute 
were constructed, and what cultural practices the results of this debate could imply? This 
investigation reveals how existing symbolic codes in civil society undergo change through 
conflict around new codes during the dispute over the electronic ID Card.  
 
Taking the formation of the Joint Struggle Committee to protect privacy rights and against 
integrated Electronic National ID Card (hereafter JSCID) as a turning point in this 
controversy, the process can be divided into three periods. Firstly, there was little or no 
opposition during the introductory period following the announcement of the electronic ID 
card in April 1995 to the formation of the JSCID in October 1996. Heated dispute developed 
from the formation of the JSCID in October 1996 to the time of the presidential election in 
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December 1997. The last period is that from the presidential election to the abandonment of 
the project in February 1999.  
 
4.2. The introductory period (April 1995 ~ September 1996) 
 
4.2.1 The announcement of the plan for the Electronic National ID Card  
 
Even though the basic plan was released to the public in April 1995
30
, it was in October of 
1996 that social organizations started to voice opposition to the plan. As for its reasons, 
existing studies (Koh, 1997; Kim K. J., 1997; Kim M.-C. , 2004) have suggested the 
following factors: ―strong technological and industrial background supporting the electronic 
ID card policy; lack of any privacy concern stemming from a collectivist tradition; awareness 
of national security due to the sharp military confrontation between North and South Korea; 
neglect of social justice due to intensified economic competitiveness; apathy to conventional 
top-down policy practices‖ (Kim M.-C. , 2004, pp. 206-7). The lack of response of civil 
society is related to the strong background cultural code of ―developmentalism‖. Thus, I 
suggest that discourses around the plan were mainly organised in terms of this symbolic code. 
To examine how Korean civil society understood the electronic ID card plan by means of the 
developmental code during the introductory period requires exploring the social background 
of the time.  
 
                                                 
30
 The basic plan was submitted to the Cabinet Meeting before the release and the pilot test was implemented at 
the Chungang-dong of Kwacheon City from June 1995 to February 1996. The Committee of Administrative 
Reform advised the MOHA to replace existing paper resident registration card with electronic ID card in 
February 1994.   
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At that time, the Kim Young-sam government, as a civilian government which was based on a 
political merger of authoritarian military forces and one democratic party
 31
, was stressing 
globalization under the pretext of the reinforcement of national competitiveness.  
‗Globalization‘ (Sekyehwa) was a new policy principle underpinning Kim Young-sam 
government‘s aims. The term ‗globalization‘ was not only ―used to express the national pride 
of successful economic growth,‖ but also ―presented as a guideline for state policy that is to 
advance into the world‖ (Shin K.-Y. , 2000, p. 430). The social situation of that time was well 
expressed by a series of popular public service adverts which began in 1994: ―my rival is a 
German housewife,‖ or ―my rival is a Danish farmer,‖ or ―who is your competitor?‖ One of 
the exemplary cases of such globalization policies was joining the OECD in 1996. The 
government announced that per capital GNP had exceeded ten thousand US dollars and that 
Korea had become a member of rich countries club. ―The membership of the OECD was 
advertised as a symbol of achievement for the globalization policy of the Kim Young-sam 
regime (Shin K.-Y. , 2000, p. 431).‖ Consequently, the intensification of national 
competitiveness via globalization was accepted as a thing having a sacred value in Korean 
society of that time. 
 
With this social atmosphere, the plan for the electronic ID card was launched in June 1996. It 
aimed to integrate seven different certificates into one multi-function device with forty two 
items; residence registration card, medical insurance card, driving license, national pension 
card, resident register, certificate of seal impression and personal fingerprints. Table 4-1 
shows the expected structure and items of the electronic ID card (Ministry of Home Affairs, 
1996; 1997). Its initial schedule was to issue electronic ID card for all Korean people aged 17 
and over by 1998 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1996).  
                                                 
31
 See the detailed discussion in the Section 2.2.1. 
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Table 4-1 The expected structure and contents of Electronic National ID Card  
 Legible items on the card Items in an embedded microchip 
Resident 
registration 
Name, Picture, Resident registration 







Name, Picture, Resident registration 
number, Address transfer history per 
person and personal household, Personal 
data (household head’s name, head of 
family, etc.) Identification data (contents 
undecided), Family, Household, Military 




Licence type, Licence number, Licence 
condition, Aptitude test period 
 
 
Licence type, Licence number, Issuing 
authority, Licence condition, Aptitude test 
period, Date of issue, Penalty points, 




Insurer code and name,  Insurer type, 
Registration number, Insured person, 
Dependents, Date of acquisition or loss of 
eligibility, Medical treatment region, 




Initial date of coverage, Insured type, 
Total amount of contribution, The 
number of insured months, relationship 
to the insured, Registration number, 
Relationship to the insured, Registration 
number, Types of benefits, Date of 
entitlement, Benefit certificate number, 
Date of the last revision 
Seal  Seal 
Fingerprint Fingerprint Fingerprint trait 
Authority 
of issue 
Authority of issue Authority of issue 
Total 12 items 42 items 





In the sense that the new electronic ID card was a multi-function card rather than a simple 
extension of the current paper ID card, the goal of this card‘s launch was explained as the 
improvement of public convenience as well as a benefit for government, through the 
reduction of administration costs and intensification of administrative efficiency (Ministry of 
Home Affairs, 1996). It was designed as a smart card with an IC chip that would be able to 
contain a large amount of personal data and which could be easily connected to other main 
databases. This led to the government proclamation that the new ID card was the most 
advanced version in the world.  
 
Contrary to the lack of response from civil society organizations, the plan had support from 
the media with an emphasis on administrative efficiency and huge interest for being the first 
of its kind in the world. Overall reporting over the electronic ID card by most newspapers at 
the time of announcement (18 April 1995) shows that the media recognized the plan as one 
which could enhance administrative efficiency and which represented a significant 
development of technology. For example, 
 
On the front side of the electronic ID card with a nail size IC chip, name, resident 
registration number, picture, date of issue and issuing authority will be shown. On its rear 
side, medical insurance, a driving licence, and a seal impression registered are written and 
forgery or alteration become impossible. If the issues of the electronic ID card are completed 
and then card readers are installed in companies and schools as well as all public institutions, 
hospitals and police offices, it can be used conveniently for the identification and issuing of 
various certificates. The MOHA states that ―if the electronic ID card is widely used, it will 
have the effect of reducing annual expenses by 1 trillion Korean won and a reduction of 
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5000 public servants, as the card can replace the copies and the abstracts of resident 
registration of 170 million papers every year‖ (JoongAng Daily, 18 April 1995).  
 
In addition to the focus on convenience, efficiency and reduction of expenses through the plan, 
another attention was paid to the link between the electronic ID card and informatization.  
 
The electronic ID card which the MOHA has decided to run from 1998 is the advanced high-
tech identification card which can contain a great deal of information. It shifts away from the 
notion of the existing identification card whose function is limited to simply identifying a 
person (The Hankook Ilbo, 18 April 1995).  
 
What is noteworthy is that in the introductory period, the characteristics of media reports did 
not depend on the ideological orientation of the media outlets themselves. Positive comments 
were made by liberal newspapers as well as conservative newspapers, including three major 
daily newspapers
32
 (The Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Daily, and The DongA Ilbo). For example, 
when all articles of one liberal daily newspaper (The Hankyoreh) and three major 
conservative newspapers during the introductory period are analyzed, it is found that just one 
article reported in a detailed way the negative aspects of the electronic ID card plan. 
Interestingly, it was an editorial of The Chosun Ilbo (19 April 1995), a conservative 
newspaper, pointing out the problems of the electronic ID card, such as the invasion of 
privacy and the intensification of state power. As such, the introduction of the electronic ID 
card was reported as a proper system to enhance national competitiveness in the era of 
globalization. The media mainly addressed various advantages, such as convenience, 
efficiency, and the reduction of administrative cost rather than drawbacks of the potential 
problems of the technology.  
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In sum, during the introductory period, the electronic ID card policy was mainly described as 
having two objectives, namely the improvement of administrative efficiency and the 
promotion of informatization. It indicates that the acknowledgement of the electronic ID card 
was based on the development code in the introductory period. The MOHA used the 
developmental code to justify the electronic ID card plan, which is in line with Alexander and 
Smith‘s suggestion (1993) that actors in civil society use symbolic codes to persuade people. 
At first, it was promoted as a tool for a reform of administration, what is called the 
downsizing of the structure of local administration. The notion stressing administrative 
efficiency was well expressed in the following address of Park Dong-Seo, the chairperson of 
the Presidential Commission on Administration Reform.  
 
It is desirable to abolish village offices or to convert their function to welfare centres, 
libraries or medical centres. ··· if the electronic ID card is put in operation, the village offices 
will not be necessary any longer because we can access administrative services with our 
electronic ID card all over the country (JoongAng Daily, 19 April 1995, p. 22). 
 
According to the MOHA, the electronic ID card was assumed to have many advantages such 
as the reduction of issuing administrative documents, the curtailment effect of administrative 
expense and the growth effect of the semiconductor industry. It was regarded as secure and 
multifunctional, compared to the outdated existing certificate of resident registration which 
was not only easy to forge, but also too simple in its functions. In this regard, it was asserted 
that its total effects amounted to almost seven trillion Korean won in terms of economic value 




Next, the electronic ID card was supposed to be a sign of progress in the context of the policy 
of informatization promotion. On the 12
th
 of June 1996, after one year and two months from 
the first announcement of the project of the electronic ID card, the government made public 
the basic plan of informatization promotion with the electronic ID card as a major stepping-
stone. The detail plan for the electronic ID card was specified in the plan of informatization 
promotion: the electronic ID card combining resident registration card, driving licence card 
and medical insurance card would be issued in 1998 and it would be possible to deal with all 
services of civil appeals at home by 2000. In particular, this plan of informatization promotion 
aimed to link all networks in the country, which implied connection of all universities, 
research institutions, and primary, middle and high schools with a super highway Internet 
network by 2002 (The Hankyoreh, 12 June 1996, p. 2). 
  
A campaign slogan of one of the leading daily newspapers, which well described the social 
circumstances of that time, was that ―although we are behind in the industrialisation, [we] are 
ahead with informatization (The Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 1995).‖ From this discourse, the 
inference can be drawn that the code seeing informatization in Korean civil society of that 
time was the developmental code driving industrialisation forward into post-industrialisation.  
 
As the electronic ID card was emphasized as one way of implementing the plan of 
informatization promotion, an ambiguous fantasy about informatization arose. The common 
view in the media was that the electronic ID card would bring both informatization and 
globalization, and informatization would improve the quality of life. It is well illustrated in a 
column of the newspaper which was presented by Kim Jung-woong, a chairperson of Hyun-




··· informatization and globalization will be one of the important factors to judge the quality 
of a resident‘s life in the period of local self-government within one or two years. Now, we 
are preparing for the information age with some projects, such as the plan of the Electronic 
National ID card at the governmental level. ··· at the information society, those who have 
problems with getting information will become the disadvantaged, so it will be a welfare 
benefit for government to teach and adjust them (The Chosun Ilbo, 16 June 1996). 
 
This logic of explanation highlighted a positive feature that the electronic ID card was a 
proper method to inaugurate the information age and to stimulate the diffusion of 
informatization among the public. It entailed the argument that the establishment of the 
foundation of information-communication industries and cutting-edge industries would lead 
to an economically developed country and would make an improvement in public life. Hence, 
it may be concluded that this argument represented the developmental code of Korean civil 
society, or at least its organised and ‗official‘ sectors, about informatization at that time. 
 
In conclusion, from the introduction of the electronic ID card in April 1995 to the formation 
of the JSCID in October 1996, the electronic ID card had strengthened its status as a new 
device that could solve the problems about disaggregated and inconveniently held information 
and give the most advanced administrative services in the world. The electronic ID card was 
accepted as inevitable in the information age. Furthermore, the connection with the policy of 
globalization reinforced its place, because it was reported that the most advanced version in 
the world would be implemented and Korea could be a leading country in information 
technology development as well as globalization. At that time, informatization policy in 
Korea was related to the globalization policy in that Kim Young-sam government promoted 




4.2.2 The structure of discourses in civil society in the introductory period  
 
On the basis of  the previous overview, with Alexander‘s approach (1988b; Alexander & 
Smith, 1993) the symbolic system of civil society concerning the debate about the electronic 
ID card in the introductory period can be summarised as follows. As shown in Table 4-2, the 
developmental code, such as efficiency and convenience was the main symbolic code behind 
the debate in the introductory period. As the codes to judge the information-related policies 
had not been settled in Korean society yet at that time, the implementation of the electronic ID 
card was successfully justified only by the developmental code. It may indicate that the values 
based on economic growth led by the government were not rejected by Korean civil society. 
Within this discursive structure, the old paper certificate of resident registration which does 
not include much information was regarded as old-fashioned and inappropriate in the 
information age. In contrast, the electronic ID card was accepted as a new policy that could 
promote the country to a developed country in the globalization age as it was considered an 
efficient contributor to information-technology development. 
 
4.3.   The period of debate (October 1996 ~ December 1997) 
 
4.3.1. The unfolding process of debate 
 
After the introductory period, it was when the objection to the electronic ID card was 
presented in an international seminar that the debate changed in a fundamental way. The 
decisive moment was the MacBride Roundtable held in Korea in August 1996. The MacBride 
Roundtable is the common name for the committee of international communication research 
which was set up by the decision of the UNESCO general assembly. 
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Table 4-2 The symbolic system of the dispute over the electronic ID card : The introduction period 
The structure of the dispute over the electronic ID card in civil society 
 The Bad The Good 
Policy 





The globalization policy 
The basic law of informatization 
promotion 
The policy of Electronic National ID 
Card 
Discourses 
The inconvenience of information 
access 
People’s inconvenience of 
administrative dealings 
The late modernization 
The inconvenience of holding various  
ID cards 
The convenience of  information 
access 
People’s convenience of 
administrative dealings 
The early informatization 
The improvement of quality of life 
Much information in one card 
The structure of cultural system in civil society 















At this international seminar, the opinions on problems of the electronic ID card, such as the 
issues of privacy invasion, abuse of personal data and violation of human rights, were 
presented. Joohoan Kim, one of speaker of this seminar, criticized the electronic ID card 
project as follows: 
 
The real dangers stem less from the Card itself than the vast database entailed by the Card 
system. The comprehensive database of integrated personal information of the whole 
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population will create the ―mass dataveillance‖ (database + surveillance) system that Clarke 
warned a few years age (Kim J. , 1996, p. 169).  
 
Afterwards, the opposition to the system started to rise in various sectors of civil society. In 
the course of this process, the JSCID was formed by 16 civil society organizations
33
 which 
were opposed to the electronic ID card. The JSCID played an important role in the anti-ID 
card movement. Public opinions against the electronic ID card were disseminated via various 
declarations and forums. For example, the forum (2 November 1996) by the JSCID and a 
forum (16 June 1997) by the Korean Bar Association helped the public to recognize the 
problems of the electronic ID card. Due to the activities of the JSCID, their arguments started 
to appear in the mass media. The media which had not mentioned any risks associated with 
the electronic ID card before began to present debates between the JSCID and the MOHA. In 
particular, The Hankyoreh which is a liberal daily newspaper presented a great deal of 
coverage about the problem of the electronic ID card from October 1996. In addition, the 
activities of the movement against the electronic ID card led most conservative daily 
newspapers to start to report the arguments against it.  
 
According to a study by Park S. H (1999) who analyzed daily newspaper articles relating to 
the electronic ID card, dividing the period from April 1995 to September 1996 and from 
October 1996 to March 1998, the contents of media reporting revealed a notable difference 
between these periods. From Table 4-3, it can be seen that the discursive structure in a civil 
                                                 
33
 They are the Union of Science and Technology Workers, the Coalition for Labour Informatization, the 
Lawyers‘ for Democratic Society, the Confederation of Intellectuals for Democracy and Progress, Social 
Information Network Group, Minkakyup Human Rights Coalition, the YMCA, the National Union of Press, the 
People‘s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, the Human Rights Committee of the Catholic Church, the 
Youth Action Group for Information Culture, the Human Right Committee of the National Council of Churches 
in Korea, National Association Professors for Democratic Society, Korea Young Men‘s Association of Science 
and Technology, and Forum for Kwacheon Citizen. 
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society before the formation of the JSCID concentrated on administrative efficiency, the 
improvement of public convenience, and issues around informatization. However, after 
October 1996, the focus of media had changed to the concerns about the invasion of privacy 
and intensification of surveillance and control.   
 
Table 4- 3 Content analysis of articles related the electronic ID card 
Contents of articles 
April 1995 ~ September  1996 
The frequency (%) 
October 1996 ~ March 1997 
The frequency (%) 
Administrative efficiency 
and cost reduction 
48(85.7%) 49(56.9%) 
Public convenience 33(58.3%) 23(26.7%) 
The diffusion of 
informatization 
11(19.6%) 6(6.9%) 
The invasion of privacy 5(8.9%) 68(79%) 
The intensification of 
surveillance and control 
2(3.5%) 45(52.3%) 
The number of articles 
which were used in 
analysis 
56(100%) 86(100%) 
 The frequency number was calculated including all items covered. 
 Reorganized by author on the basis of Park, S. -h. (1999, p. 51). 
 
With the mobilisation of public opinion against the electronic ID card facilitated by civil 
society organizations, the electronic ID card began to emerge as a hot issue for Korean society. 
The JSCID published a data collection against the electronic ID card in April 1997. It also 
announced manifestos and held a symposium (2 November 1996) to initiate issues over the 
invasion of privacy, surveillance and control by the government. Special symposia by the 
Korean Bar Association (16 June 1997) and the Human Rights Committee of the Catholic 
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Church (30 June 1997) provided an opportunity to enhance public awareness of legal and 
social problems. In particular, the symposium by the lawyer‘s association contributed to the 
conversion of the dispute over the electronic ID card to a social debate as members of the 
Home Affairs Committee in National Assembly attended the symposium by request. (Lee Y. 
H., 1999, p. 184). The symposium provided an opportunity for lawyers to join in the 
construction of opposition opinions. The detailed process of the movement against the 
electronic ID card is summarized in the Appendix 4-1, the chronology of the dispute over the 
electronic ID card. 
 
With growing pressure from action groups and worsening public attitudes, the bill was 
presented to the Home Affairs Committee on the 14
th
 of July 1997. The committee held a 
public hearing on that day, reflecting that it had become a socially controversial issue. At the 
public hearing, two experts, who were introduced by the ruling party, argued that the 
introduction of the electronic ID card did not infringe privacy and basic rights and could be 
one of the bases of the infrastructure for an information society. In contrast, two experts 
representing the opposition parties emphasized that it could lead to intensified surveillance by 
the government and an effective protection of privacy could be achieved by keeping 
fragments of personal information separately (The National Assembly, 1997). Afterwards, the 
bill was referred to the sub-committee of the Home Affairs Committee for detailed 
examination. On the 14
th
 of November, 1997, the sub-committee reported to the Home Affairs 
Committee the motion which two members from the first opposition party voted against. The 
motioned bill excluded some items of the electronic ID card. The contents of the driver‘s 
licence, the certificate of medical insurance and the certificate of national pension were not 
included and the certificate of one‘s seal impression was left up to individual‘s choice. The 
motion was passed at the Assembly plenary session, despite the opposition party‘s objections 
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to it (17 November 1997). However, the anti-card campaign continued because the 
substantive issues associated with the electronic ID card, for example, the invasion of privacy 
and intensification of surveillance and control, were not resolved even if the number of 
recorded items was decreased.  
 
4.3.2. Content of debate 
4.3.2.1. The assertion of opponents 
 
The arguments of the opponents, including the JSCID, can be summarized as follows
34
. One 
type of the argument was related to the issues of privacy invasion and the risk of leaking or 
hacking personal information. Another argument was connected with the high possibility of 
the intensification of surveillance and control by the government. It was argued that the 
electronic ID card was more likely to reinforce the control function of the existing certificate 
of resident registration, which was a vestige of a dictatorial government, and to intensify this 
control because personal information could be combined by the unification of certificates. 
Third, the insufficient legal basis for the card was criticized in the sense that it did not follow 
the six recommendations of OECD Guidelines
35
 for the protection of privacy. Fourthly, the 
probability of inconvenience rather than convenience was suggested. The fact that the 
electronic ID card would provide the infrastructure for accessing electronically all social 
services might cause severe difficulties in the case of the loss of the electronic ID card or 
security number. Fifth, the feasibility of the advance to information-oriented society was 
                                                 
34
 This summary is primarily based on Hong (1997). 
35
 The OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data are 1 Collection 
Limitation Principle, 2 Data Quality Principle, 3 Purpose Specification Principle, 4 Use Limitation Principle, 5 
Security Safeguards Principle, 6 Openness Principle, 7 Individual Participation Principle and 8 Accountability 




challenged. It was suggested that more importance should be laid on what the priority of 
governmental policy for informatization should be. Also, it was insisted that the electronic ID 
card could not reduce dramatically the administrative cost as the government argued, because 
it needed other work to bring it into being (Lee S.-j. , 1997, p. 28)  
 
Public opinion in a civil society against the electronic ID card, then, concerned apprehensions 
about privacy invasion and loss of informational human rights. In particular, the fact that the 
National Intelligence Service would take part in the encoding of the electronic ID card 
reminded people of past experiences of dictatorial governments and how governmental 
control might work. This concern was represented in the media reporting at the time. A 
specialist in cryptology warned as follows: 
 
It is natural for the National Intelligence Service to be willing to replicate the master key for 
the databases of the major 7 ministries ··· it will not be a long time before the staff of the 
National Intelligence Service can look through everyone‘s personal information at his/her 
own office (The Hankyoreh, 7 March 1997). 
 
As the distrust of the secret services and the police stemmed from the historical experience of 
Koreans, the concern about governmental control with the monopolization of information 
could be suffused with disbelief about government motives. It led to the concern that the 
country could become a police state. It was shown in the Declaration of the JSCID:  
 
We have been cautious that this electronic ID card had high possibility of privacy right 
infringement and the information monopolization by the government can produce a severe 
imbalance in the relationship between state power and civil society. In particular, we express 
grave concern that our society would be likely to degenerate into a police state that can 
139 
 
control people because our society has no established framework and practice for 
information right protection (Press release from the JSCID, 18 November 1997).   
 
People were worried that all information would be stored in a digitalized form with an 
identification code and accordingly could be easily and accurately searched and compiled 
with other information within the network databank. More concern was that such jobs would 
be at the government‘s disposal without the limitation of time and space. It was revealed 
clearly in the JSCID‘ Data Collection‘s title, the Coming of the Electronic Surveillance 
Society. As a result, the argument that the surrender of freedom would result in ordinary life 
being controlled by power came to be disseminated in a civil society. 
 
··· the anxiety of opponents warning of the electronic panopticon could not be eliminated. It 
seems to reach the situation that all citizens become criminals without committing a crime 
and are locked in the microchip rather than in the iron bars of prison (Lee G. P., 1997). 
 
The concern about governmental control opened a discussion that the policy of the electronic 
ID card itself could threaten democracy. It was argued that the invasion of privacy, the 
information intensification and the obscurity of information management by the government 
could violate the basic rules of democracy. 
 
The reason why it [the electronic ID card] is the first in the world is that developing 
countries with authoritarian remnants do not possess resources and technology for this 
system while developed countries with them have a deep-rooted people‘s concept and 





4.3.2.2. The assertion of proponents 
  
The government‘s opinion for the enforcement of the electronic ID card can be summarized 
as follows
36
: Basically, as the system of resident registration was introduced in the perspective 
of administrative business management by the government, it was an essential system to 
protect governmental security and to enhance public welfare. Furthermore, the electronic ID 
card would contribute to improve its efficiency. 
 
The government contradicted the anti-campaign‘s arguments. First, as for concerns about  
privacy invasion, it insisted that the content of the electronic ID card could be accessed only 
by the qualified institutions and the minimum items included in the electronic ID card by 
related laws, such as data relating to people‘s status and qualifications. So, the government 
asserted that the possibility of infringement of basic rights might be very low and particularly, 
the more problematic items relating to privacy invasion were now to be excluded. Also, it was 
emphasized that the system of the electronic ID card had a security system with the latest 
technology in order to be protected from hackers.  
 
The government tried to link the electronic ID card to an information-oriented society and 
asserted that the electronic ID card was a well-matched system to the requirements of 
information society. It also insisted that the rejection of it by opponents was due to ignorance 
of technology. It also took the stance that the leaking of information and hacking could be 
prevented by technology. The discourse below expressed that the electronic ID card could 
keep up with the changing of the times. 
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The project of the electronic ID card will be necessary in pursuit of the flow of information 
age. And it is possible that if the problem is revealed, it will be complemented institutionally 




There is nothing but ambiguous objection caused by the lack of technical understanding. 
However, this ID card is merely the combination of a certificate of resident registration, a 
certificate of medical insurance and a driving licence and so on which are brought separately 




Proponents of the electronic ID card plan optimistically anticipated the future after the 
electronic ID card was implemented:  
 
One day in January of 1998, in an emergency room of the Seoul National University 
Hospital, a person was taken in an ambulance from a car accident and the medical history 
was seen on screen immediately as soon as the electronic IC card was inserted into a card 
reader.  It showed that the person had an adverse reaction to penicillin and a rare blood type 
RH-. The person in danger was saved by paramedics taking emergency measures on the 
basis of such information. This would be one scene which shows the use of the electronic IC 
card replacing (paper) resident registration certificates of 34 million people in the coming 
1998 (JoongAng Daily, 10 December 1996).  
 
Second, it contradicted the concern about the surveillance and control by government. It was 
suggested that the limit on access could prevent the intensification of information control. The 
government argued that abuse of personal data could be detected technically and the 
protection committee of the electronic ID card was tasked to investigate abuse of data. 
                                                 
37
 This is an opinion of Hwang Jong-sun, a Professor of computer engineering department at Korea University. 
38
 It is the announcement of the MOHA.  
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Regarding the electronic ID card‘s loss, it was asserted that the risk of loss could be reduced, 
because the obligation of possessing it was removed in the new revised bill and it was a 
requisite only for some occasions, such as in a bank or hospital.  
 
Proponents stressed the benefits, such as efficiency and convenience rather than the problem 
of this system. It was well expressed in the assertion of a public officer of the MOHA (Jang, 
1997). His illustration about the efficiency and cost reduction was that Korea would need only 
one day and little cost to make a voter‘s list for the National Assembly owing to the computer 
network of resident registration, while Japan spent a total six trillion yen for 3 months. 
Moreover, he stressed that if the system of electronic ID cards were to operate it would reduce 
costs hugely and gives better administrative services than the existing resident registration 
system. Such a contention of the MOHA was depicted in the media as follows: 
 
If the electronic ID card is launched, the direct administrative cost for issuing the certified 
copy and abstract of resident registration, which amounts to one trillion won annually, as 
well as the indirect cost will cut down dramatically, because the certified copy and abstract 
of resident registration can be issued via self-service machines that will be set up at public 
places, such as banks, schools, department stores, and subway stations (JoongAng Daily, 4 
November 1996).  
 
Third, as for the insufficient legal base, the government maintained that it was promoted on 
the basis of the resident registration law and would revise the related laws of 1997. It 
supported the notion that the policy could be enacted with the revision of existing law, since 




In conclusion, the argument in the civil society in favour of the electronic ID card policy was 
still represented broadly in two ways; the electronic ID card was not only linked to the 
information society, but also could accentuate  efficiency and convenience. On the basis of 
the above review, Table 4-4 depicts the opinions of advocates and opponents of the electronic 
ID card. 
 
Table 4-4 The contents about the dispute between advocators and opponents 
 Against the electronic ID card In favour of the electronic ID card 
Actor   
 
Civil society associations like the 
JSCID 
The Lawyer’s association 
The Human Rights Committee of the 
Korean Catholic Church 
The MOHA 




Contents   
The invasion of 
privacy 
The leakage of personal information 
will increase. 
The damage from errors of   
computation records will grow. 
 
 
It can be protected with the newest 
technology. 
The illegal data leakage and hacking 
are punished institutionally 






It worsens the problem of the 
certificate of resident registration. 
The personal information is 
concentrated and control with the 
integrated certificate is intensified. 
 
The information concentration can 
be protected institutionally 
The access is limited. 
A committee for data protection of 




The related laws and regulations are 
insufficient. 
The international standards are not 
satisfied. 
The legal ground is enough as the 
resident regulation law and the 





The difficulty of social activity can 
happen when it is lost. 
There are many people who cannot 
memorize an ID number 
The risk of loss is reduced as the 





The self-machine will be set up in 
only village offices because of the 





The governmental human power 
cannot be diminished. It was not 
reduced despite of computerization. 
  
It is convenient as the certified copy 
and abstract of resident registration 
can be issued via self-service 
machines at public places. It is 
possible to confirm their seal with 
the electronic ID card in banks and so 
on. 
There is a convenience of possession 
as it integrates many cards. 
The administrative human power is 
reduced. 
The contents of 
symbolic 
conflict in civil 
society 
Privacy is invaded. 
The degrading human rights caused 
by control intensification of 
government are concerned.  
It is a main stream of information 
age. 
It improves convenience and 
efficiency. 
 
4.4. The final period (December 1997~February 1999) 
 
4.4.1. The transformation of the situation and abandonment of the 
electronic ID card 
 
The dispute over the electronic ID card in civil society strongly affected politics, so the 
electronic ID card was selected as one of the main topics of TV debate for the presidential 
election (14 December 1997). Although all three presidential candidates expressed their 
concern about the electronic ID card, only Kim Dae-jung, a candidate of the opposition party, 
opposed it outright. The other two candidates followed the opinion of supporters that it would 
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be possible to be implemented, if the technical points were resolved in order not to invade 
privacy. Kim Dae-jung, who had suffered from surveillance and wiretapping during the past 
military regimes, declared an objection to the project with reasons such as the protection of 
privacy and human rights. 
 
I do not agree with this system in principle. It should be cautious because if we only consider 
the governmental convenience and administrative ability, it will result in neglecting privacy 
and human rights. Furthermore, nowadays this country cannot ensure people‘s private life as 
phone-tapping is prevalent and diffusing the secret of saving. So, I believe if it came into 
operation, the privacy of all people would be violated greatly. ··· I would like to say that, in 
principle, I don‘t agree.39 
 
Then Kim Dae-jung won the presidential election in 1997. At that time, Korean society was in 
the middle of a financial crisis and the President-elect Kim Dae-jung was regarding himself as 
a president ready to tackle the economic crisis. Under this critical situation, the Kim Young-
sam government and its globalization policy that might be regarded as the cause of the 
financial crisis took the place of the profane in the symbolic system of civil society. 
 
In this context, on the 30
th
 of December 1997, the Declaration of the JSCID shifted its 
opposition to the large amount of budget and the operating equipment to be imported, rather 
than the invasion of privacy, the protection of human rights and the intensification of 
surveillance which had up to then mainly been debated. As such, it is noteworthy that the 
developmental code was now also used to oppose the electronic ID card project at this time. 
The benefits of the plan supported by developmental code, such as the reduction of cost, were 
                                                 
39
 It comes from the discussion records of presidential candidates (14 December 1997). 
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re-evaluated. The electronic ID card was linked to the situation of Korean society suffering 
economic hardship supervised by the IMF.  
 
The policy of the electronic ID card has other problems apart from the things discussed 
earlier we consider in our new situation where we have to worry.  ··· in circumstance a large 
scale of budget cut is required. ··· The project of electronic ID card is the first to be 
scrapped. ··· It is necessary to have various new technologies and equipment for operation 
but most of them are not domestic products (Press release from the JSCID, 30 December 
1997).  
 
In January 1998, it was reported that the Presidential Transition Committee had asked the 
Board of Audit and Inspection to investigate the MOHA for its illegitimate use of the budget 
for the promotion of the electronic ID card. Both the National Intelligence Service and the 
police were also implicated.  
 
In February, the Presidential Transition Committee requested the MOHA to ban the execution 
of the budget as it was suspected of budget illegalities before confirmation of the project.  
 
The Board of Audit and Inspection audited intensively the actual condition and validity of the 
electronic ID card project from April. As a result, it was revealed that the MOHA had 
misused the budget. So, the policy of the electronic ID card became one of the faulty policies 
relating to the financial crisis brought about by the Kim Young-sam government. The project 




By July 1998, the Board of Audit and Inspection pointed out that the project of the electronic 
ID card had no validity in comparison with required budget and recommended the total re-
examination of this project.  
 
Consequently, the MOHA decided to defer the project of the electronic ID card taking 
national economic crisis into consideration. Finally, the new government announced the 
abandonment of the whole project in February 1999. 
 
4.4.2. The structure of discourses in civil society in the final period 
 
On the basis of symbolic conflict over the electronic ID card in a civil society, it can be 
concluded that Korean society realized that the value of the protection of privacy, 
informational human rights and democracy were more important in information society and it 
affected the cultural system of Korean civil society.  
 
The result of the dispute shows that both democratic codes, such as privacy, democracy and 
human rights, and existing industrialisation codes, such as rationality, efficiency and fastness, 
started to coexist in the value system around informatization.  
 
It can also be illustrated that the existing values around the electronic ID card in Korean civil 
society had undergone change through symbolic conflict during this period. Table 4-5 shows 
the symbolic system of the Korean society after the controversy over the electronic ID card. 
Compared to the introduction time at May 1995 (Table 4-2), it was found that a more 




Table 4-5 The symbolic system of the dispute over the electronic ID card : The final period  
The structure of the dispute over the electronic ID card in civil society 
 The Bad The Good 
Policy 
The policy of resident registration 




President Kim Young-sam 
The National Intelligence Service 
The IMF 
The President-elect Kim Dae-Jung 
The JSCID 
The Board of Audit and Inspection 
Discourses 
The prisoners of electronic 
panopticon locked in microchip 
The electronic surveillance society 
The invasion of privacy 
Degrading human rights 
The intensification of information by 
the government and police 
The use of imported equipments and 
technology which spent lots of 
budget 




The protection of privacy 
 




The reduced budget to overcome IMF 
 
The structure of cultural value system in civil society 



























On the other hand, it is worthy to note that the economic situation of that time as well as Kim 
Young-sam government and the financial crisis played a crucial role in placing the electronic 




Alexander (1993, pp. 293-4) suggests that ―because both action and its environments are 
indelibly interpenetrated by the nonrational, a pure technically rational world cannot exist, so 
this prototype of modern technology has been caught within a deep and traditional cultural 
web.‖ His argument provides insight into the exploration of a new social situation like 
informatization based on new information technology. Meanwhile, Castells points out that the 
essential struggle in the network society ―lie in the redefinition of cultural codes in the human 
mind‖ (2000, p. 140). It implies that a new social change caused by informatization can also 
be interpreted within the existing cultural system. 
 
The ID card was promoted without any opposition from civil society, but a year and a half 
later was terminated because of their strong objections. From the perspective of the social 
movement theory, it is not clear why the civil society position on the ID card debate changed 
given the dramatic growth of civil society movements in Korea in the 1990s.  It needs more 
systematic analysis of structural changes.  
 
Along these lines, this chapter has borrowed the framework of tradition of codes to examine 
the dispute over the electronic ID card in Korea. In the sense that the debate period was 
between April 1995 and February 1999, it showed how existing codes underwent change at 
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the beginning stage of the transition toward democracy in Korea. On the basis of the above 
discussion in the process of the debate, some implication can be drawn as follows. 
  
First, it can be noted that Korean society has multiple codes. The debate over the electronic 
ID card can be described as a collision of two codes that are characteristic of a civil society; 
the developmental code of efficient administration, convenience to the people, information 
and national competitiveness versus the democratic code of human rights and privacy. The 
dispute over the electronic ID card also shows that the co-existence of multiple codes in civil 
society involves a potentially symbolic conflict.  
 
Second, it can be concluded that the classification of the sacred and the profane is not absolute 
and can be subject to change through the process of symbolic conflict in a civil society. In 
Korea, the government-driven economic development regarded the industrial code of 
efficiency as sacred. In this context, at the initial stage of the debate, the policy could be 
accepted without any opposition. However, in the course of the debate, the democratic code of 
human rights was added to the sacred. Hence, both the developmental code and the 
democratic code had a sacred status. The electronic ID card as a particular sign became 
signified by the developmental code in the initial stages, but a year and a half later became re-
signified by the democratic code, losing much of its justification.  
 
As suggested by existing studies, the lack of response of civil society in the initial stage may 
have been influenced by the Confucian legacy of virtuous government in government-led 
informatization. This argument may lead to the explanation that opposition from civil society 
in the following stages came from the destruction of a virtuous government image. However, 
this argument provides few explanations of why the virtuous government image was 
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destroyed. Hence, I argue that it is more appropriate to explain the lack of response of civil 
society to the electronic ID card as related to the developmental code of informatization 
which might be reinforced by the Confucian legacy of virtuous government. Along these lines, 
the scrapping of the electronic ID card is the result of the ID card policy‘s resignification by 
the democratic code. 
 
Third, it can be found that the democratic code has the tendency to be dominant in the early 
stage of the transition toward democracy in Korea. However, following the research drawing 
on multiple discourses and multiple codes
40
, Korean civil society at that time which was an 
unsettled and less established civil society would face a challenge to the validation of a 
dominant code.  
 
Fourth, it can be suggested that the dispute over the electronic ID card provided a decisive 
moment for civil society organization to become more aware of the privacy issue. Various 
civil movement groups including religious organizations, lawyers‘ association and professors‘ 
groups started to pay more attention to information rights in the information age. For example, 
the Progressive (Jinbo) Network which formed in November 1998 published a newsletter 
regularly. It may indicate that informatization in Korea would depend on democratic code as 
well as developmental code and accordingly democratic value may not be sacrificed for the 
sake of developmental value. What is noteworthy is that the significance of the ID card in 
today‘s Korea cannot be neglected. A resident registration number has been prevalently used 
to identify an individual in various areas of Korean society; in the private sector as well as in 
the public sector and in transactions online as well as offline. Because a resident registration 
number has been employed as a reference key, information on individuals has been 
                                                 
40
 See the discussion in section 3.2.2. 
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transformed into database easily and cheaply. It indicates that economic efficiency and 
convenience of a resident registration number may lead to the reluctance to replace it with an 
alternative in the private sector as well as in the public sector, regardless of its possibility of 
the invasion of privacy and the intensification of surveillance and control.   
 
Finally, the external effect on civil society can play a significant role in symbolic conflict. In 
the case of the electronic ID card policy, the foreign experts raised the question and gave a 
chance for Korean society to think over the developmental code which was sacred at the time. 
Another external factor was the financial crisis of 1997 which sped up the ending of the 
dispute. It is also necessary to note that such an external component is likely to change the 

















5.1. Introduction  
 
During 27 years (1961-1987), dictatorial regimes in Korea suppressed civil society and left 
huge legacies including the authoritarian social values based on government-led economic 
development. Their demise has transformed civil society dramatically. In particular, this 
growth of civil society was accelerated by the first transfer of power by the opposition party 
in 1998 and the first accession to power by only democratic forces without any coalition in 
2002.  
 
These series of events brought two significant changes in civil society in Korea. One is that 
civil movements in various areas have been activated and voluntary and autonomous 
associations in civil society have flourished (Chang W.-Y. , 2006, pp. 53-4). It connotes the 
possibility of a conflict not only between the government and social organizations but also 
between social organizations. The other change is that democratic values have begun to be 
understood as the proper way for dialogue in civil society, while legacies of authoritarianism 
still remain. As discussed in chapter 4, a higher value started to be placed on the democratic 
code rather than the developmental code. However, it does not indicate that the developmental 
code has disappeared. As discussed in the framework of multiple discourses and multiple 
codes in Section 3.2.2, it is more likely to be still ―active in the cultural process‖ and ―remain 
as a powerful residual legacy.‖ 
 
This chapter aims to explore the above changes in civil society in Korea by examining the 
controversy over the National Education Information System (hereafter NEIS). The NEIS was 
designed as an online based comprehensive education information management system. It 
attempted to connect around 10,000 elementary, middle and high schools, and education 
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administration offices, such as the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development 
(hereafter MOE) and the 182 local offices and 16 Metropolitan or provincial Offices of 
Education. The system was intended to collect a wide range of information on academic 
affairs, administrative affairs, students‘ personal records including health records, and so on.  
 
In this regard, the debate over the NEIS may have similarity to the controversy over the 
electronic ID card. Both of them are debates over information-related policies and are based 
on the conflict between developmental codes and democratic codes. However, while the 
electronic ID card was terminated, the NEIS has been implemented after some revisions. This 
difference provides the motivation of this chapter. Another motivation comes from the periods 
of two debates. While the main debate on the electronic ID card started in the first 
government elected from the opposition party through a coalition with a conservative party in 
1998, that of the NEIS was conducted after the first accession to power by only democratic 
forces without any coalition in 2002. This raises the question about what happened in civil 
society in the transition toward democracy.  
 
The dispute over the NEIS well reflects the aspects of civil society in the transition to 
democracy, such as conflicts between social organizations and confrontations between 
cultural codes. At the beginning stage, the dispute was between educational organizations and 
the Korean government and then was intensified to cause a conflict between various 
educational organizations divided by their ideological orientations. The first main contenders 
of the debate were the MOE versus educational organizations. As the conflict extended to 
confrontations between teachers‘ organizations, which were divided according to political 
disposition, the dispute over the NEIS became complicated (Jho W.-S. , 2004; Chang W.-Y. , 
2004; Moon & Ryoo, 2006). Accordingly, central to the debate over NEIS was the conflict 
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between conservative organizations and liberal organizations. In the process of the debate 
over the NEIS, the symbolic meaning of the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers‘ 
Union (hereafter KTU), which was a main opponent, affected the structure of the controversy. 
The KTU was regarded as a radical organization and therefore conservative forces attempted 
to link the arguments of the KTU to a rigid anti-reform image and a threat to national interest, 
regardless of the content. As a result, while this debate started as a conflict between the 
human rights of information and administrative efficiency, it transformed into a conflict 
between developmental codes of the conservative forces and democratic codes of the liberal-
reform forces within civil society. 
 
Existing studies on the conflicts surrounding the NEIS have examined them from the 
perspectives of decision making mechanism; governance mechanism (Jho W.-S. , 2004), 
social shaping of technology (Chang W.-Y. , 2004), conflict resolution in decision making 
process (Park J. , 2006) and policy making (Ha, Joo, Kang, Lah, & Jang, 2009). Hence, they 
have emphasized what was needed for conflict resolution in the case of the NEIS. However, 
existing studies have had the tendency to overlook what motivates the discussants and what 
sort of symbolic codes they draw on to define discussants and to create categories of inclusion 
and exclusion. Existing studies on the democratic transition and consolidation in Korea have 
an analytic limit in answering these questions i) why did two democratic-forces-based 
governments (the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments) promote the NEIS, though 
the first democratic-forces-based government had scrapped the electronic ID card with similar 
objectives, such as national competitiveness?  ii) What made the second democratic-forces-
based government put a priority on the NEIS over democratic values, even though the NEIS 
was criticized to be anti-democratic by democratic forces? iii) What influenced the 
interactions between social organizations within civil society? And iv) how did social 
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organizations define their inclusion and exclusion? To answer it, this chapter draws on the 
framework of Alexander‘s ―codes of civil society‖ and developments of it, as discussed in 
chapter 2.  
 
In the process of the debate over the NEIS, the two turning points are the launch of the NEIS 
in March 2003 and the establishment of the Education Informatization Committee (hereafter 
EIC) under the Prime Minister in June 2003. With them in mind, it would be useful to divide 
the process of the debate over the NEIS into the three periods: first, the beginning period of 
the debate (January 2000-February 2003) when the plan of the NEIS was formulated; Second, 
the deepening period of the debate (March 2003- June 2003) when the NEIS was launched 
and the EIC was established under the Prime Minister; Third, the period of mediation (July 
2003-December 2003) when the mediation and the agreement was made by the EIC. 
 
5.2. The period of introduction the NEIS and the beginning of 
debate (January 2000 ~ February 2003)  
 
5.2.1. The background of education administration computerization and 
the introduction of the NEIS 
 
The NEIS was introduced as part of a number of projects of education informatization which 
were promoted by Korean government in line with the government‘s informatization policy. 
In pursuit of strengthening national competitiveness in the information age, the ―Framework 
Act on the Promotion of Information and Communication Technology‖ was enacted in 1995 
and the ―Education Informatization Promotion Action Plan‖ was instituted in 1996 (Ministry 
of Education & Human Resources Development, 2000). The basic plan for establishing an 
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integrated School Information Management System (hereafter SIMS) was undertaken for 
handling academic and administrative affairs and the SIMS in Korea has progressed to two 
systems; the Client Server (hereafter C/S) system and the NEIS. 
 
In 1998, the C/S system for academic and administrative affairs was supplied to all schools 
nationwide
41
. Its prominent feature was the first SIMS to be operated as a closed network to 
which access from outside a school was blocked and was managed by a school principal. 
Approximately 90% of the entire elementary, middle, and high schools installed this system 
by 2001, expending 147 billion Korean Won (US$ 134 million) (The Donga Ilbo, 15 May 
2003).  
 
In 2001, the NEIS was introduced as one of eleven major plans in an E-government project. 
Compared to the C/S system, the NEIS had salient characteristics in terms of openness and 
the scope of data collection. Unlike the school-based C/S system, the NEIS was designed as a 
regional-based integrated system which attempted to connect schools across the country to 
education offices in cities and provinces and the MOE through the Internet
42
 (Chang W.-Y. , 
2004, p. 171). Its goal was to improve efficiency of education administration within schools 
                                                 
41
 It encompassed various applications, such as student health records management, school affairs, and tutoring 
as well as existing student school life record management. Before the C/S system, the Stand Alone (hereafter 
S/A) system was used. It was a PC application for a student‘s school life record management program. It was 
supplied to schools nationwide in 1997. Its infrastructure was formulated by the government‘s national 
computerization project whose main features were the computer distribution policy for a computer lab with 20 
PCs per school and a PC with a printer per teacher. The goal of the S/A system was to replace hand-written 
documents. The traditional management method was the hand-written method by which teachers recorded notes 
on all students on a personal information card. In contrast, the S/A system was designed to store students‘ 
information such as the school-life records on a PC. However, under this system, the PCs containing students‘ 
personal information did not link to the network and were managed by teachers (Ministry of Education & 
Human Resources Development, 2001a; Korea Teachers and Educational Worker's Union, September 2003). 
42
 Appendix 5-1 shows the comparison of C/S system and the NEIS.  
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and education offices and logically to combine, and link, the previous individual and closed 
SIMS. As a result, this system aimed to give education offices in cities and provinces and the 
MOE the authority to control integrated databases registered by each school and to deal with 
education administration electronically. 
 
Moreover, the NEIS was designed to collect massive information about teachers as well as 
students and parents. To this end, it was categorized into 27 sections about overall areas of 
education administration, as shown in Appendix 5-2. While 24 sections were related to 
general administration, 3 sections were associated with school administration (Ministry of 
Education & Human Resources Development, 2005). The first group covered general 
administration areas, such as teacher and staff Human Resource, Pay-roll, Facilities, Budget, 
Accounting, Supplies, and etc. It also incorporated information on each teacher including 27 
items
43
, such as basic personnel data and, of particular significance, records of political 
activities. The second group was intended to collect 385 personnel records per student, 
comprising three categories: School/student affairs (170 items), Admission/admission to a 
school of higher grade (45 records) and Student health (143 records)
44
. The installation of the 
NEIS cost 52 billion Korean Won (US$ 47 million).  
                                                 
43
 They include resident registration number, birthdates, residence address, military service records, health status, 
religion, wealth records, family backgrounds, educational backgrounds, employment test, awards and 
disciplinary action. 
44
 ―School/student affairs‖ included 170 items related to student‘s records of basic personnel (e.g. resident 
registration number, a beneficiary of social security programs or not, a head of household or not, birthdates, 
residence address, educational backgrounds of a student and parents, disabled or not, etc), behaviour and school 
life (e.g. awards, scholarships, future dreams, disciplinary action, records of counselling and delinquency, school 
activities, certificates, etc), and exam scores. ―Admission/Admission to a school of higher grade‖ consisted of 45 
records per student, such as resident registration number, picture, attendance, special talents, scores, etc. 
―Student health‖ encompassed 143 records of a student‘s health, such as physical examination, fitness test, oral 
hygiene and pathology test, disease history, and results of a comprehensive check-up (e.g. obesity, malnutrition, 




While the previous C/S system concentrated on dealing with administrative affairs inside 
schools, the NEIS was intended to carry out education administration outside schools 
synthetically by linking all affairs in 27
 
work categories. The NEIS, following the C/S system, 
can be understood as the most modernized version with computerization and networking to 




On the basis of the above, two implications can be drawn. One is that the NEIS might be 
expected to raise inherent concerns about both teachers‘ workload for operating the NEIS and 
about the extensive accumulation of highly sensitive private information. Compared to the 
C/S system, the NEIS attempted to newly introduce most information categories except for 
supplies, budget and accounting and also expanded the scope of data related to school/student 
affairs, admission and student health (Hwang & Choi, 2003). Accordingly, the scope of data 
collection involved a potential opposition from teachers and students. The other implication is 
that the NEIS had a high likelihood of generating problematic and divisive conflict between 
contenders in the dispute. It is closely related to its characteristic of integrated open 
information system containing various and massive data on students, parents and teachers. In 
this regard, the NEIS would permit the government to link together, using resident 
registration number, and produce valuable information about people without their consent. It 
may indicate that while the government had the strong incentive to develop the NEIS under 
                                                 
45
 The above development of the SIMS in Korea can be summarized as the process to improve efficiency in 
administrative information management with the following characteristics (Chang W-Y, 2004, p. 168). First, it is 
found that education information management has changed from manual to computerization and from a closed 
system to an open system. The second feature is that the SIMS has evolved into a cumulative and integrated 
system from individual and decentralized system. The last is that the amount of information under the 
government‘s control has the tendency to increase in line with a computerized educational network. What is 
noteworthy is that these salient features of the above changes were well reflected in the NEIS. 
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the name of administrative efficiency, it was inevitably destined to face a lot of strong 
resistance insisting both invasion of privacy and more fatal damage inflicted by information 
leakage. In other words, the NEIS connoted the conflict between civil society organizations 
and the government and the tension between administrative efficiency and protection of 
privacy in Korean civil society where democratic values have already become settled. 
  
5.2.2. The unfolding process of debate   
 
The introductory period of the debate over the NEIS was from January 2000 to February 2003, 
as summarized in Appendix 5-3. The NEIS project originated from the New Year Policy 
Address by the President in January 2000. President Kim Dae-jung, who was the first 
president elected from the opposition party, placed priority on the agenda for the 10
th
 most 
powerful nation in information and knowledge as one of ways to recover from the financial 
crisis in 1997. Along this line, he announced the early completion of the comprehensive plan 
for education informatization in 2000, which was originally targeted for 2002.  
 
In May 2001, the Special Committee for E-government selected the NEIS as one of 11 major 
government initiatives, which were planned to be completed by November 2002. It led to the 
decision to replace the C/S system with the NEIS in July 2001
46
. The serial steps
47
 were taken 




                                                 
46
 The plan for a Nationwide Educational Administration Information System for the Promotion of E-
government was established and the basis plan for the NEIS was formulated in November 2001. 
47
 These are system design, S/W development and H/W & infrastructure building. 
48 One of the reasons for this schedule was to meet the E-government projects schedule to be completed in 
November, a month before the next presidential election. Another practical reason was that the NEIS was 
planned to open in time for the beginning of the second academic semester of 2002. 
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However, teachers who attended at the early stage of user training courses, started to voice 
complaints about the NEIS, blaming its system failure and concerns about instability 
problems on the NEIS. For teachers, the NEIS seemed to increase the workload of teachers, in 
contrast to government claims. As a result, the KTU and the Korean Federation of Teachers‘ 
Association (hereafter KFTA) urged the MOE to revise the NEIS and to delay its launch. To 
be more specific, they demanded the removal of sensitive information in three categories, 
such as ―School/student affairs‖, ―Admission/Admission to a School of higher grade‖ and 





The MOE accepted their suggestions for the purpose of a quick end to negotiations. The 
acceptance was partly because E-government projects including the NEIS were planned to be 
finished by November 2002 (Press release from the KTU, 30 August 2002)
50
. The NEIS, 
except for three categories, was launched, but the MOE agreed that the implementation of the 
final three categories in this system would be delayed until March 2003. On the 20
th
 of 
September 2002, the MOE decided to delete some sensitive personal information
51
 from the 
NEIS (The Hankyoreh 21, 19 July 2003)
52
. On the 4
th




                                                 
49
 The examples of their resistance are the signature campaign against the NEIS and the refusal to accept official 
NEIS certification. At the same time, teachers‘ organizations suggested establishment of a policy consultation 
meeting to discuss how to correct and improve the NEIS. 
50
 It is a summary of the talks between the KTU and the MOE on 29
th
 August 2002. 
51
 The examples are mobile phone numbers and e-mail addresses of students, and resident registration numbers, 
the final academic background, mobile phone numbers, family background, and occupation of parents. 
52
 While the items such as mobile phone numbers and E-mail addresses of students and the resident registration 
number, the final academic background, mobile phone numbers of parents were excluded on 20 September 2002 
in coordination with the education ministry itself, family background information was changed to special details 
at that time and then deleted on 12 January 2003. Occupation of parents was also removed in April 2003 after the 




Despite the MOE‘s concession to teachers‘ organizations, their opposition to the NEIS was 
intensified by two significant changes in the political landscape in December 2002. One was 
the presidential election in December which ended with the succession of Roh Moo-hyun, 
who got support from the democratic-reform forces in the vehement confrontation between 
the conservative forces and the democratic forces. The other change was that a new executive 
board of the KTU was elected in December. Unlike the former executive board, it requested 
the withdrawal of the NEIS and the KTU‘s anti-NEIS movement became fierce, such as filing 
a petition to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea
54
 (hereafter NHRC) with 24 
educational non-government organizations such as the People‘s Solidarity of Participatory 
Democracy on the 19
th




5.2.3. Content of debate 
 
The opponents to the NEIS emphasized the massive information accumulation in the NEIS. 
By linking ―information accumulation‖ to ―workload‖ and ―human rights,‖ the critics against 
the NEIS attempted to portray the NEIS as overburdened and a serious threat to democracy. 
The arguments of opponents in this period can be summarized as follows: i) the workload of 
teachers with computers may increase rather than decrease ii) the NEIS is highly likely to 
infringe human rights of information iii) the NEIS is a kind of education control system for 
the control and surveillance by the government iv) hacking and leakage of information seems 
to be inevitable partly because of commercial interests. 
                                                                                                                                                        
53
 The pilot service was offered to fifteen schools in five cities and provinces, expanding to 276 schools later. 
54
 The NHRC was ―established in 2001 as a national advocacy institution for human rights protection.‖ 
55
 Other anti-NEIS movements began suing the Minister of Education (14 February, 2003), holding a public 




First, opponents including both the KTU and the KFTA contended that the NEIS would 
increase the workload of teachers partly because the NEIS in the early stage contained various 
errors and system lags. Hence, the KTU requested a revision of the NEIS prior to the 
implementation (27 August 2002) due to frequent policy changes in the information required, 
which led to an increase in computer workload. 
 
Frequent policy changes created confusion at schools, such as training for system conversion, 
greater workloads from transferring existing data to the new system and reregistering data, 
and much trial and error caused by system instability and frequent software upgrades (Press 
release from the KTU, 27 August 2002) 
 
They pointed out that teachers had to input so much information about their work, including 
tutoring and management of teaching materials into the NEIS that it would overburden them
56
. 
The KFTA also urged the MOE to delay the implementation of the NEIS, while it required 
the change of old PCs, the user-oriented program and the reduction of educationally 
unnecessary input items (2 September 2002).  
 
Second, groups in the opposition attempted to link the NEIS to infringement of human rights 
of information. The basic argument was that without consent by students, parents and teachers, 
                                                 
56
  The survey of teachers in Seoul by the KTU in August 2002 showed that one of the main problems in the 
introduction of the NEIS was the workload of teachers. 
 
As for the problems in the introduction of the NEIS, teachers chose trial and error method due to a 
lack of understanding by teachers (23.2%) and an increase in workload of teachers (23.2%). 
Additional issues that were pointed out were human rights of information (19.1%) and instability of 




the NEIS aimed to collect and accumulate excessive information in three privacy-sensitive 
categories; School/student affairs, Admission/admission to a school of higher grade and 
Student health
57
 (Moon & Ryoo, 2006, p. 201). They maintained that as far as such 
information was centralized in the network of the MOE through the NEIS, the students‘ 
privacy could not be protected. The following manifesto (6 February 2003) by the coalition of 
Non-Government Organizations against the NEIS
58
 showed a concern over the contents of 
databases to be collected. 
 
The confidential personal information such as individual students‘ school records, various 
activities inside and outside school, health records, and medical histories have been collected 
and also, the sensitive personal information of teachers such as activities at parties and social 
organizations and total assets have been accumulated (A Joint Meeting for Protection of 
Privacy and the Abolition of NEIS, 2003, p. 43).  
 
The fear was apparent in the survey by the KFTA (August 2002). 94.9 % of teachers 
answered that new system required too much personal information of teachers and students 
and accordingly invasion of privacy and infringement of personal information were probable 
(Yonhapnews, 4 September 2002). 
 
                                                 
57
 Along this line, it was also stressed that the MOE not only accumulated massive personal information of all 
graduates without the concerned people‘s consent, but also was already converting all information of schools 
into the NEIS from February 2002. 
58
 23 entities included a political party (Democratic Labour Party, Minju-nodong dang), organizations for 
information rights (Coalition against Fingerprint, Korean Progressive (Jinbo) Network, etc), human rights 
organizations (Korean Human Rights Group (Sarangbang),   People‘s Solidarity for Social Progress, Citizen‘s 
Action and Solidarity for Human Rights, People‘s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, etc), Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions, education organizations (Korean Professors Union, KTU, Parents Associations 
for True Education, etc), cultural organizations, etc. 
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Third, the NEIS was portrayed as a control and surveillance system on the part of the 
government since it was centrally operated by the MOE and could be interconnected to 
various government databases with indices such as resident registration number.  
 
This huge accumulation and concentration of personal information was a severe invasion on 
the privacy and security of the public, and a dangerous step toward a totalitarian society of 
surveillance and control. ··· The main concern is that personal information can be transferred 
to other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Military Manpower 
Administration, the National Police Agency and the National Intelligence Service, which are 
not related to education and possibly be misused for other purposes rather than education (A 
Joint Meeting for Protection of Privacy and the Abolition of NEIS, 2003, p. 43).   
 
In addition, they claimed that it would be possible for teachers‘ work to be controlled by the 
authorities through the NEIS system, as the activities of teachers would be recorded and 
managed (Kim J.-c. , 2003, pp. 11-23). 
 
The NEIS is an education control system just with administration but without education. If 
personal information is integrated in the central server of the government, discrimination and 
exclusion are inevitable (Press release from the KTU, 18 February 2003).  
 
Conservative newspapers also pointed out problems about the integration and accumulation of 
information by the government.  
 
··· the education ministry has to reconsider if it is an anachronistic idea that the central 





Lastly, the opponents‘ critics emphasized a potential danger of hacking and leakage of 
information. This concern was originated from the NEIS‘s feature of an Internet and regional-
based integrated system. 
 
The Association said that as all teachers nationwide use the network, information leakage by 
an insider is possible because of the free access of information in national institutions such as 
education offices and the ministry (The Chosun Ilbo, 22 September 2002). 
 
According to the nationwide survey of parents by the KTU in February 2003, 82.3% of 
respondents worried about high possibility of information leakage and 86.7% of them raised 
concerns about the infringement of human rights by the leakage (Press release from the KTU, 
14 February 2003).  
 
The detractors of the NEIS believed that there would be a strong possibility of information 
leakage induced by commercial needs. The above survey by the KTU (February 2003) found 
that 85.1% of parents expressed fears over commercial utilization of leaked information by 
companies.  
 
The KTU and other organizations argue that it could produce the extreme side effects if the 
security system of NEIS is easily intruded by hackers. For example, it is so easy to find out 
students who are physically retarded (e.g. under 140cm tall) or are obese (e.g. over 65kg) in 
the second year of middle school. This information is valuable for companies which are 
planning to start some business relating to obesity clinic. Therefore, the concern is raised that 
the collection of personal information in NEIS is like having the fox guard the henhouse 




Against the above arguments by teachers‘ organizations, the MOE attempted to defend the 
NEIS by linking positive assessments of ―information age‖ to ―the NEIS.‖ The NEIS was 
described as efficient, convenient, and competitive. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
informatization was driven by the government as another name for industrialisation in the 
globalization and information age. Hence, in the sense that the NEIS was selected as a part of 
the E-government plan, it was regarded as an important part of the administration 
informatization projects. The MOE seemed to believe that the expansion of information 
technology to each administrative organization can improve administrative efficiency, reduce 
workloads, and provide more convenient administration services. The defence of the NEIS 
was drawn on the following arguments; i) the efficiency of education administration has to be 
pursued, ii) a new network has to be built to improve public convenience and to promote 
global competitiveness in accordance with development of information technology. The 
assertion of the MOE in pursuit of efficiency can be summarized as follows. 
 
First of all, the MOE pointed out that one of the important purposes of the NEIS was to 
enhance the efficiency and productivity of education administration. They argued that this 
opportunity of the information age must be taken to improve the productivity of work process 
with informatization infrastructure.  
 
It is time to enhance the productivity by transforming existing hand-written document based 
administration into digitalized administration. It can reduce a large portion of paperwork 
which amounts to over 50% of education administration in education offices of cities and 
provinces. It is estimated that productivity would be improved by over 25% if the current 
hand-written method were to be discarded. The quality of the education policies could be 
improved by the construction of information environment where overall school affairs can be 
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handled with a limited number of staff. Accurate and various information would be available 
in real-time and be offered automatically to the education offices (Ministry of Education & 
Human Resources Development, 2001b).  
 
Furthermore, the MOE stressed the advantage of the NEIS that enabled teachers to collect and 
store all of the entire school life records for students in elementary, middle, and high schools. 
In this regard, the NEIS would reduce administrative burdens of teachers and accordingly 
induce teachers to devote more time to teaching (Ministry of Education & Human Resources 
Development, 2002). 
 
Because various materials such as school life records and others can be accumulated, 
teachers do not need to input them repeatedly and several statistical affairs can be handled 
automatically at the same time following daily routine works. Thus, once teachers complete 
their routine work properly, several miscellaneous works such as the making of statistical 
materials which was done manually one by one will be greatly reduced (The Chosun Ilbo, 4 
November 2002). 
 
Second, the MOE contended that education administration services would be improved in the 
sense that the NEIS could provide convenient access to information. The NEIS allowed 
people to apply for official documents, such as certificates of degrees or diplomas, via the 
Internet and take them from nearby schools or education offices. In the past, they were issued 




                                                 
59
 As well described in the below example, the benefits of certificates issued through the NEIS was to minimize 
the inconvenience of the people living at a distance, by making it possible for them to easily obtain transcripts 
and the certificates of registration or graduation from any school in the country (Ministry of Education & Human 




―because documents, such as school life records, students‘ health records, and others, which 
are required for admission to upper level schools and for transferring applicants, can be sent 
to the relevant institutions through the system; parents do not need to visit schools in person 
for them‖ (The Chosun Ilbo, 4 November 2002).  
 
Moreover, the MOE insisted that because student information could be acquired via the 
Internet, students‘ academic and behavioural development could be checked and their 
problems could be resolved through the Internet counselling without parent‘s personal visits 
to schools or interviews with teachers. 
 
Finally, the MOE asserted that the NEIS would play a significant role in education 
informatization which formed one pillar of E-government. President Kim Dae-jung stressed a 




 century, creativity and adventurism led by information-oriented education are the 
ones that will drive the economy and foster the strength of the nation (The Korea Herald, 21 
April 2001). 
 
In this context, the NEIS was selected for the government‘s goal to construct the foundation 
for information circulation on a national basis through the development of a standardized 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Mr. B was asked to submit his graduation certificate by his new company but postponed its submission 
because his hometown was located in a rural area. It was difficult for him to visit his school himself or to 
ask his hometown acquaintance to request document issuance. Incidentally, he heard the news of the 
NEIS launch and got access to the civil service system. If he would request the certificate via the Internet, 
it could be issued by a school nearby his home or an education office. Mr. B was able to get the certificate 
issued through the NEIS during the lunch hour. He thinks what a convenient world it is (Press release 
from the MOE, 2002). 
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system (Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development, 2001b). To be more 
specific, the government‘s purpose was that the standardization of the forms, codes, and work 
processes would lead to online information sharing in the government and accordingly other 
ministries or agencies as well as education offices could use data of the NEIS without any 
additional work. As such, for the government, the NEIS was not only an endeavour to be 
adjusted to the information age but also the logical outcome of information technology‘s 
development. 
 
From the above, some findings can be summarized as follows. The first is that while the plan 
for the NEIS started in 2000, the meaningful debate over the NEIS unfolded only from the 
second half of 2002. In other words, before the launch of the NEIS in March 2003, most time 
was spent in deliberation and discussion inside the government. Interestingly, it was after the 
start of user training from August 2002 that the NEIS became a wider socio-political issue. It 
may indicate that the earliest policy decision making process for the NEIS followed the form 
of industrialisation periods of the authoritarian regimes and was based on industrial codes, 
such as efficiency without any consideration of human rights. Another interesting point is 
related to the name of this system. The Korean title of the NEIS (the National Education 
Information System) was translated by the MOE as the Education Administration Information 
System. ―National‖ in English title was replaced with ―Administration‖ in Korean title. This 
is evidence that the original purpose of the NEIS was the enhancement of efficiency in 
education administration (Kim J.-C. , 2003, p. 5). 
 
The second finding is that the dispute over the NEIS in this period was centred on the 
controversy between teachers‘ organizations and the MOE, a main body promoting the project 
of the NEIS.  Of special interest is the same objection from both major teachers‘ organizations, 
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the KTU and the KFTA. Both of them requested postponing the NEIS launch until the 
consent of civil society. Historically, the KFTA was an officially recognized teachers‘ 
organization during dictatorial governments. The KTU which started to stage democratisation 
movements in the educational area was not recognized legally for a long time. Nonetheless, it 
was finally legalized in the Kim Dae-jung government which was the first civilian 
government in Korea. In this regard, the KFTA represented the conservative, anti-communist 
forces, while the KTU stood for liberal reform forces. However, in this period, the two 
teachers‘ organizations‘ different ideological orientations made no difference in their common 
opposition to the NEIS. As both teachers‘ organizations raised questions about it, the NEIS 
policy became an issue within civil society and the controversy started. Most of the other civil 
society organizations supported their assertions. 
 
The last finding is that the first argument made by both the KTU and the KFTA is how and 
when the NEIS would be implemented rather than whether it should be scrapped or not. The 
opposition did not suggest the withdrawal of education informatization, but the revision of its 
goals. 
 
We do not disagree with the education informatization project itself. The reason why we 
oppose the NEIS is that education reform has been carried out to meet market needs rather 
than to improve the quality of education. Information on students, parents and teachers 
collected in NEIS is much more detailed and precious than customers‘ information collected 
by companies. ··· Education informatization project should be readjusted to pursue the 
benefits of students and teachers and to enhance its publicness rather than to focus on 
administration convenience and commercial profits (A Joint Meeting for Protection of 




The first main argument that they depended on is a potential increase in teachers‘ workload 
(Ha, Joo, Kang, Lah, & Jang, 2009, p. 658). It indicates that the important issue they focused 
on is whether the NEIS could contribute to improve administrative efficiency, or what was to 
be done to improve the efficiency of the NEIS. It was after 2003 that the conflict between 
efficiency and human rights accelerated.  
 
What is of interest here is that the first newspaper which raised the issue of information rights 
is The Chosun Ilbo, one of the conservative newspapers in Korea.  
 
··· the problem was that such information was being shared on a network connecting the 
ministry of education, education offices, and schools, ···, personal information of more than 
20 million people, including some 7 million students and 14 million parents, was being 
collected at one place (The Chosun Ilbo, 22 September 2002).  
 
As the NEIS becomes a social issue, the debate is transformed into a conflict between 
administrative efficiency and human rights, which was very similar to the structure of the 
dispute over the Electronic ID cards. According to research analyzing editorials and articles in 
newspapers about the NEIS (Chang W.-Y. , 2004, p. 175), it was found that, at the beginning 
of 2003, the media started to define the dispute over the NEIS as a controversy between the 
invasion of human rights for information and the need for administrative efficiency
60
. While 
efficiency was supported by the MOE, human rights were highlighted by the KTU. Also, at 
the time, not only most educational organizations such as the KFTA but also the conservative 
forces including The Chosun Ilbo (the conservative daily newspaper) and the Grand National 
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 It implies that until the beginning of 2003, the dispute over the NEIS was hardly presented in the media and 
the content and frequency of related articles were also very few during this period (Chang W.-Y., 2004, p. 175). 
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Party (opposition party) all agreed to the KTU‘s assertion and expressed a concern about 
information control by the government. 
 
5.2.4. The structure of discourses in civil society in the beginning of debate 
 
In conclusion, it can be suggested that in this period, most teachers‘ organizations and 
educational non-government organizations opposed the implementation of the NEIS without 
the consent of civil society. Their argument centred on the concerns about the invasion of 
human rights and the control by the government. On the other hand, the MOE maintained that 
the NEIS would enhance the efficiency of administration and the convenience of the public.  
 
Hence, the structure of discourse in this period can be shown as Table 5-1. It is found that the 
structure of controversy in the introductory period was very similar to the previous dispute 
over the electronic ID card. The MOE was perceived by civil society organizations as well as 
teachers‘ organizations in terms of the counter-democratic discourse. The MOE was 
illustrated as a symbol of the bad by associating the MOE with government agencies which 
played a major role in suppressing democracy in authoritarian regimes, such as the National 
Intelligence Service and the National Policy Agency. At the same time, the structure of 
discourse in the beginning of the debate over NEIS was based on the conflict over democratic 
code and developmental code as shown in the case of the electronic ID card controversy. The 
MOE attempted to persuade civil society members by explaining how the administrative 
efficiency and convenience for information access would be improved and how this system 
would contribute to improve the infrastructure for the informatization. In other words, the 




Table 5-1 The symbolic system of the dispute over the NEIS: The introductory period  
The structure of the dispute over the NEIS in civil society 
 The Bad The Good 
Policy  
E-government project 
Education informatization project 
Actor The MOE 
The KTU, The KFTA, 
National Human Rights Commission of 
Korea 
Discourses 
Increase the workload of teachers 
The invasion of privacy and 
infringement of personal information 
Control and surveillance by 
government 
Commercial utilization by companies 
with leaked information 
Improving  the efficiency and 
productivity of education 
administration 
Promoting global competitiveness in 
accordance with development of 
information technology  
One  pillar of E-government 
The structure of cultural value system in civil society 






Infringement of privacy 
 
Imperfection in technology 










Protection of privacy 
Informatization 
Perfection in technology 









In contrast, the civil society organizations criticized the problems of the NEIS, depending on 
the democratic code. As such, the debate about the NEIS in this period can be concluded to 
add evidence that i) the developmental code and the democratic code seem to be basic cultural 
values of Korean civil society and ii) the democratic code may have more significant effect on 
civil society organizations in the controversies over information-related policies after the 
debate over the electronic ID card. Even though the NEIS was associated with the 
developmental code at the initial stage of this period, civil society organizations attempted to 
associate the NEIS as being a threat to democratic values and accordingly achieved a 
reduction in the range of information collection and the postponement of its launch. This 
result may be related to the growth of civil society. Many social organizations for the 
protection of information rights after the debate over the electronic ID card actively 
participated in the dispute over the NEIS. The success of democratisation movements and the 
reform forces‘ staying in power seem to contribute to the settlement of democratic codes in 
civil society.  
 
5.3. The deepening period of debate (March 2003 ~ June 2003) 
 
5.3.1. The transition of the situation and disruption of civil society 
 
From March 2003 when the services for three of the categories were provided, the debate over 
the NEIS began to be intensified. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2, the presidential election and 
the inauguration of a new executive board in December 2002 fanned the flames of more 
heated debate over the NEIS. During the presidential election, Korean society had 
experienced a severe division between conservative forces and liberal-reform forces. The 
latter were successful in the election. In addition, the new board requested the abandonment 
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of the NEIS rather than its revision before implementation. Hence, the opening of pilot 
services for three categories led to a more severe confrontation between the KTU and the 
MOE
61
. In particular, while the MOE organized the EIC (8 March 2003) to complement the 
issues including human rights infringement, reform forces including the KTU and liberal 
parents‘ organizations refused to join, questioning the intentions of the EIC. 
 
Interestingly, in the beginning of this period teachers‘ organizations which spoke with one 
voice in the previous introductory period seemed to split over the strategies against the NEIS. 
Unlike the KTU, the KFTA did not change their strategy, demanding a revision of the NEIS 
before implementation. It criticized the KTU‘s request to cancel the NEIS. Their arguments 
were that i) the NEIS could benefit them, through the reduction of workloads, and ii) that 
KTU sought the dropping of the NEIS without any solution (Press release from the KFTA, 7 
March 2003). One of the reasons for their split was the confrontation of ideology which had 
accelerated during the presidential election in 2002. The conflicts over ideologies were 
reflected in the dispute over the NEIS, so the dispute over the NEIS became a foundation for 
the conflict between conservative forces and reform forces, namely between industrial power 
and democratic power. Moreover, two incidents fuelled the conflict between two forces in 
school fields; Anti-war class lessons and a school principal‘s suicide.  
 
Anti-war class lessons had been provided by the KTU as a part of Anti-war and Pro-peace 
movement which was sparked by the war in Iraq (20 March 2003)
62
. In particular, materials 
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 The anti-NEIS movements were a sit-in protest by the KTU (3 March 2003), parent‘s group‘s announcement 
against the NEIS (17 March 2003) and mass leave of absence (27 March 2003). 
62
 The government and the National Assembly passed a bill to dispatch noncombat troops to Iraq (2 April 2003). 
However, the vote on dispatching the troops recalled the confrontation between conservative forces and liberal 
forces in civil society. In addition, the presidential election, the North Korean nuclear program in 2002 and two 
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for anti-war classes contained pictures of those killed by U.S. soldiers. The government 
insisted that such materials had the possibility of inducing anti-Americanism
63
. The KFTA 
urged the government to approach this issue with a firm and clear stance (1 May 2003) and 
the Association of Principals criticized the KTU by describing it as a Pro-North Korea group 
(The Chosun Ilbo, 22 April 2003). What is noteworthy is that the conservative forces 
including the KFTA made criticism against both KTU‘s anti-war class and its arguments 
against the NEIS in the same statements.  
 
After the government said it would conduct a study to gauge the level of anti-U.S. sentiments 
being taught in schools, the union retorted that it would not stand idle in the face of 
"criticism with evil intentions." The KTU‘s teachers also announced a "pan-national 
disobedience movement" against the introduction of the new information system which 
schools are implementing nationwide (The Chosun Ilbo, 2 April 2003). 
 
Meanwhile, the NHRC issued a public statement against sending troops insisting that the war 
led to the indiscriminate sacrifice of civilians in Iraq (26 March 2003). 
                                                                                                                                                        
14-year-old Korean girls‘ death by an US Army armoured vehicle on a public road (13 June 2002) revived the 
conflicts of ideologies embedded in civil society. 
 
Various groups are planning large-scale street rallies on Saturday, the 84th anniversary of the March 1st 
Independence Movement against the Japanese occupation. The "Anti-Nuclear, Anti-Kim Jong-il National 
Rally for Freedom and Unification" will be held ··· with various religious groups and civil organizations 
participating. The groups are to demand an end to North Korea's nuclear program and oppose the 
withdrawal of US forces. Marking March 1st, an "Anti-War Demonstration for Self-reliance and Peace" 
candlelight demonstration will be held ··· The organizing group of the candlelight vigils also plans a 
demonstration demanding the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and opposing the war in Iraq ··· 
(The Chosun Ilbo, 28 February 2003). 
 
63
 President Roh Moo-hyun has received reports that the left-wing teachers union has been presenting anti-U.S. 
material while teaching students about anti-war ideas, ··· he pointed out that ··· materials that may contain such 




Another incident intensifying the confrontation in school fields was a principal‘s suicide on 
the 4
th
 of April 2003. The male principal at the Bo-sung elementary school asked a temporary 
female teacher to serve tea for him and his visitors. With the help of the KTU, she raised an 
issue over his sexual discrimination and his degrading of the KTU, demanding his 
handwritten apology and assurance that there will be no disadvantage in personnel terms. This 




The principal‘s suicide provoked bitter conflicts in education fields. In fact, the conflict over 
the school operation was deeply rooted. The KTU was criticizing the authoritarian 
management by school principals and was trying to improve democratisation of school 
management at that time when this event occurred (The Hankyoreh, 10 April 2003). However, 
with the principal‘s suicide, the conservative forces in schools which had complaints about 
the request for the democratisation of school management began to strongly blame the KTU‘s 
activities. As addressed in the editorials of JoongAng Daily
65
, they condemned the KTU, 
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 This dispute was triggered when the KTU raised the question as to whether it was right for the temporary 
teacher to be asked to serve tea for a principal. The KTU questioned the problem of sexual discrimination in the 
education field and accordingly the principal was blamed by the KTU. Controversy over the serving of tea was 
one of the examples of conflicts between authoritarian values and democratic values. It is well described in the 
following statement of the National Parents‘ Association for Good Education. 
 
That woman teachers are still forced to serve tea is a reflection of the undemocratic school administration 
system that has failed to break away from outdated practices and authoritarian inclinations 
(http://www.womennews.co.kr/ewnews/enews54.htm  accessed 5 January 2012). 
65
  
What is needed from the union now is not an evasion of responsibility, but cooperation with the inquiry to 
clarify where the responsibility for the suicide lies. Such problems in our schools as forcing female 
teachers to perform the most menial tasks, the unstable status of part-time teachers and remnants of 
traditional Confucian culture in elementary schools, which prompted the incident, should be dealt with 
from a different perspective (JoongAng Daily, 9 April 2003). 
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requiring the KTU to admit its responsibility and to give a formal apology for the suicide. 
Furthermore, their criticism focused on overall activities of the KTU in the past by portraying 
them as uneducational, self-righteous, and selfish. As such, KTU‘s arguments that the legacy 
of traditional Confucian culture in education fields is anti-democratic and needs to be 
reformed were strongly addressed. However, the contaminated image of the KTU as pro-
communist seemed to weaken the influence of the KTU‘s arguments. 
 
The patience to accept the Union‘s activities beyond the limit would be useless (Press release 
from the Korean Union of Teaching and Educational Workers, 7 April 2003). 
 
The tragic death of an elementary school principal, whose funeral was on Tuesday, needs to be a 
turning point for the devastated state of Korean education. ··· Most of the country would agree, 
however, that what is needed most is a rebirth within Jeongyojo, or the Korean Teachers and 
Education Workers Union. ··· In the course of its development, however, Jeongyojo has come 
to be buried in its own negative legacy, with its overambitious, political and uneducational ways 
to wage its struggles. Its ideological leanings and self-righteous obstinacy compels it to go after 




As such, the dispute over the NEIS expanded and developed from an educational issue to a 
confrontation between conventional conservative forces and reformist and radical forces in all 
Korean society (Chun, 2003, p. 299). In this regard, the conservative forces‘ arguments 
against the KTU led to the change in the request on the NEIS from the previous ―a revision 
before implementation‖ to ―an immediate revision and implementation (Han, 2003, p. 96) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
(http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=1962654  accessed 5 January 2012). 
66
 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2003/04/08/2003040861031.html  accessed 5 January 2012. 
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to ―implementation according to the decision of the EIC‖ that the NEIS had to open full 
service on the 11
th
 of April (Press release from the KFTA, 1 May 2003).  
 
In sum, in this period, the debate over the NEIS turned into the conflict between the 
conservative teachers‘ organizations and the liberal-reformative teachers‘ organizations. The 
conservative educational organizations which included the KFTA, the Association of 
Principals, and the Korean Union of Teaching and Educational Workers started to criticize 
both the claims against the NEIS and overall activities of the KTU by linking the KTU to 
―anti-communism‖ and ―negative legacy.‖ 
 
5.3.2. The unfolding process of debate  
 
During the process of the conflict mentioned above, on the 12
th
 of May 2003, the NHRC 
made recommendation on the NEIS
67
. The main points of the recommendation are as follows 
(National Human Rights Commission, 2003): first, the NEIS should exclude three sensitive 
student-related categories, such as ―School/student affairs‖, ―Admission/Admission to a 
School of higher grade‖ and ―Student health‖ out of 27 categories. In addition, some items of 
personnel records of teachers, namely 26 questions on the Personnel Management Card, 
should be excluded. Second, the existing C/S system should be maintained for three 
categories and measures should be taken to improve the security of the C/S system. The 
reason behind the recommendation was that ―the possibility of human rights violations is very 
high‖ and ―the NEIS could threaten the right to privacy.‖ 
 
                                                 
67
 It was a response to the petition of the KTU with 24 educational non-government organizations on the 19
th
 of 
February. For this, on the 8
th
 of April, the NHRC held a public hearing but postponed the decision for two more 
weeks on the 28
th
 of April. 
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The recommendation drew an angry backlash from the conservative educational organizations, 
while the KTU welcomed it and asserted that it was time to try to resolve the conflicts 
between educational organizations (Press release from the KTU, 13 May 2003). One of the 
reasons for this was that the recommendation seemed to support the arguments of the KTU. 
Based on Korea‘s Constitution and the international Guidelines68, the NHRC declared that 
administrative efficiency could not override the fundamental right of the people.  
 
NEIS has been promoted without the clear possibility of drastic enhancement of 
administrative efficiency and even if administrative efficiency improves significantly, it 
could conclude that it would not be able to justify the violation of the fundamental rights of 
citizens. ··· The National Human Rights Commission decided that the value of both the 
accumulation of personal information and educational vision toward the future had a higher 
priority than the practical issues such as economic profits and losses (National Human Rights 
Commission, 2003). 
 
Another important reason why the conservative forces were disappointed at the 
recommendation was that the Minister of Education had repeatedly vowed to follow the 
recommendation of the NHRC (JoongAng Daily, 26 April 2003), even though the NHRC‘s 
recommendation had no enforcement power. The KFTA criticized the recommendation, 
                                                 
68
 These are Article 10 (right to pursue happiness), Article 17 (freedom of privacy and secrecy), Article 31 (right 
and duty to receive an education), and Article 37 (respect of freedoms and rights of citizens) of the Constitution; 
Article 12 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights; Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Article 16 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child; OECD Guidelines on the 
International Circulation of Private Data and Protection of Privacy; UN Guidelines for Regulations on Electronic 
Personal Information; and the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public Agencies 
(Press release from the NHRC, 17 May 2003). 
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arguing that it triggered confusion among schools because teachers had to operate the C/S 
system as well as the NEIS at the same time
69
 (Press release from the KFTA, 13 May 2003). 
 
However, unlike the previous announcement, the MOE reversed its position on acceptance of 
the NHRC recommendations
70
, which brought out a hunger strike and mass leave of absence 
strike carried out by the KTU, eventually resulting in the negotiation between the MOE and 
the KTU. On the 26
th
 of May 2003, the MOE and the KTU reached the agreement that i) 24 
categories out of 27 categories would be operated by using the NEIS, while the full-scale 
implementation of the NEIS for three categories would be reviewed and ii) for the 3
rd
 grade 
students, who were preparing their applications for university admission, the NEIS would be 
used fully including the three categories, but for the students under the 2
nd
 grade, the previous 
system before the NEIS could be operated for three categories temporarily until February 
2004. The agreement was rejected by the proponents of the NEIS, arguing that it would be 
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 The KFTA revealed the nationwide survey of teachers finding that 64% of the respondents supported the NEIS 
(The YTN, 19 May 2003). 
70
 The MOE did not seem to accept the recommendation fully because the recommendation could aggravate the 
confusion in schools. The use of C/S system implied that registering all student information into the NEIS during 
the winter vacation would be for nothing and moving them back to the C/S system would require the same 
period. The Minster of Education answered at the interpellation of the National Assembly that the NEIS was 
preferred if the MOE should choose either the NEIS or C/S system and the MOE was not bound to follow the 
recommendation even though the recommendation could be considered with respect (The Chosun Ilbo, 20 May 
2003). 
71
 Requiring the resignation of the Minster of Education, the KFTA decided to start a disobedience movement 
against the MOE and withdrew from the EIC (Yonhapnews, 26 May 2003).  
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Despite the agreement, what aggravated the situation was the change of the MOE‘s position72. 
The guideline
73
 of the NEIS announced by the MOE on the 1
st
 of June allowed schools to 
temporarily decide whether to operate either the C/S system or the NEIS depending on each 
school‘s circumstance. The KTU claimed that the guideline was different from the agreement 
and actually forced schools to adopt the NEIS, considering that more than 97 % of schools 
had already adopted the NEIS. In this context, the KTU together with civil society 
organizations declared a severe fight against the implementation of the NEIS such as filing 
suits against the MOE and staging a collective walkout (The Korea Times, 2 June 2003). The 
conservative forces also continued to intensify their attacks on the MOE by collecting a 
signature drive for the Minister‘s resignation as well as a massive demonstration rally. To 
mediate and solve the fierce conflicts over the NEIS, the government decided to transfer the 
EIC from the Ministry of Education to be under the Prime Minister (18 June 2003). 
 
The debate over the NEIS in this period unfolded with three distinctive features. First, 
educational organizations took a clearer stance regarding the NEIS. It was partly because the 
recommendation of the NHRC served as a momentum. Second, the conflict eventually 
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 The Minister of Education at the National Assembly‘s Education Committee on the 28th of May answered that 
the agreement did not mean the return to the C/S system but a six-month re-examination period when the 
superiority of the NEIS would be proved, leading to the agreement on the entire implementation of the NEIS 
(The Chosun Ilbo, 29 May 2003). 
73
 Meanwhile, the guideline confirmed the removal of sensitive personal information from three categories, 
resulting in the reduction in the number of input items (The Hankyoreh, 3 June 2003). 
Categories Present (A) Delete (B) Remain B/A 










Admission/admission to a 
School of higher grade 
45 45 0 100% 












resulted in a choice between the NEIS and the C/S system. The NHRC advised to maintain 
the C/S system, for the three sensitive categories, while, the MOE left each school to decide 
which system to use. For these reasons, the assertion for the abolition of the NEIS indicated 
support for the C/S system. In a similar vein, the support for the NEIS led to the scrapping of 
the C/S system. The conflict was amplified rather than approached with a compromise. 
 
5.3.3. Content of debate 
 
As discussed above, unlike the previous period, educational organizations in this period had 
severe confrontations leading to different assertions with regard to the NEIS. Most of all, the 
difference was found from the perspective of human rights protection. At the same time, two 
organizations took an opposite position regarding a security issue and a cost issue. Two issues 
emerged from the choice between the NEIS and C/S system. 
 
In this period, the detractors of the NEIS attempted to emphasize their strong opposition by 
linking ―rights‖ to ―a non-negotiable goal,‖ ―technology‖ to ―imperfection,‖ and ―the NEIS‖ 
to ―waste and corruption.‖ The assertions of opponents of the NEIS including the KTU and 
parents‘ organizations supporting the KTU can be summarized as follows; i) human rights of 
information are not negotiable with other goals. ii) The security problem of the NEIS cannot 
be solved with imperfect technology but should be approached in the social and cultural 
context. iii) The NEIS will require a huge amount of taxpayers‘ money and was stained with 
corruption. 
 
First, they emphasized a priority of human rights. The right of privacy in the information age 
was regarded as the most important right that is not negotiable with other goals (Kim H.-h. , 
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2003a, p. 33). This went beyond the passive claims of infringement of human rights in the 
previous period. 
  
Privacy is more than human rights in the information society. It becomes a legal safeguard to 
protect freedom and autonomy of civil society from state power which intends to manage 
and control the whole society with cutting-edge information and communications 
technologies (Kim H.-h. , 2003a, p. 30). 
 
In this context, it was argued that infringement of human rights could not be resolved by 
adjusting a range of input items but only by keeping sensitive information from the three 
categories within the school. Furthermore, ―rights‖ were linked to ―autonomy.‖ In the sense 
that information collected in the NEIS was related to sensitive privacy of students, the NEIS 
was criticized to be in direct contradiction to the essential principle that student information 
should be collected and used in the context of educational purpose and should not go beyond 
the school boundary (Kim H.-h. , 2003a, p. 29). A committee member of the NHRC also 
insisted that where to store information matters in order to prevent the misuse of personal 
information.  
 
It was the National Human Rights Commission‘s judgement that the NEIS has the 
convenience to look through everything about students from the elementary schools to high 
schools, but it could be misused for that reason. ··· In all OECD countries, the personal 
information of students has not been centrally managed beyond the school boundary (The 




As such, the argument behind the NHRC‘s recommendation was that the NEIS ―could 
potentially violate human rights such as the right to privacy‖ and accordingly the school-
based C/S system should be used for the three sensitive categories. 
 
Second, the opposition group attempted to describe security technology as imperfect. The 
detractors of the NEIS stressed that the extent of damage by information leakage was much 
greater in the NEIS and even in the situation where banks had been hacked, an electronic 
authentication system and a bank-level four-step security system could not remove the risk of 
information leakage (Kim H.-h. , 2003a, pp. 32-33). The danger of leakage and hacking in the 
NEIS was demonstrated by a teacher
74
.  
Hwang (2003, p. 139) asserted the imperfections of security technologies
75
 by definition.  
 
Regrettably, 100% confidence cannot be given to existing security technologies. No 
experience has been shared that security technologies have prevailed over hacking 
technologies. The reason is that whatever it is, it is a man that conducts hacking or security 
operation. Moreover, it is the nature of technology that a security system has to trace the 
development of hacking (Hwang G.-m. , 2003, p. 139). 
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 For example, on the 5th of May, a teacher opposing to the NEIS system attempted hacking into the NEIS and 
succeeded within two hours. It was broadcast through the KTU‘s network and revealed how the NEIS could be 
infiltrated by hacking. A teacher watching the process expressed serious concern about the security of the NEIS. 
 
“I could not help being surprised by the fact that a hacker could neutralize a certificate with the simple 
hacking program, get into the NEIS and even exert all administrator privileges, because I had thought the 
NEIS was a very safe system in terms of security‖ (Weekly DongA, 5 June 2003, vol. 387, pp. 34-35). 
 
75
 He also presented more specific examples of possible technological flaws in security; the ORACLE database 
which the NEIS adopted had six critical security problems. (Hwang G.-m. , 2003, p. 144) 
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In particular, a virus attack that paralyzed the Internet for 9 hours on the 24
th
 of January 2003 
showed how vulnerable the networked computers are to hacking (JoongAng Daily, 27 January 
2003). In this regard, Hwang pointed out that the security problem was not a matter of 
technology but could be a type of cultural issue. He criticized the belief that security problems 
could be controlled and technically revealed the limits of technology-oriented thinking. 
 
It is a man who is in charge of system security and manages and operates databases. 
Therefore, various social and cultural contexts such as insider‘s betrayal and power 
surveillance should be considered in the security issues (Hwang G.-m. , 2003, p. 139). 
 
Third, the opponents‘ critics focused on the huge cost of the NEIS. They insisted that the 147 
billion Korean won (US$134 million) cost for building C/S system would be useless if the 
NEIS was implemented. At the same time, they claimed that the NEIS not only cost 52 billion 
Korean won (US $47 million) in its installation, but would also cost an additional 300 billion 
Korean won (US$273 million). Moreover, the KTU attempted to associate the NEIS plan with 
corruption by lobbying from large conglomerates
76
. It questioned the background of NEIS‘s 
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What is noteworthy is that many suspicions about this system have been aroused. Although the MOE had 
opposed to this system at first because of the characteristics of education, it had suddenly changed to total 
implementation through the process which is beyond understanding. In addition, doubts that huge 
amounts of money were delivered during this process is being raised through the inquiries of the National 
Assembly and media. Even many teachers are questioning that it‘s odd that the previous 150 billion won 
($163 million) invested in the C/S system was suddenly scrapped and the NEIS, requiring extra cost of 
300 billion won ($381 million) as well as supplies of 50 billion won ($54 million), is introduced. 
However, as the details concerning this decision are still not disclosed, the suspicion is on the increase. 
As long as the education informatization project is spending huge amounts of taxpayers‘ money, the 





implementation and argued that Samsung SDS, a main supplier of the NEIS system, lobbied 
the MOE (The Hankyoreh 21, 5 June 2003, vol. 462).  
 
Regarding the cost issue, notable criticism is found in the NHRC‘s recommendations. The 
NHRC concluded that economic profits and losses could not override the value of private 
information (National Human Rights Commission, 2003)
77
. As such, anti-NEIS groups placed 
higher value on democratic codes such as human rights than on developmental code such as 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
 
Meanwhile, in this period, the proponents who represented the KFTA and the Association of 
Principals attempted to defend the NEIS by linking ―the NEIS‖ to ―a necessity of information 
age‖ and ―the KTU‖ to ―the threat to national interest.‖ Their arguments to support the NEIS 
are as follows; i) the NEIS is such a necessity of the information age that human rights can be 
sacrificed. ii) Security issues are technically manageable. iii) The NEIS is cost-effective. iv) 
The KTU is in line with anti-Americanism and it shows no responsibility for society but 
makes selfish and radical claims on society.  
 
First, the defenders for the NEIS argued that the operation of NEIS should be recognized as a 
necessity of the information age. The following contention in a conservative newspaper seems 
to reveal the background of the argument recognizing the NEIS as a product of the new 
information age.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
See also relating articles for this argument such as The Hankyoreh 21, vol. 463 (5 June 2003), vol. 464 (19 June 
2003) and vol. 465 (26 June 2003). 
77
 What is noteworthy is that the NHRC admitted that the cost of reverting to the C/S system could be huge 
partly because the security of the C/S system needed to be improved, regardless of a wide range from 45 billion 
Korean won (the KTU) to 2.3 trillion Korean won (the MOE) of estimated additional cost. 
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Improving the administration of education affairs is the key to becoming an advanced 
information society. If we look at the issue in the context of modernizing the administration 
of education, we can find solutions to the controversy easily. ··· The information age will 
never come without individual patience and tolerance. Mutual trust and an open heart can 
help us succeed (JoongAng Daily, 20 May 2003). 
 
The MOE also supported this argument by saying the ―the efficient accumulation and storage 
of information is a clear trend in the information age‖ (The Chosun Ilbo, 30 May 2003). In 
this context, contrary to the proponents‘ assertion, proponents of the NEIS argued that the 
implementation of the NEIS with elimination of sensitive private items would be better than 
its total withdrawal in the information age and other human rights issues could be resolved 
with the decisions by the NHRC or the judiciary. Furthermore, the MOE argued that if the 
concerns over human rights infringements would lead to the abolition of the national 
informatization projects, it would jeopardize significant national interests and threaten the 
survival of the country in the future (Kim J.-g. , 2003, p. 13). As such, proponents viewed 
human rights as something that could be negotiated with other goals. In other words, human 
rights were portrayed as a dispensable item that could be sacrificed for the sake of 
administrative efficiency.  
 
Second, the advocates of the NEIS argued that security issues were manageable technically. 
They claimed that from a technological view point, the NEIS would be safer than the C/S 
system in terms of security. Stressing the technological superiority of the NEIS, 
78
 they 
asserted that if we were to follow the law for protection of personal information in public 
institutions, there would be no problem of the infringement on human rights (Press release 
                                                 
78
 It was supported by the MOE maintaining that the NEIS was better than the CS system in terms of security.    
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from the KFTA, 4 June 2003). The following opinion in a conservative newspaper may show 
how the security can be justified from the viewpoint of technology. 
 
The NEIS appears to have no technical flaws; its workability has been verified by highly 
qualified specialists, including those at the National Computerization Agency. The 
information entered into the NEIS is encrypted before it is stored, thereby all but eliminating 
access to personal files by hackers. The level of security technology behind the NEIS is 
superior to that of ordinary personal computer networks and the existing education 
information system, providing a measure of safety on a par with Internet banking (JoongAng 




Third, the NEIS was described as a cost-effective system. They asserted that as existing 
information systems were gradually replaced by new internet software technology, the NEIS 
was more economically efficient. Specifically, the MOE explained that as the development of 
hardware and software in the NEIS was completed at a cost of 52 billion Korean won (US$47 
million), and it would cost only 300 billion Korean won (US$273 million) more for the 
management of the NEIS. However, returning cost to the C/S system was estimated to be 795 
billion Korean won ($723 million) only for the first year because of the cost of buying and 
changing servers for the C/S system at individual schools, the cost of building a security 
system, and maintenance and repair costs. Furthermore, half of the above cost was estimated 
to occur for the following year resulting in up to 2.3 trillion Korean won (US$20.9 billion) 
additional money to run the C/S compared with running the NEIS during next five years (The 
Weekly Chosun, 12 June 2003, vol. 1757).  
 
                                                 
79
 This opinion was written by Kim Hyoung-joo (a professor of computer science at Seoul National University). 
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Lastly, the proponents attempted to link the KTU to the threat to the national interest. The 
critics against liberal forces insisted that the issues of the NEIS stemmed from their radical 
and political approach without any solution (Press release from the KFTA, 13 May 2003; 17 
May 2003). The proponents argued that the KTU‘s assertion to revert back to C/S system 
would cause more confusion in schools and overburden teachers in charge of inputting 
information (Press release from the KFTA, 4 June 2003). The KFTA claimed that as the 
teachers who were in charge of inputting information had worked to transfer information from 
the C/S system to the NEIS, returning to the C/S system which requires retrieving information 
would cause an excessive workload.  
 
In particular, as discussed in section 5.3.1, a principal‘s suicide and confrontations with anti-
war class lessons provided conservative forces chances to criticize the overall activities of 
liberal forces including the KTU as well as their arguments against the NEIS. 
 
After the government said it would conduct a study to gauge the level of anti-U.S. sentiments 
being taught in schools, the union retorted that it would not stand still in the face of 
"criticism with evil intentions." The unionist teachers also announced a "pan-national 
disobedience movement" against the introduction of the new information system which 
schools are implementing nationwide (The Chosun Ilbo, 2 April 2003). 
 
By stigmatizing the KTU as anti-Americanism in the case of anti-war class lessons and as a 
political and unprofessional entity in the principal‘s suicide case, conservative forces appealed 





Jeongyojo is now a massive political element that overwhelms Korean education. It exercises 
massive influence over the content and means of teaching. Now it needs to act with a sense 
of responsibility becoming of such an organization (The Chosun Ilbo, 8 April 2003). 
 
It indicates that conservative forces‘ argument against the KTU resorted to the developmental 
codes originated from anti-communism as well as efficiency in informatization. They argued 
that society was being overtaken by the KTU‘s self-righteous obstinacy and radical protests 
such as mass leave of absence. 
 
Most people now doubt the government, and are asking ―how can you call yourself a 
government if you can‘t do anything without Jeongyojo‘s stamp of approval?‖ (The Chosun 
Ilbo, 26 May 2003) 
 
On the basis of the above discussion, some findings can be summarized as follows. First, the 
conflict over the NEIS reached a peak in this period. The dispute over the NEIS became so 
complicated that it made trouble with all Korean society as well as at school fields and the 
confrontations of social values were intensified.  
 
The dispute over school education currently taking place in Korea is not just a dispute but a 
war. ··· The “educational war” is the shadow of a war in a larger society. Thus, trying to 
solve problems related to education with the reform of the education system is as useless as 
using a cleaner to remove the shadow (JoongAng Daily, 11 May 2003).  
 
Second, compared to the previous introductory period, one of the characteristics in this period 
is that the educational organizations were divided into proponents and opponents for the NEIS. 
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The discussants in the NEIS debate in this period had changed to the KTU versus anti-KTU 
from all teachers institutions versus the MOE. 
 
In the next school year, it may be the case that parents will ask schools to notify them as to 
which teacher belongs to which organization and choose teachers for their children 
according to that information (JoongAng Daily, 11 May 2003).  
 
As the controversy over the NEIS intensified, the contenders expanded to various social 
organizations which flourished during the transition toward democracy. Accordingly, it led to 
the conflict between the conservative forces and the reform forces, particularly through three 
events, namely the presidential election, anti-war class lessons and a principal‘s suicide. 
 
Third, in terms of value conflict by the contenders, some other differences between the two 
periods can be found. Like the previous period, the basic conflict between human rights and 
efficiency continued in this period. However, one of differences between the two periods is 
that contenders in this period insisted on which values should be dominant. Their stances 
emerged clearly after the recommendation of the NHRC that the previous school-based C/S 
system should be used for the three sensitive information categories. The opponents asserted 
that human rights could not be negotiated with other goals and the deletion of some private 
information could not complement the fatal and potential information leakage problem in the 
NEIS. In contrast, the proponents of the NEIS argued that convenience and efficiency could 
override human rights in the information age. Unlike the opponents who stressed that security 
problem would not be a technical issue, the supporters for the NEIS highlighted the 
superiority of technology. In terms of the cost issue, the proponents argued that the NEIS 




Another distinctive difference was that the controversy between human rights and 
administrative efficiency in the previous introductory period began to evolve into the conflict 
between conservative values and reform values, namely between the development code and 
the democratic code. For example, the principal‘s suicide which changed the characteristic of 
the debate over the NEIS provided an opportunity to discuss authoritarianism and feudalistic 
characteristics and sexual discrimination embedded in schools.  
 
The last feature in this period was that arguments were closely related to the contenders‘ 
intrinsic characteristics. For example, conservative forces attempted to link the KTU‘s 
arguments against the NEIS to the negative legacy of the KTU. In other words, critics from 
the conservative forces sought to stigmatize the KTU‘s arguments against the NEIS with the 
fault of the KTU‘s activities. As such, the opposition to the NEIS was contaminated by the 
KTU‘s radical inclination. It indicates that conservative forces resorted to the developmental 
code relying on anti-communism which is deep-rooted in Korean society and efficiency 
which is one of advantages in the informatization. In conclusion, the contents of controversy 
in this period became more complicated, as shown in Table 5-2. 
 
5.4. The period of reconciliation (July 2003 ~ December 2003) 
 
5.4.1. The unfolding process of reconciliation 
  
The EIC was transferred to the offices of Prime Minister in June of 2003, declaring that all 





Table 5-2 The contents about the dispute between advocators and opponents 
 Against the NEIS In favour of the NEIS 
Actor   
 
Korean Teachers and Education 
Workers’ Union (KTU), 




Korean Federation of Teacher’s 
Association (KFTA),  
the Association of Principals, 
the Korean Union of Teaching and 
Education Workers,  
Conservative forces 
Contents   
The recognition 
for human right 
The right of privacy in the information 
age is the most important right so it 
cannot be negotiated with other 
goals. 
Information accumulation could lead 
to surveillance by the government. 




The operation of NEIS should be 
recognized as a necessity of 
information age. 
The security of 
the technology 
The danger of leakage and hacking in 
the NEIS are inevitable. 
Security technologies are imperfect. 
The NEIS would be safer than C/S 
system in terms of security. 
The NEIS is technologically superior.  
Problem of cost 
The cost of introducing the NEIS is 
huge. 
The NEIS plan may be closely related 
to a corruptive conglomerate’s lobby. 
The NEIS is cost-effective. 
The cost of returning to C/S is more 






Liberal forces’ critics against the NEIS 
stemmed from their radical and 
political approach. 
The contents of 
symbolic 
conflict in civil 
society 
Human rights are not negotiable. 
The administrative efficiency could 
not override the fundamental right of 
the people. 
The danger of leakage and hacking 
are inevitable.  
Human rights are negotiable. 
It is a necessity of information age 
It improves convenience and 
efficiency. 




negotiations between the MOE and the KTU resumed. The reason for this was that the KTU 
announced no participation in the EIC and started a hunger strike together with many civil 
society organizations
80
. The KTU argued that the government composed the EIC unilaterally 
excluding the anti-NEIS civil society organizations. The liberal forces, including the KTU, 
jointly staged protests against the NEIS, such as participating in a strike with the Korea 




In particular, on the 8
th
 of July, 43 civil society organizations
82
 launched the ―Joint Struggle 
Committee to Protect Human Rights in Information Society and against NEIS‖ (hereafter 
JSCNEIS), announcing the start of a big run for the abolition of the NEIS and the protection 
of human rights in the information society (Press release from the JSCNEIS, 8 July 2003).  
 
―JSCNEIS will carry out many activities and campaigns to break the E-government projects 
which infringe the human rights and to socially widen the discussion of human rights in 
information society‖ (A Joint Struggle Committee for Human Rights in Information Society 




                                                 
80  
They are Korean Progressive (Jinbo) Network, Korean Human Right Group (Sarangbang), Centre for Human 
Rights Dasan, Peace & Human Rights Coalition, Chunbuk Peace & Human Rights Coalition, Human Rights 
Committee of Catholic Church, and Minkakyup Human Rights Group and Won Buddhism Human Rights 
Committee, etc. 
81
 Other protests were to pay a visit to the MOE (20 June), to send ―complaint to ILO about the Korean 
government implementing the NEIS (21 June), to take collective leave for one day walkout (21 June), to hold 
press conferences (23 June; 25 June; 27 June), etc. 
82
 43 entities included a progressive political party (Democratic Labour Party, Minju-nodong dang), human 
rights·education·students·parents and civil society organizations such as the KCTU, Lawyers for a Democratic 
Society, Parents‘ Association for True Education, and Civic Solidarity for Education Reform. 
83
 http://noneis.jinbo.net/english.html accessed 8 January 2012.  
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However, KTU‘s demonstrations, which were coupled with strikes led by the KCTU, faced a 
hard stance from the government
84
. At last, the liberal forces decided to participate in the 3
rd
 
meeting of the EIC (8 September 2003)
85
 and both the EIC and the JSCNEIS held public 
discussion meetings
86
. At the public discussion meeting, the KTU suggested the School 
Education Information System (hereafter SEIS) on the grounds that students‘ information 
should be collected and managed within a school (Kim H.-h. , 2003b, p. 31). It was a type of 
advanced C/S system which did not allow the access via the Internet and accordingly was 




Meanwhile, while the KTU were boycotting the NEIS, the MOE attempted to sneak the NEIS 
into the tight universities application schedule. The MOE announced the guidelines that the 
NEIS would be used only for the 3
rd
 grade students and schools were required to submit CD-
ROMs containing student‘s personal records and academic profiles to universities (10 October 
2003). It angered the KTU who raised suspicion that the MOE intended to virtually enforce 
the NEIS. The KTU filed provisional disposition petition for the ceasing of production and 
distribution of CD-ROMs (24 October 2003). 
 
                                                 
84
 The government took legal action against KTU‘s executive board and teachers who joined the leave walkout. 
The KTU‘s chairman was arrested on charges of leading illegal strikes (17 July 2003) but was bailed on the 21st 
of August 2003. 
85
 The KTU‘s explanation for the decision was that the KTU needed to progressively participate in the policy 
decision making process because i) the NEIS issue, cause for conflicts in school fields should be resolved as 
soon as possible and ii) a policy recommendation of the EIC at the end of that year would have a significant 
influence in the coming education informatization direction. 
86
 The EIC held a public debate titled as ―Issues and Tasks of Education Administration Informatization‖ on the 
17
th
 of September. The JSCNEIS organized massive demonstrations
86
 in September but it also held a public 
debate for providing an alternative to the NEIS (1 October 2003). 
87
 The SEIS was officially proposed to the EIC on the public hearing of the subcommittee under the EIC on the 
24
th




The petition was approved by the court on the 28
th
 of November 2003, clarifying that CD-
ROMs storing 6 million students‘ information would put privacy at risk if it were to be 
distributed to all universities. The fact that each CD-ROM contained information on all 6 
million students indicated that universities would possess information of all students rather 
than that of their own applicants. Furthermore, universities planned to keep the CD-ROMs for 
4 years. Based on the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public 
Agencies, the court declared that personal information should not be used or be transferred to 
another agency for purposes other than those of its original collection. In this regard, the 
court‘s explanation was that the MOE did not have the authority to distribute students‘ 
information to universities for the universities application process without prior consent by 
each student. The court stressed that ―the protection of privacy was more important than the 
convenience of education administrations‖ (The Chosun Ilbo, 29 November 2003).  
 
However, the MOE refused to follow the court‘s ruling, arguing that the ruling was applicable 
to only three students who filed the petition and accordingly decided to distribute the CD-
ROMs eliminating the information of those three students. Conservative newspapers also 
opposed the court‘s decision, claiming that CD-ROMs were necessary because of a tight 
application schedule and the distribution of CD-ROMs had been the established practice since 
1997 (The DongA Ilbo, 29 November 2003; JoongAng Daily, 29 November 2003)
88
. Even 
though the court explained that the ruling did not mean the cessation of the construction of the 
NEIS, it seemed to reproduce the severe conflict which had occurred in the previous period. 
 
In the frequent meetings of the EIC, ways to implement the system for the three information 
categories were discussed. The 7
th
 meeting of the EIC on the 15
th
 of December 2003 formed a 
                                                 
88
 The KTU urged the MOE to respect the ruling and threatened a lawsuit to claim damages against the MOE. 
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broad outline for the implementation of the NEIS; i) 24 of 27 work fields would be managed 
in the existing NEIS, ii) 3 fields, such as School/student affairs, Admission/admission to a 
school of higher grade and Student health, were separately operated in the form of an 
independent system not in the existing NEIS and iii) the independent system would be 
physically and separately operated by a server installed in each school or by a group server 
combining schools and would be managed by an education office in 16 cities and provinces 
base or outside professional organizations (Education Information Committee, 15 December 
2003). The last was called ―Co-location‖ method.  
 
The decision was a compromise between the MOE and the KTU. The MOE steadily preferred 
a server built in the education offices and operated by each school. In contrast, the KTU 
insisted that each school should operate its own independent server in each school. Hence, the 
liberal forces including the KTU welcomed and accepted the decision (Press release from the 
JSCNEIS, 15 December 2003) on the basis that a physically separate server would be built in 
each school and accordingly the authority to control students‘ information would remain 
within a school.  
 
However, the KFTA opposed the decision, arguing that ―to manage the three fields with an 
independent server for each school will cost too much to create but will also require much 
expense to maintain‖ (The DongA Ilbo, 16 December 2003). A further problem of the outline 
solution was that some specific issues remained unsettled and were left to be discussed in the 
next meeting (Education Information Committee, 15 December 2003). One of the specific 
issues was the criteria by which an independent server would be installed. It was closely 






 meeting of the EIC on the 30
th
 of December 2003 did not reach agreement on this 
issue despite a heated debate. The MOE preferred fewer independent servers
89
. The reason for 
this was that ‗institution and system based design‘ could prevent human rights infringement 
and thus, group servers rather than many independent servers were preferred (Inew24, 4 
January 2004). The KTU insisted on more independent servers
90
 in accordance with the core 
principle of human rights protection in the agreement of the 7
th
 meeting. Such a wide 
difference resulted in the rejection of the EIC‘s proposal91 by a vote of 8 to 10.  
 
However, the proposal was finally accepted by the last meeting of the EIC on the 9
th
 of 
February 2004 on the condition that the new system would be installed within the initial 




From the above, some findings can be summarized as follows. First, compared to the previous 
two periods, the main debate over the NEIS in this period was conducted through the official 
process, namely the EIC of the government. It seems to raise the possibility of compromise 
between contenders because the official meetings tend to provide a place for negotiations and 
decisions. Second, participants in the controversy over the NEIS expanded to more civil 
society organizations in this period. The KTU‘s protests became mixed with massive 
                                                 
89
 The MOE suggested that around 200 independent servers would be enough. The estimated cost was 20 billion 
Korean won. 
90
 It suggested that around 4,000 independent servers should be required. According to the KTU, high schools, 
elementary and middle schools with over 31 classes and special schools with handicapped students would 
operate an independent server. The KTU estimated the installation would cost around 70 billion Korean won. 
91
 It was around 2,500 independent servers which were the sum of both an independent server per around 15 
elementary and middle schools and an independent server for each high and special school. 
92
 The final agreement was approved at the Ministerial meeting on the 3
rd
 of March 2004. After several 
negotiations between the MOE and the KTU and reviews on new system design for three categories, the official 
launch date of the new system was decided to be the 1
st




demonstrations by Labour Unions and a political party. It would imply that the arguments of 
the KTU against the NEIS would be highly likely to be contaminated by the activities of the 
Labour Unions. Third, the focus in this period was placed on the more specific and technical 
issues relating to three sensitive information categories. In the sense that the three categories 
were composed of 65% of the NEIS input items (Park J. , 2006, p. 8), the decision on whether 
they would operate within the existing NEIS and how they would be controlled seemed to be 
essential in this period. 
 
5.4.2. Content of debate 
 
The opponents of the NEIS in this period attempted to link ―information‖ to ―democracy‖ and 
―the NEIS‖ to ―irrationality and illegality.‖ The liberal forces purposefully emphasized 
democracy in the information age, such as right of information self-determination and 
autonomy, in order to secure more favourable position in the agreement of the EIC. The 
assertions of opponents in this period were as follows; i) as the right of information self-
determination is indispensable in the information age, sensitive information should be 
controlled within the school fence. ii) The goals of education can be achieved effectively as 
long as autonomy and professionalism in education are respected. iii) The NEIS is irrational 
and illegal. 
 
First, opposing groups continued to put more emphasis on human rights rather than an 
efficiency of education administration. For instance, maintaining abolition of the plan for 
production and distribution of CD-ROMs, the KTU condemned the MOE which ignored the 
human rights infringement within the plan in pursuit of administrative expediency (Education 
Informatization Committee, 2003a, p. 7). In the case of the ruling by the court for the 
203 
 
distribution of CD-ROMs, the KTU criticized the refusal of the MOE to follow it, insisting 
that the efficiency of administration could not be compatible with the protection of human 
rights in the information age.  
 
"When the court ruling concerns human rights issues in a government policy, the ministry 
still looks at the issue from the convenience and efficiency of school administration," the 
union`s spokesman Song Won-jae said (The Korea Herald, 29 November 2003). 
 
The notion of the right of information self-determination was repeatedly employed for 
emphasizing the priority of personal information protection over administrative efficiency. 
The right of informational self-determination implies that students and teachers should be 
ensured that the individual has the right to dispose over the production and use of his or her 
personal information. Accordingly, its indication is that personal information should be 
manged in pursuit of a ―Collection Limitation Principle93‖ and a ―Purpose Specification 
Principle
94 ‖ (Kim H.-h. , 2003c, p. 21). The detractors of the NEIS argued that these 
principles were violated by the NEIS because the NEIS aimed to allow education offices 
outside school to manage and control students‘ information which should be kept and shared 
within the school fence on the basis of these principles (Kim H.-h. , 2003c, pp. 20-21). 
 
The court also declared that only the principal of each school is entitled to produce and 
distribute personal information of students on the basis of relating laws.  
                                                 
93
 According to the OECD guideline, it is said that ―7. There should be limits to the collection of personal data 
and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or 
consent of the data subject.‖ 
94
 It is that ―9. The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified no later than at the time of 
data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not 




The Minister of Education has only the authority to set criteria on writing and managing the 
records of school life. The principal in each school has the right to produce and distribute the 
records. In this regard, the principal also has the authority to make and disperse the records 
in the electric form (Press release from the JSCNEIS, 28 November 2003). 
 
The concept of the right of information self-determination was a useful point for insisting that 
an many independent servers as possible needed to be installed, an intentional attempt to 
virtually cripple the NEIS.  
 
Second, the NEIS was described as anti-democratic. Opponents strongly tried to defend the 
vision of school autonomy from the government. They claimed that the NEIS could encroach 
on autonomy and professionalism in education. Their argument was that the standardized 
education administration based on the NEIS would lead to the surveillance and control of 
teachers. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the goals of education could be achieved if 
education would be suitable to an educatee‘s circumstance, character, ability and background 
and accordingly the unified criteria enforced by the NEIS could just increase competition in 
school (Lee E.-w. , 2003 , pp. 107-111). As stressed by Kim (2003c, p. 33), the autonomy of 
education and school was one of the important reasons why the SEIS, namely closed school-
based system, should be adopted rather than the NEIS (Press release from the KTU, 24 
October 2003).  
 
The NEIS case is at the crossroad of education informatization; either to respect autonomy in 
school and the human rights of students or lead to the control of teachers and potential 




Third, detractors of the NEIS tried to signify the NEIS issue as one of education reforms. The 
JSCNEIS claimed that the EIC should review existing practices related to student information 
as well as the NEIS (Press release from the JSCNEIS, 8 September 2003).  
 
The struggle over the NEIS gave the chance to review the fundamental issues in the process 
of education informatization. We realized that the problem was not a choice between the C/S 
system and the NEIS but the customary practices in school collecting excessive information 
and managing it without any principle (A Joint Struggle Committee for Human Rights in 
Information Society and Against the NEIS, 2003b). 
 
In this context, they requested an education reform to customary practices in school such as 
poor school meal services, corporal punishment, personal corruption, and bribes from parents 
(Press release from the KTU, 18 July 2003). Along this line, for the agreement on the 15
th
 of 
December, the editorials of a liberal newspaper expressed the hope that the agreement on the 
NEIS would provide the momentum to correct the school and education system stained with a 
long tradition of feudalism, standardization in the era of military regimes, and inhumane 
values (The Hankyoreh, 17 December 2003). 
 
Fourth, the opponents criticized that the NEIS had no legal basis.  
 
They [civil society organization] also condemned the fact that the government is trying to 
gather lots of private information into this system without any agreement from people, so it 
is absolutely illegal and unconstitutional (Press release from The Centre of Jinbo Network, 




As shown in the filing of the provisional disposition petition for the CD-ROMs, the MOE‘s 
accumulation of personal information through the NEIS was portrayed as being against the 
spirit of Constitution in the sense that it collected excessive personal information without any 
legal basis (Press release from the KTU, 24 October 2003). The KTU insisted that the court‘s 
ruling on CD-ROMs could be applicable to the NEIS. In other words, as long as the collection 
of information into CD-ROMs without the student‘s consent was illegal, it was argued that 
the NEIS was similar to the CD-ROMs in terms of no agreement from students and as a result 
would be against the law. 
 
The supporting groups for the NEIS in this period intended to connect ―limited resources 
constraints‖ to ―new system design‖ and ―informatization‖ to ―necessity for education.‖ Their 
claims against the activities of the KTU were used to refute the KTU‘s argument against the 
NEIS. Proponents‘ arguments can be summarized as follows; i) the NEIS is efficient in terms 
of cost and university application schedule. ii) The NEIS is required for the purpose of 
education. iii) The KTU staged illegal demonstration with hostile and intransigent Labour 
Unions and violated the student‘s right to an education.  
 
First, proponents continued to maintain the advantages of the NEIS in terms of efficiency. 
Compared to the previous period, the focus of this period was on the students‘ university 
application schedule and cost issue. They argued that, considering the tight schedule, the 
NEIS was far less time-consuming than other alternatives. Such arguments were also one of 




··· said Hwang Dae-joon, administrative officer at Sungkyunkwan University. ˝Given the 
large number of students and tight schedule, the year-end entrance exam might lead to chaos˝ 
(The DongA Ilbo, 21 August 2003). 
 
Using this argument, conservative newspapers supported the MOE‘s decision to continue to 
distribute CD-ROMs.  
 
However, the ministry‘s decision to continue manufacturing the CDs without the data of the 
three students who filed the suit is an inevitable choice taking into account the college 
application process (JoongAng Daily, 29 November 2003). 
 
We totally agree with the MOE‘s determination, considering the concern over the deadlock 
of university application process (The Munhwa Ilbo, 29 November 2003). 
 
The cost issue was frequently used as a counter-argument to the opponent of the NEIS. For 
the installation of independent servers, the KFTA opposed to the KTU‘s argument of one 
independent server per school, claiming that the cost would be huge (The DongA Ilbo, 16 
December 2003). The MOE estimated the KTU‘s suggestion would cost 2.3 trillion Korean 
won. In this context, the KFTA proposed the installation cost as the most important criterion 
for the decision on the number of independent servers.  
 
The ―co-location‖ method or the KTU‘s suggestion of independent server operation per 
school can never be accepted. The adverse effects, such as a loss of an astronomical sum of 
taxpayers‘ money and an increase in workload of teachers, are serious (Press release from 




This argument seemed to be included as the important part of the agreement in the final 
meeting of the EIC; the new system should satisfy the initial budget constraints.  
 
Second, advocates insisted that the NEIS would be an essential and effective device for 
education. The basic idea comes from the belief that the more information we have on a 
student, the higher quality of education can be provided to the student.  
 
From the point of view of educational values, it would be better to collect more information 
on a student in order to guide the student effectively (Kim J.-C. , 2003, p. 7).  
 
The reason why the assertion was stressed in this period was partly because the debate was 
held in the official governmental committee with educational experts. Administrative 
efficiency and convenience of administration service looked unappealing in the debate with a 
small group of experts. Proponents believed that the collection of student information would 
be inevitable to obtain the goals of education. They stated that the collection of student 
information would be virtually impossible from the perspective of the encroachment on a 
student‘s human right. Hence, they argued that the information collected in school should not 
be evaluated just by the human rights infringement. Instead, it was claimed that the 
information should be judged eventually on the basis of the necessity to enhance educational 
effectiveness (Lee C. , 2003, pp. 41-42).  
 
Third, proponents criticized that the KTU‘s activities against the NEIS were illegal and 
political. For example, the collective leave of absence was condemned as illegal and criminal 
complaints were filed against the executive board of the KTU. Along the same line, the 




Teachers union members who joined the demonstration on Saturday and those who 
participate in a strike with the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions today will be subject to 
punishment, the official said (JoongAng Daily, 25 June 2003). 
 
In particular, the KTU‘s joint strike with Labour Unions and a political party invited strong 
criticism from the conservative forces who attempted to promote a violent and political image 
of the KTU. The defenders for the NEIS attempted to relate the KTU to the counter-
democratic side by emphasizing the KTU‘s motivations. 
 
Yesterday's partial strike led by the KFTU, for instance, was demonstrating against the 
system. Demands such as abolishing the free economy, district laws, and the National 
Education Information System were part of a political demonstration for "professional" 
labour movement members. ··· The greedy group struggles of large, energetic labour unions 
cause an excessive increase in labour costs, and much of that heads on to subleased 
companies or middle and small businesses (The Chosun Ilbo, 26 June 2003).  
 
Fourth, the supporters of the NEIS argued that the KTU violated the student‘s right to 
education which runs against democratic ideals. The critics argued that the KTU used students 
as hostages for its selfish goal and consequently students became the victim of the illegal 
protests by the KTU. The first tough stance against the KTU by the government seems to 
come from this argument.  
 
―KTU‘s collective leave will be strictly dealt with in order to protect the students‘ right to 
education,‘‘ Prime Minister Koh Gun said during a meeting with the nation‘s 16 city and 




In line with it, conservative forces filed a lawsuit against the KTU‘s executive board, arguing 
that ―the KTU is infringing on students‘ right through illegal acts such as taking collective 
leave from school‖ (JoongAng Daily, 25 June 2003). A conservative newspaper explained 
that police would charge an illegal protest led by the KTU.  
 
The police see the protest by KTU as a violation of the law, which bans any collective action, 
strike or boycott by education workers (The DongA Ilbo, 28 June 2003). 
 
From the above discussion, some findings can be detected as follows. First, the debate over 
the NEIS in this period also still resorted to the conflict between the democratic code and the 
developmental code. However, one salient feature in this period was the change in contents of 
each code. To be more specific, for the democratic code, the concept of ‗rights of information 
self-determination‘ was stressed in the critical issues such as that of the need for an 
independent server. Within the developmental code, the need for high quality of education as 
well as budget constraints was highlighted. It seemed to be caused by the fact that the main 
debates in this period were conducted in the governmental committee with experts as 
mentioned above.  
 
Second, discussants, particularly conservative forces, in this period attempted to stain their 
counterpart‘s image more aggressively. It was partly because the KTU‘s activities against 
NEIS in this period were accompanied with the protests of Labour Unions as well as other 
liberal civil society organizations. Conservative forces signified the KTU‘s illegal and self-
righteous image. Instead, the liberal forces responded passively and concentrated on the 
original issues of the NEIS such as human rights infringement and school autonomy. Even 
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though the inherent problems in school were also raised in this period, they were not the main 
issues and hence, did not have significant effect on the debate in this period. As a result, it 
indicates that conservative forces made full use of both sides of developmental codes in Korea, 
namely efficiency and anti-communism. 
 
Third, the final agreement reflected arguments from both liberal forces and conservative 
forces. As shown in Table 5-3, the compromised plan considered both cost constraints and 
human rights. Under the time constraints, namely universities application schedule, and 
budget constraints, the contenders were pressured to reach the agreement partly because the 
severe confrontation over the NEIS had continued for around one year in the turmoil of civil 
society during the transition toward democracy. As such, the debate over the NEIS resulted in 
an ambiguous reconciliation between the democratic code and the developmental code.  
 
Table 5-3 The comparison of three plans 
 MOE Agreement KTU 
Content Operating integrated 
system which has the 
server installed at 16 
education offices.  
Each school operates an 
independent server and 
servers are managed in the 
16 education offices in 
cities and provinces.  
(co-location method) 
Operating independent 




An integrated system is cost 
effective and contributes to 
higher quality of education. 
Both the cost constraints 
and human rights should be 
considered together.  
All system but independent 
server per school cannot 
protect the students’ 
human rights of 
information  
 Reference: Reorganized by author on the basis of Chang Woo-Young (2004, p. 183) . 
212 
 
5.4.3. The structure of discourses in civil society in the period of 
reconciliation 
 
 The structure and symbolic system of controversy in this period can be summarized as shown 
in Table 5-4. Compared to the structure in the introductory period (Table 5-1), two distinctive 
features can be found. One salient feature is the perception about the government including 
the EIC. The EIC tried to be a mediator between conservative forces and reform forces. After 
all, it was understood as the neutral symbol, between the good and the bad, after the KTU 
participated in the EIC from the 3
rd
 meeting.  
 
The other characteristic is that anti-communism was linked to a positive side of the NEIS. The 
debate over the NEIS in this period shows that the tension between the developmental code 
and the democratic code re-emerged, even though the latter was dominant in the introductory 
period. What is noteworthy is that conservative forces depended on the developmental code‘s 
emphasis on anti-communism rather than efficiency. As depicted in Table 5-1, the MOE in 
the introductory period of the debate was eager to persuade civil society by emphasizing 
administrative efficiency and convenience from the developmental code. However, as the 
debate evolved, conservative forces including the KFTA exerted more effort to pollute the 
KTU by accusations that the ideological viewpoints of the KTU were not in accordance with 
the core values of Korean civil society based on the developmental code‘s theme of anti-
communism. As such, the KTU‘s arguments against the NEIS were contaminated by the 
KTU‘s image that it was a threat to national interest. Advocates for the NEIS also attempted 
to defend the NEIS by assigning liberal forces to an illegal and self-righteous image. In short, 
the dispute over the NEIS could not be resolved by drawing on either the democratic code or 
the developmental code because neither of them became dominant.  
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Table 5-4 The symbolic system of the dispute over the NEIS: The period of reconciliation  
The structure of the dispute over the NEIS in civil society 
 The Bad The Good 
Policy  NEIS  
Actor  EIC  
Discourses 
The encroachment on autonomy and 
professionalism of education by the 
NEIS. 
Existing customary practices from 
tradition of military regime in school 
to collect excessive information and 
manage it.  
Collecting excessive personal 
information illegally. 
Infringement students’ right through 
illegal act such as taking collective 
leave from school by the KTU. 
The protection of human rights. 
The right of informational self-
determination. 
 





The more information on a student, 
the higher quality of education. 
 
The structure of cultural value system in civil society 



























In this regard, the compromise between the two forces based on either the developmental code 




The purpose of this chapter was to examine civil society in the transition toward democracy 
through the dispute over the NEIS. In the debate of the electronic ID card, when the first 
government was elected from the opposition party in 1998, the democratic code seemed to be 
established as the dominant code. That of the NEIS hit its stride after the first accession to 
power by only democratic forces without any coalition in 2002. What is of interest is that 
while the electronic ID card was scrapped, the NEIS was implemented after some revision. 
Hence questions can be raised as to i) whether the democratic code failed to be more sediment 
in civil society as the dominant code, ii) the possible tension between the democratic code and 
the developmental code, and iii) the process and consequences of the tension. Furthermore, 
the existing studies on the debate over the NEIS paid scant attention to what instructs action 
and speech in civil society and how discussants divide people into the categories of inclusion 
and exclusion.  
 
With this in mind, this chapter examined the dispute about the NEIS by drawing on the 
framework from the traditions of the different codes. The implications which can be drawn 
from the process of the debates are as follows. First, like the debate over the electronic ID 
Card, the controversy over the NEIS not only confirms the co-existence of the democratic 
code and the developmental code but also the contestation for dominance between them. It 
may be evidenced that the developmental code did not disappear in the transition toward 




Second, unlike the case of the electronic ID card where the developmental code depends on 
efficiency of administration, that of the NEIS shows the distinctive feature that the 
developmental code in Korea is associated with anti-communism as well as efficiency. At the 
end of the first period (from the end of 2002 to the first quarter of 2003), the arguments 
against the NEIS by most social organizations seemed to draw on the democratic code. 
However, what is noteworthy is that, as the dispute continued, conservative forces started to 
depend on the developmental code derived from anti-communism to divide discussants into 
the categories of inclusion and exclusion. During severe confrontation between discussants in 
the second and final period of the NEIS debate, they continuously attempted to link reform 
forces with threats to the national interest by drawing on anti-communism. Hence, it can be 
concluded that as discussed in chapter 2, the developmental code as the amalgamation of 
efficiency and anti-communism in Korea is likely to have more enduring and pervasive 
influence on civil society in Korea than in other countries. It may indicate that even though 
the democratic code has the tendency to be dominant, its validity will be contested 
continuously for a considerable period.  
 
Lastly, it is found that the parameters of the conflict expanded through both contenders and 
their arguments in the transition toward democracy. The parameters of the conflict expanded 
from between the government and social organizations to between social organizations. Of 
special interest is the differentiation of social organizations which may be one of the salient 
features of the transition to democracy. For instance, teachers‘ organizations with similar 
arguments in the introductory period of the NEIS debate were split over the strategies against 
the NEIS and furthermore positioned as counterparts in the second period. The main selling 
point of their arguments was also differentiated in every period of the dispute. It may imply 
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that the vehement confrontation between conservative forces and liberal forces was inevitable 
and fierce symbolic practices were conducted by linking other forces to their negative image 
which would not be accepted in civil society. For example, the advocates of the NEIS 
pronounced the NEIS as ―nice,‖ while opponents of the NEIS called it as ―n-e-i-s‖ to link it to 
the ―Network + AIDS.‖ Unlike the debate about the electronic ID card, the NEIS‘ initial 
controversy between human rights and administrative efficiency evolved into a conflict 
between conservative values and reform values. As such, the debate over the NEIS may 
demonstrate that the possible conflicts between the democratic code and the developmental 















6.1. Introduction  
 
During the last three government regimes in Korea (February 1993 – December 2007), 
Korean civil society has been in transition toward democracy. At the same time, it has been 
hugely affected by the diffusion of informatization which was pursued as a national 
developmental strategy. In tandem with these trends, the development of the credit 
information sharing system (hereafter CISS) in Korea has been accelerated. The legal 
framework for the CISS was also established and reorganized. These changes brought forth a 
controversy over the use and protection of credit information in Korea. 
 
The Use and Protection of the Credit Information Act (hereafter Credit Information Act), 
which is the Korean law regulating credit information, was enacted in 1995 when the first 
civilian government stressed the intensification of national competitiveness. Since then, the 
Credit Act has been revised once a year on average. The periods of the revisions of the Credit 
Information Act which are explored in this chapter (January 1995 – December 2007) are 
prolonged over the last three regimes in Korea, as shown in Appendix 3-1 of Chapter 3. They 
encompass the periods of the previous two debates about the electronic ID card (April 1995 – 
February 1999) and the NEIS (July 2000 – December 2003). Compared to the previous two 
debates, the dispute over credit information provides a particularly interesting environment in 
which the conflicts between the democratic code and the developmental code can be 
examined from a longer perspective. Furthermore, the previous two debates showed the 
continuous competition of the two codes for dominance. It raises an interesting question of 
how their confrontation in the dispute over credit information has been in line with the 




One expected argument could be that debates over credit information are more likely to be 
based on the developmental code. One possible explanation behind this assertion would be 
that the development of credit information system may be easily combined with a 
government-led economic growth strategy and aspirations for economic development in 
Korea. It can be drawn from the observation that i) the establishment and operation of a CISS 
in Korea was aimed to help the government to monitor the amounts of loans and ii) the 
expansion of credit information system was coupled with the globalization and 
informatization promotion policy as a method to improve  national competitiveness.  
 
What is of interest is that Korean civil society has been in transition toward democracy. 
Hence, a question can be raised as to how arguments originating from the developmental code 
have been contested by the democratic code. Another plausible explanation for the assertion 
may be closely related to the financial institutions‘ need for credit information. Financial 
institutions have been suggested to have the tendency to support the use of credit information 
to overcome the asymmetric information problem
95
 with credit information sharing. As for 
Korea, the CISS between financial institutions has been operated since 1955 (Seoh, 1996, p. 
26). Accordingly, financial institutions have participated in the CISS voluntarily or 
mandatorily. From the first stage of the debate, financial institutions in civil society as well as 
the government have been proponents for the use of credit information. As a result, unlike the 
previous two debates, the debate over credit information may cause an innate conflict between 
                                                 
95
 Asymmetric information problem implies that ‗the probability of default is known by borrowers more 
accurately than by lenders.‘ It induces an adverse selection problem and a moral hazard problem. Adverse 
selection arises when an average interest rate would be charged due to the lack of accurate credit information and 
accordingly attracts those who are likely to default and would be willing to pay a higher interest rate. Moral 
hazard problem occurs when borrowers‘ activities after borrowing cannot be monitored adequately by lenders 
and accordingly borrowers would tend to relax their efforts to prevent default (Bertola, Disney, & Grant, 2006, 
pp. 12-13; Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, p. 2017).  
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civil society organizations as civil movements have been activated along with the process of 
democratisation and informatization only after 1987. 
 
Another interesting question is associated with the name of the Credit Information Act. The 
name of the Credit Information Act, that is the Use and Protection of Credit Information Act, 
includes both the use and the protection of credit information. It differs from the names of 
laws in other countries. For instance, the legal framework of the United States for credit 
information is the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This shows the high possibility of the tension 
between the use and the protection of credit information. Hence, the process of revision of the 
Credit Information Act may reveal the high value which has been put on protection of 
information in the transition toward democracy in Korea. The question as to whether the 
developmental or democratic code is dominant and how the tension between them has been 
resolved can be examined in this process.   
 
During the last three regimes (Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
government) as described in Appendix 3-1, the Credit Information Act was amended 10 times 
directly and 7 times indirectly by the amendments of other Acts. With these in mind, the 
controversies can be divided into three periods according to the change of Korean 
governments; the introductory period (January 1995 – December1997) when the Credit 
Information Act was enacted in the first civilian government: the second period (January 1998 
– December 2002) when the first transfer of power was achieved and the government tried to 
recover from the financial crisis: the third period (January 2003 – December 2007) when the 




6.2. The period of enactment of the Credit Information Act and the 
beginning of debate (January 1995 ~ December 1997)  
 
6.2.1. The background about the credit information system in Korea  
 
6.2.1.1. Credit information 
 
According to the Credit Information Act, credit information is defined as ―information which 
is necessary for judgement on identification, credit rating, and credit transactions capacities of 
transacting parties in commercial transactions including financial transactions‖ (§2.1.).96 This 
definition of credit information in terms of economic activities can make the difference 
between credit information and other personal information manifest. In the sense that credit 
information is closely related to economic life, credit information has seemingly contradictory 
features of its utilization as economic activity information as well as the protection as 
personal information. The implication of credit information can be found in the fact that a bad 
credit history holder tends to create many difficulties in economic activities. If a person is 
registered as a delinquent debtor in a CISS, it is nearly impossible for him or her to conduct 
financial transactions and, when possible, the terms can be unfavourable. He or she is unable 
to receive additional credit cards and is also disqualified from taking out loans or giving 
surety for others receiving loans. Furthermore, job security as well as job seeking can be 
                                                 
96
 The general definition of ‗credit‘ is a ‗reliance on the truth of something said or done‘ (Merrian-Webster‘s 
Collegiate Dictionary). This definition focuses on its ethical aspect. However, credit has been widely used in 
terms of economic activities. From an economic viewpoint, it implies the degree of belief or confidence which 
one economic agent gives the other economic agent. In a more specific way, the credit in economic activities can 
be defined as ‗the facility of being able to obtain goods or services before payment, based on the trust that 
payment will be made in the future‘(Compact Oxford English Dictionary). 
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threatened (Hankook Ilbo, 2 March 1998; Maeil Business Newspaper, 26 August 2002). In 
this context, an individual, in particular with a good credit history, has the incentive to 
provide credit information to others in order to get more favourable terms at financial 
transactions and economic life (Miller, 2003, p. 26). However, considering a bad credit 
holder‘s difficulties in ordinary life, the abuse of credit information can be a fatal blow to an 
individual‘s economic activities. The stronger the demand for credit information by financial 
institutions and the government becomes, the more vigorous the request for its protection 
grows. 
 





 and information technology development.
99
 
In fact, due to the development of information technology, ―it is rare for borrowers to hide 
from their credit background because credit histories are usually well documented by credit 
bureaux (hereafter CB) and are readily accessible by potential lenders at low cost‖ 
                                                 
97
 Modernization has augmented the role of credit information in a society (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 1694). 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) demonstrate that the geographical mobility of the population is positively correlated 
with credit information sharing. As an economy has developed, the mobility of people has become higher. The 
scope of commercial and financial transactions between economic agents has become wider and wider, 
indicating that the possibilities of the transactions between people without transactions histories have increased.  
For instance, one of the main causes of a rapid urbanization in Korea was net migration. According to the 
Korean National Statistics Office, the urbanization rate increased from 28.0% in 1960 to 81.5% in 2005. The 
growth of the urban population during the period of 1966-1970 was affected by net migration as of 73.2%. It 
implies that the credit-based transactions have expanded, leading to the increase in the necessities of collecting 
and sharing credit information. 
98
 Financial development is another driver to growing interest in credit information. The age of limitless 
competition between financial institutions caused by financial liberalization has led to credit-based lending 
policies (Miller, 2003, p. 34; Ferretti, 2008, p. 1). Severe competition has reduced the rate of margin, resulting in 
a tight management of credit risk to assure appropriate profits from loans which were already provided. Credit 
risk management requires more credit information management. 
99
 Advances in information technology have increased interest in credit information (Jentzsch & Riestra, 2006, p. 
39). A rapid growth in computing technology enables financial institutions to access and analyze credit 
information quickly and cheaply. 
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(Vercammen, 1995, p. 462). At the same time, credit information is more likely to be shared 
because ―there are increasing returns to the scale of information sharing‖ (Pagano & Jappelli, 
1993, p. 1694).  
 
A better understanding of the importance of credit information in Korea may require a brief 
examination of Korea‘s own characteristics, a state-led development strategy which hugely 
influenced CISSs in Korea. The government-led growth strategy under poor domestic 
financial resources resulted in credit rations by the government. As a result, the government 
aimed to establish a centralized CISS, in particular to collect information on loans to 
individuals and corporations. Afterwards, Korea‘s CISS was improved by the Korea 
Federation of Banks (hereafter KFB) under government supervision. Such a strong role of the 
government in the CISS may be partly because of the collectivism based on Confucian 
tradition and familialism. From the financial institutions‘ perspective, it was neo-liberal 
policies based on the market rather than the government that highlighted the importance of 
credit information. In the government-led development era, Korea experienced insufficient 
financial resources and a chronic excessive money demand, leading collateral-based lending 
policies with financial institutions‘ little need for credit information (Seoh, 1996, pp. 6-7). 
Since the financial crisis in 1997 when the economic system was transformed from a 
government-based one to a market-based one, the credit information system has been a 
critical part of the financial system. This situation is well illustrated in the financial markets in 
Korea in the 1990s and the early of the 2000s. In the case of commercial banks in Korea, the 
proportion of credit loans in total loans increased 51.4% in 1990 to 61.9% in 1996 before the 
financial crisis in 1997. In particular, after the financial crisis in 1997, business objectives of 
financial institutions in Korea were set for consumer credit rather than corporate loans. 
Household debt surged at an annual rate of around 20% to 30% during 2000 to 2002. These 
224 
 
situations have raised the importance of credit information to financial institutions as well as 
to individuals. 
 
As such, credit information is one of the most essential elements for a fast moving open 
society like Korea. Social changes have increased the importance of credit information. This 
trend has reinforced the incentive and disincentive mechanism about credit information.  
 
6.2.1.2. The credit information sharing system in Korea 
 
The CISS in Korea shows the coexistence of the public credit registry (hereafter PCR) and the 
credit reporting agency (hereafter CRA)
 100
. Appendix 6-1 depicts the CISS in Korea. The 
former includes the Centralized Credit Information Collection Agency of the KFB (hereafter 
CCA) and four industry-specific credit information collection agencies, which are non-profit 
private organizations. According to the first Credit Information Act enacted in 1995, the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (hereafter MOFE) could designate the CCA and determine 
                                                 
100
 The CISS can be broadly categorized into groups on the basis of its ownership: PCR and CRA (Miller, 2003, 
p. 27; Jappelli & Pagano, 2006, p. 347; Ferretti, 2010, p. 5). In general, the PCR is established by the 
government or a central bank for the purpose of the prudential supervision of banks and monitoring the safety 
and soundness of financial system. In contrast, the CRA is operated by financial institutions or commercial firms 
to improve the risk management about borrowers and to overcome asymmetric information problem. The above 
different ownership and purpose of two CISSs produce major differences between them in terms of participation 
in them and their coverage of financial institutions. The participation in the PCR is mandatory by law, leading to 
complete coverage of financial institutions. By contrast, the CRA voluntarily collects and shares credit 
information on a contractual basis and accordingly tends to have incomplete coverage. The frameworks of credit 
information sharing in the world have revealed mixed result; the PCR or the CRA operates alone and both of 
them coexist (Miller, 2003, p. 35; Ferretti, 2010, p. 5). Financial institutions in Belgium and France share credit 
information through the PCR. Those in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and so on exchange 
credit information through the CRAs. In Germany, Austria, Italy and so on, credit information is shared through 
both the PCR and the CRAs. This variation across the countries is suggested to depend on the legal system 
(Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007, p. 301) or the absence of one of them (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-37). 
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exchange partners and the scope of credit information collected, managed and used
101
. Hence, 
the participation of financial institutions in the CCA is compulsory. As summarized in 
Appendix 6-2, the PCR in Korea was originated from the sharing system among financial 
institutions in 1955 with the objective of providing an information system for the government 
to monitor the indebtedness of borrowers (Seoh, 1996, pp. 25-29).  
 
Since 1982, the KFB has operated the PCR under government supervision. Through various 
channels, including an online network system, it has collected not only information on the 
amounts of loans, but also negative credit information such as delinquency and default 
records, as shown in Appendix 6-3. In particular, it functioned as a black list which 
accumulated information on delinquents who had more than 300,000 Korean won (US$ 273) 
(hereafter KRW) overdue for over 90 days. They were labelled as ‗bad credit holders‘ 
(Shinyong bulryang ja) until January 2005. Around 5,000 financial institutions are data 
providers and users of the PCR in Korea. Government agencies and public corporations also 
provide credit-related public information such as delinquencies in the payment of taxes and 
social insurance premiums.  
 
The CRAs in Korea compose the second tier of the CISS in Korea
102
. Two CBs and four 
credit inquiry companies collect and provide credit information on a contractual basis. The 
CBs are NICE Information Service and Korea Credit Bureau. The establishment of a CB in 
Korea was closely related to a steep increase in household credit at around 20 to 30 growth 
                                                 
101
 Since the amendment of the Credit Information Act in 1999, the CCA has not been designated but registered. 
However, the participants and the scope of credit information collected and shared have still been determined by 
the government. 
102
 93.3 percentages of the population age 15 and above were covered by the CRAs in Korea, compared to 61% 
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation‘s Countries (World Bank, 2010).  
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rate after the financial crisis in 1997. In particular, the credit card debt crisis in 2002
103
 
increased the demand for individual credit information. In this context, the first CB in Korea 
was launched by the Korean Information Service in February 2002 and in September 2002, 
the National Information & Credit Evaluation started the credit bureau business. Both of them 
were merged into the NICE Information Service. As shown in Appendix 6-1, apart from 
credit information from the CCA, they gather short-term delinquency records and positive 
credit information
104
 from their members including financial and non-financial companies 
such as department stores and telecommunication companies.  
 
In sum, the CCA in Korea has served as the PCR to help i) the government monitor the 
amount of loans and stability and soundness of financial institutions for prudential supervision 
and ii) correct moral hazard problems by blacklists strengthening discipline effects on 
borrowers via reputational mechanisms where credit delinquency reduces the value of 
‗reputation collateral‘ in credit market (Miller, 2003, p. 27). In addition, private CRAs in 
Korea have provided positive credit information as well as negative credit information to 
improve credit risk management of both financial institutions and non-financial companies. 
 
6.2.1.3. The legal framework for credit information in Korea 
 
Like other legal systems in Korea, the legal framework relating credit information is 
composed of four forms; Act, Presidential Enforcement Decree, Enforcement Rule and 
                                                 
103
 Outstanding amount of cash advance service and card loans by credit companies increased 9.7 trillion KRW 
in 1998 to 46.9 trillion Korean won in 2002. 
104
 While the CCA collects information on loans more than 90 days overdue, CRAs gather data on more than 5 
days within 90 days overdue. The positive information collected by CRAs includes borrower‘s characteristics 
such as occupation and income, credit transaction history such as loan payment and card usage, opening of 





  However, unlike other laws, one distinctive feature of the legal framework for 
credit information is that associations between financial institutions play a significant role in 
the legal framework. Representatives of the financial sector form a Credit Information 
Council (hereafter CIC) of the CCA. The Credit Information Act allows the CIC to determine 
matters necessary for the central management and utilization of credit information. The 
CIC
106
 sets the Agreements between financial institutions on the Management of Credit 
Information
107
 (hereafter AMCI) which are composed of one of the important parts in the 
legal framework for credit information in Korea.  
 
The basic legal framework for credit information in Korea is the Credit Information Act 
enacted in 1995. The Credit Information Act covered i) credit information business, ii) 
collection, investigation and processing of credit information, iii) distribution, use and 
management of credit information and iv) protection of credit information subject. The use of 
credit information is related to each of these aspects. 
 
Some details for implementation for the Act are specified in the subordinate legislation, such 
as Presidential Enforcement Decree and Enforcement Rules. In particular, details regarding 
the use of credit information are determined in the Regulation on Supervision of Credit 
Information Business which is delegated to the Financial Services Commission by the 
Enforcement Decree. For instance, the outline of the exchange partners and the scope of credit 
                                                 
105
 An Act is enacted and amended by the National Assembly and a Presidential Enforcement Decree is made by 
the State Council to implement an Act. An Enforcement Rule to supplement an Act and a Presidential 
Enforcement Decree provides details concerning implementation. A Regulation is made by a Ministry to 
implement practical details of an Act and subordinate legislations. 
106
 The head of the CCA, namely the chairman of the KFB, determines the formation and operation of the CIC. 
107
 Before 2001 various Agreements on the Exchange and Management of Credit Information existed in each 
financial sector. They were unified into the Agreements on Management of Credit Information in 2001. 
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information in the CCA are determined by the Presidential Enforcement Decree. Details of 
the exchange partners and the scope of credit information in the CCA are specified in the 
Regulation on Supervision of Credit Information Business
108
. However, the Regulation on 
Supervision of Credit Information Business delegates more details to the CIC whose members 
are the representative of the financial sector. 
 
From the above, some interesting findings are as follows: First of all, participants in the legal 
process about credit information would be the government, the National Assembly, civil 
society organizations and financial institutions. What is of interest is that financial institutions 
can directly participate in decision making on the use of credit information through the CIC. 
Civil society organizations have no direct way to be involved in the decisions. Second, the 
legal framework of credit information in Korea seems to reflect the history of the CISS in 
Korea. In the sense that the CCA has been operated by the KFB, the legal framework gives 
financial institutions the ultimate legal authority to decide the exchange partners and the scope 
of credit information in the CCA. Lastly, matters concerning the use of credit information are 
specified in the subordinate legislation, in particular the AMCI. Only mutual consent between 
the government and financial institutions is required to revise the matters concerning the use 
of credit information. In contrast, those about the protection of credit information tend to be 
determined in the Credit Information Act. It may indicate that the change of the former could 
be easier than that of the latter. 
 
 
                                                 
108
 Its initial title was the Credit Information Services Management Guideline which was replaced by the Credit 
Information Services Management Regulation in 1998. The Credit Information Services Management 
Regulation was substituted by the Regulation on Supervision of Credit Information Business in 2001. 
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6.2.2. The enactment of the Credit Information Act 
 
The Credit Information Act was enacted in 1995 when the Kim Young-sam government 
stepped in mid-term. However, it virtually originated from Kim Young-sam‘s inauguration. 
Kim Young-sam initiated the ―New Korea‖ reform programmes including political and 
socioeconomic reforms. In particular, economic reforms and renewal were highlighted in his 
special message of a ―new leap toward a new economy‖ based on competition rather than 
regulation on the 3
rd




The next two or three years would be a critical time to decide whether our economy will leap 
toward an advanced economy or slip back to an underdeveloped country. 
 
Along this line, the financial sector plan of a five-year programme for the New Economy, 
which the Ministry of Finance announced on the 22
nd
 of May 1993, included the improvement 
of the credit information system such as the expansion of the scope of credit information 
management and the establishment of an on-line system. More specific plans regarding credit 
information management were made public in the action plan for financial reform of the five-
year programme for the New Economy (23 July 1993). The enactment of the Credit 
Information Management Act was set forth. This was also recommended by the Presidential 
Commission on Administrative Reform (20 November 1993). The latter suggested that the 
Ministry of Finance needed to be responsible for the Credit Information Act. The Credit 
Inquiry Business Act, which was a law concerning credit information at that time, was 
                                                 
109
 Korea had enjoyed an annual growth rate of 8.2% during the 1989-1991 period. However, the growth rate 
dropped steeply to 4.7% in 1992. It gave rise to deep concerns about the future of the economy and led to the 
necessity for reforms to enhance competitiveness (Korea Institutie for International Economic Policy, 1993). 
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recommended for abolition. The reason behind this recommendation was that credit 
information is an important financial infrastructure for the development of financial industries.  
 
As such, the improvement of the credit information system was initiated under the name of 
globalization and informatization. The conclusion to be drawn here is that the main and initial 
purpose of the enactment of the Credit Information Act focused on the use of credit 
information rather than its protection (Korea Development Institute, 2004, p. 96). The review 
report on a draft of the Credit Information Act by the Finance Committee of the National 
Assembly also pointed out as follows. 
 
Because market liberalization of credit rating business is scheduled to start in 1996, it is 
urgent to give policy attention to credit information business ··· (The Finance Committee, 
1994, p. 5). 
 
In addition, the following evidence demonstrates that the government placed high priority on 
the use of credit information rather than the protection of credit information. One piece of 
evidence is the government‘s close involvement in the CISS. In 1995, the legal authority 
concerning the use of credit information and the promotion on credit information business 
was given to the government. The Credit Information Development Review Committee, 
whose chairperson was the deputy minister for financial policy, was established in accordance 
with the Presidential Enforcement Decree. The Committee could review matters concerning 
collection, concentration, exchange and use of credit information. It implies that policy focus 
was placed on the use of credit information. Another piece of evidence for the high priority on 
the use of credit information is that the enactment of the Credit Information Act provided 
momentum to expand the scope of credit information collected in the CCA. Individuals‘ loan 
amounts started to be collected, as shown in the main contents of the scope of credit 
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information in the CCA in Appendix 6-5. Even though a personal consent on the collection 
was required and individuals with more than 30 million KRW per financial institution were 
targeted, it was a big step toward more credit information in the CISS in Korea. Under the 
name of the risk management of individuals‘ loans, the criterion for inclusion tended to be 
lowered afterwards.  
 
Besides the above developmental motive of the enactment of the Credit Information Act, 
another trigger on the enactment of the Credit Information Act was a series of kidnappings 
and killings in 1994. A gang of murderers (Chijon Family) admitted that they chose victims 
from the mailing list of a department store which was bought from the store worker. This 
startling news sparked public opinion on the need for the enactment of the Credit Information 
Act (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 September 1994; The Hankyoreh, 25 September 1994; 
The DongA Ilbo, 25 September 1994). In 1994, for personal information protection in the 
public sector, the
 
Act on the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public 
Agencies was enacted to provide comprehensive guidelines. In this context, the Credit 
Information Act was expected to serve as a general law with respect to personal information 
protection in the private sector
110
 (The Finance Committee, 1994, pp. 5-6; Cheong, 2001, p. 
320). The main contents of the Credit Information Act in 1995 are summarized in Appendix 
6-4. 
 
                                                 
110
 The Personal Information Protection Act, which is a general law regarding personal information protection in 
Korea, was promulgated in March 2011. 
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What is noteworthy in the Credit Information Act is that the definition of a credit delinquent 
was explicitly stated as a ‗bad credit holder‘111. It indicates that the Credit Information Act 
acknowledged the role of an existing comprehensive CISS as blacklists at that time. It 
suggests that the Credit Information Act was in line with the existing practices and regulations 
about credit information collection. In this context, the KFB was designated as the CCA by 
the Ministry of Finance. As shown in Appendix 6-5, delinquent borrowers were determined to 
be registered as bad credit holders who were categorized into three groups depending on 
delinquent amounts and overdue periods. According to the Agreements on the Exchange and 
Management of Credit Information, financial institutions should take action against highly 
risky borrowers, named ―red borrowers,‖ such as prohibition on drawing out new loans and 
applying for new credit cards. As a result, the scope of bad credit holders and the retention 
periods of their information have been one of the critical issues in the debates over credit 
information. 
 
6.2.3. The unfolding process of debate 
 
The promulgation (January 1995) and the enforcement of the Credit Information Act (July 
1995) was followed by the government‘s continuous announcement of credit information-
related policies. As shown in Appendix 6-6, strategies for enhancing the competiveness of 
financial industries (20 May 1996), deregulation of the financial sector (24 July 1996) and a 
series of reports by the Presidential Commission on Financial Reform (hereafter PCFR) in 
1997 seem to be consistent with the basic spirit of the enactment of the Credit Information 
Act; that is, more policy focus on the use of credit information. In particular, the serious 
                                                 
111
 A ―bad credit holder (Shin yong bulrang ja)‖ was defined as ‗a person who has failed to repay debts such as 
bills or loans arising from commercial transactions such as financial transactions before the specified due date in 
the absence of justifiable grounds.‘(Article 2. 7.) 
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impact of ailing company bankruptcies
112
 on the Korean economy and a sharp rise in the 
number of bad credit holders
113
 turned on the red alarm light and buzzer on the credit risk 
management of financial institutions. 
 
As shown in Appendices 6-7, 6-8 and 6-9, most credit information-related policies for the 
periods 1995-1997 were associated with the CISS, particularly the CCA. During this period, 
the government and the KFB tried to expand the participants in the CCA and the scope of 
credit information collected. On the 18
th
 of March 1995, the MOFE announced the inclusion 
of non-banking financial institutions in the CCA to strengthen risk management for ailing 
companies. The comprehensive CCA, including non-banking financial institutions as well as 
banks, was launched on the 6
th
 of February 1998. In addition, attempts to widen the scope of 
credit information collected in the CCA continued for this period. Public information, such as 
information on delinquency in payment of taxes, was also collected in the CCA
114
. The Scope 
of information on corporate loans and individuals‘ loans collected were continuously 
expanded. 
 
Furthermore, the arrangement of the legal and physical framework for the use of credit 
information was accelerated. First of all, the legal basis of the CIC was formed to replace 
most roles of the Credit Information Development Review Committee in 1997. The legal 
authority to determine the AMCI was given to the CIC. It indicates that financial institutions 
                                                 
112
 The bankruptcies of 7 affiliates of Ducksan conglomerate (28 February 1995) sparked those of construction 
companies in 1995. On the 1
st
 of May 1996, a CEO of the First Bank was arrested for a ‗bad loans scandal.‘ The 
financial collapse of Hanbo Steel, which was an affiliate of the 14
th
 largest conglomerate, was followed by those 
of other big conglomerates such as Sammi, Jilro, Haitai, Daenong and KIA (Edaily, 3 December 2007). 
113
 The number of bad credit holders increased from 1.2 million in November 1995 (Maeil Business Newspaper, 
8 December 1995) to 1.72 million in September 1997 (Maeil Business Newspaper, 2 October 1997). 
114
 The policy direction was announced in the 4
th
 of May 1996 and the National Collection Act was amended in 
the 30
th
 of December 1996. 
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which composed the CIC reserved a direct decision on the CCA. In addition, the policies for 
the use of credit information were promoted. For instance, the government changed the policy 
on the requirement for borrowers‘ consent when loans amount would be collected in the 
CCA
115
. Information on loans amount started to be collected into the CISS without borrowers‘ 





The establishment of the system where various kinds of credit information could be 
exchanged immediately will be promoted. ··· Because on-line computer network was not 
operated, it took at least 7 days and up to 40 days for financial institutions to view bad credit 
information even if it was registered. This situation produced side-effects, such as loans to 
insolvent companies (The Korea Economic Daily, 5 May 1996). 
 
Another measure for the promotion on the use of credit information was to allow for the 
establishment of an individual credit information collection agency, apart from the CCA. The 
restriction on a licence of credit information business
116
 was also alleviated.
117
 To promote the 
use of credit information, the revision of the measures for the credit information protection 
was made. For instance, the use limitation principle was weakened. The Credit Information 
                                                 
115
 A bad loans scandal was one of the reasons for this policy change. It was declared on the 13
th
 of May 1996 





 In 1994, the National Assembly amended the government‘s draft to enhance eligibility requirements for credit 
information business. To strengthen the public interest of credit information business, the licence of credit 
information business was restricted to Credit Guarantee Fund, Technology Credit Guarantee Fund and 
Corporations jointly owned by financial institutions which operate credit rating business (The National 
Assembly, 1994, p. 10). 
117
 The restriction on a licence changed from corporations jointly owned by financial institutions which operate 
credit rating business to corporations in which fifty percents or more of the capital are invested by financial 
institutions. The MOFE (1997, p. 557) aimed to expand the scope of credit information and to encourage credit 
information to be distributed by promoting the competition between credit information companies.  
235 
 
Act in 1995 stated that personal credit information should not be disclosed or used for 
purposes other than business purposes. However, on the 7
th
 of May 1997, the MOFE clarified 
the criteria that financial institutions‘ provision of credit information to credit information 
companies is not be considered to be the acts of disclosing or using credit information for 
purposes other than business purposes. Its aim was to change financial institutions‘ passive 
attitude to the collection of credit information by credit information companies (The Ministry 
of Finance and Economy, 1997, p. 558).  
 
Meanwhile, in this period, some measures for the protection of credit information were 
implemented. One of them was that financial institutions should notify the relevant individual 
15 days prior to registration when the individual would be registered as a bad credit holder. A 
few revisions in the credit information retention period were made, such as the immediate 
deletion of records or the exclusion from the blacklists when an individual pays arrears 
according to specific criteria.  
 
In sum, the policy focus in this period was placed on the use of credit information rather than 
the protection of credit information. The reasons behind such policy directions may be 
government goals for the enhancement of national competiveness and the increase in ailing 
companies‘ bankruptcy.  
 
6.2.4. Content of debate 
 
 The proponents for credit information sharing attempted to i) link the use of credit 
information to ―reform‖ and ―infrastructure‖ and ii) portray ―delinquency‖ as ―a threat to a 
society.‖ The main argument of the proponents can be summarized as follows: i) Credit 
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information sharing needs to be promoted to reform the economy and enhance competiveness. 
ii) Credit information is one of the indispensible infrastructures for the economy. iii) Bad 
credit holders are harmful for a society. First of all, one of the most distinctive features in this 
period is that two governmental committees, which were established for the ‗reform‘ of 
administration or financial sector, progressively recommended the efficient use of credit 
information.  
 
The existing Credit Inquiry Business Act ··· gives the authority of supervision to a local 
police chief rather than an economic-related Ministry. Hence, it focuses on a privacy 
protection rather than smooth distribution of credit information. For that reason, the 
development of a comprehensive centralized management system and efficient use of credit 
information which is an important resource in information society may be retarded (The 
Presidential Commission on Administrative Reform, 1993, pp. 85-86). 
 
Furthermore, as pointed out in section 6.2.2, the policies for the use of credit information were 
promoted under the name of ―New Economy‖ and the enhancement of national 
competitiveness.  
 
Second, the expansion of the use of credit information was believed to be a gate toward 
―credit society.‖ The Hankyoreh, one of the liberal reform newspapers, interpreted the 
enforcement of the Credit Information Act under the title of ―if the Credit Information Act 
would be implemented/ financial transactions at a glance ··· a cornerstone of a credit society.‖ 
 
Our society will take the first step to enter into a full-fledged credit society this coming July. 
The Presidential Enforcement Decree and Enforcement Rule of the Credit Information Act 
which the government announced on the 24
th
 of May have the implication of laying the 
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institutional foundation that makes us enter into full-fledged credit society (The Hankyoreh, 
25 May 1995).   
 
The government and the Bank of Korea also linked the expansion of the use of credit 
information to the idea of a ―credit society.‖ 
 
Promoting early settlement of a credit society is driven by expanding the scope of credit 
information management in accordance with the trend of the expansion of economic size 
(The Ministry of Finance, 22 May 1993). 
 
The Bank of Korea pointed out that in order to settle a credit society, it is necessary to 
expand credit loans, strengthen the penalties to bad credit holders and so on. It stressed that 
what is required is to establish the intensive credit information management system to easily 
distinguish bad credit holders from good credit holders (The DongA Ilbo, 13 May 1994). 
 
Furthermore, financial institutions attempted to associate the Credit Information Act with the 
idea of an open society. They argued that the Credit Information Act focused on credit 
information protection excessively. They stressed that the development of credit information 
business for an open society should not be obstructed by the Credit Information Act.  
 
Financial sector workers pointed out that even though the Credit Information Act was 
enacted on the way toward open society, excessive concerns over side-effects caused by 
credit information leakage are likely to retard the development of credit information business 




Third, proponents for credit information sharing insisted that comprehensive CISSs could 
benefit the economy by preventing financial instability caused by bad loans.  
 
Jae-hyung Hong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economy answered at 
the Finance and Economy Committee, ―in order to prevent the increase in non-performing 
loans of financial institutions which financial scandals similar to Ducksan conglomerate‘s 
bankruptcy caused, the government will promote a comprehensive CISS for the exchange of 
information on loans between banks and non-banking institutions and reinforce the 
disclosure of bad loans (Maeil Business Newspaper, 18 March 1995). 
 
Credit rating agencies also argued that ‗such a big bankruptcy as Ducksan‘s default would be 
prevented if information on loans between financial institutions could be shared (The Korea 
Economic Daily, 12 March 1995). Furthermore, financial institutions attempted to link bad 
credit holders to enemies of the credit society.  
 
Because all financial institutions are connected like the cobwebs, bad credit holders will be 




Lastly, the advocates of the CISSs and credit information business contended that the 
collection and use of credit information may help individuals in credit markets. The 
development of credit information sharing may prompt financial institutions to shift away 
from collateral-based lending to credit-information-based lending. In this context, it was 
suggested that credit information sharing could expand credit markets.  
 
                                                 
118
 This is a part of interviews of Mr. Sohn, director of team for financial transactions information in the CCA. 
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The Ministry of Finance and Economy states that further development of credit information 
business will increase unsecured loans by financial institutions and decrease the practices of 
requiring collateral in financial transactions (The Hankyoreh, 7 January 1996).  
 
The supporting group for credit information sharing stressed the incentive mechanism about 
credit information. Good credit histories were linked to more favourable terms for financial 
transactions. For instance, the government explained the implication of on-line based CISS as 
follows, 
 
An official of the Ministry of Finance and Economy said that as the credit society becomes 
settled, financial institutions would strengthen the management of bad credit holders but 
increase the benefits for good credit holders. In other words, it indicates that the gap between 
incentives and disincentives depending on an individual‘s credit can grow (Hankook Ilbo, 27 
June 1997). 
 
Against the above arguments from the proponents for credit information sharing, the 
opponents passively attempted to link credit information sharing to ―hacking,‖ both ―illegal‖ 
and ―commercial.‖ The arguments of the opponents can be summarized as follows: i) A CISS 
may be vulnerable to hacking. ii) The leakage of credit information is illegal and should be 
punished. iii) Commercial companies seem to leak credit information easily. First of all, the 
detractors of credit information sharing stressed the possibility of hacking into the CISS. For 
instance, the editorial of the Korea Economic Daily which was titled as the problems of 
commercialization of credit information pointed out, 
 
The security of information network is also important as much as its expansion. Even the 
government‘s information network is vulnerable to hacking due to the development of 
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hacking technologies. If the era of commercialization of credit information unfolds in earnest, 
law regulations would have inevitable limits no matter how safety measures are arranged and 
punishments are enhanced (The Korea Economic Daily, 24 March 1995). 
 
Second, the leakage of credit information is linked to an infamous crime. A series of 
kidnapping and killings by a gang of murders (Chijon Family) evoked the importance of 
credit information protection. 
 
The staff (at Social Issue Department of the Seoul YMCA) insisted that consumer‘s credit 
information should be strictly regulated even if it would require the enactment of a special 
law. The department store which leaked customer‘s credit information ··· should be punished 
(The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 September 1994). 
 
A critic of the Credit Information Act used the Chijon Family as an example of its side-effects 
due to its greater focus on the use of credit information rather than credit information 
protection.  
 
From the course of preparing the Credit Information Act last year, it is true there have been 
many critics who have stated that the government put a priority on the use of credit 
information rather than its protection. Illegal distribution of credit information in our society 
today has become a growing problem enough. ··· The government said that the disclosure of 
an individual‘s credit information would not be allowed if the person does not want to. 
However, were customer‘s lists passed to the Chijon Family’s hands because customers 
agreed to it? Considering such a circumstances, side-effects seem to be apparent if the Credit 
Information Act would be enforced with the priority on the use of credit information rather 




Lastly, the opponents of credit information sharing attempted to associate the use of credit 
information with commercial interest. For the alleviation of the licence condition on credit 
information business, a newspaper claimed as follows:  
 
The opening up of credit information business to non-financial companies will increase a 
risk of credit information leakage (Segye Ilbo, 8 May 1997). 
 
On the grounds of the above contents of the debate, it can be suggested that a severe debate 
over credit information was not found in this period. Some explanations for this can be 
provided as follows. The first explanation can be that credit information in Korea could be 
easily linked to the leap to a developed economy. With successful economic growth during 
the last two decades, civil society was more likely to accept that credit information sharing 
would be inevitable for the entry into the developed countries club and Korea would be in the 
transition toward becoming a credit society. Another explanation would be that the 
government actively participated in the development of the CISS and suggested to the public 
its policy direction to focus on the use of credit information. For instance, the Kim Young-
sam government‘s policy was that informatization policy, including the improvement of the 
credit information system, was required to reinforce national competitiveness and stimulate 
economic growth. Financial institutions also attempted to expand the CISS in accordance with 
the government‘s policies. In contrast, progressive actions or claims for credit information 
protection, except for a few articles in newspapers, had not emerged
119
. It is similar to the 
introductory period of the debate over the electronic ID card.  
 
In summary, the structure of discourse in the civil society at the beginning of debate over 
credit information can be summarised as Table 6-1.  
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 For example, they are The Korea Economic Daily (24 March 1995), Segye Ilbo (8 May 1997) and so on  
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Table 6-1 The symbolic system of the dispute over the credit information system: The enactment 
period of Credit Information Act 
The structure of the dispute about the Credit Information System in civil society 
 The Bad The Good 
Policy 
 
Credit Inquiry Business Act 
 
‘New Korea’ reform programmes 
The Credit Information Act 
Blacklisting system 
Actor 
The Ministry of Finance 
The Bank of Korea 
Financial institution 
Discourses 







Leakage of personal information 
New leap toward a new economy 
Credit information as an important 
infrastructure for the development of 
financial industries 
Enhancement of national 
competitiveness 
Credit society 
Personal information protection 
The structure of cultural value system in civil society 



















The developmental code was the main symbolic code behind the debate in the introductory 
period, which is very similar to the previous dispute over the electronic ID card. The Credit 
Information Act was regarded as one part of the ―New Korea‖ reform programme. Credit 
information sharing is not only suggested as an important financial infrastructure toward the 
credit society but also connected to the enhancement of national competitiveness. As such, the 
policy focus in this period was placed on the use of credit information rather than the 
protection of credit information. Although some concerns about the leakage of personal 
information were raised, the disputes were dominated by the developmental code, and its 
themes of efficiency and economic development.  
 
6.3. The deepening period of debate (January 1998 ~ December 
2002)  
 
6.3.1. The “Government of the People” and legacies of the financial crisis in 
1997 
 
Entering 1998, the debate over credit information began to intensify. Two significant 
incidents seemed to play a significant role as a trigger for the debate. One incident was the 
election of the president Kim Dae-jung, who had been regarded as one of the most 
progressive politicians. As discussed in section 2.2.1, fierce conflicts between the 
conservative forces and the liberal reform forces were waged and, nevertheless, new systems 
to guarantee civil rights started to be introduced. It may indicate that the government‘s policy 




The other incident was the financial crisis in 1997. To overcome the crisis, the government 
attempted to promote the development of information communication industries and the fast 
diffusion of communication networks. In this context, the Presidential Transition Committee 
announced the new government‘s 100 tasks including the improvement of the credit 
information distribution system (Maeil Business Newspaper, 13 February 1998; Korea Times, 
14 February 1998). The financial crisis also raised the importance of credit information 
among financial institutions. The financial crisis led financial institutions to concentrate on 
lending to individuals rather than corporate lending. Accordingly, a steep increase in 
household credit at around 20 to 30 growth rate raised concerns over a surge in the 
delinquency rate on loans to households. Eventually, the financial crisis forced many 
individuals and businesses into bankruptcy. The failure to pay debts resulted in economic 
sanctions against delinquent borrowers through the registration of bad credit holders. As such, 
the financial crisis in 1997 highlighted the use of credit information to enhance national 
competitiveness and to strengthen credit risk management of financial institutions.  
 
What is interesting is that the government and the ruling party endeavoured to introduce 
policy measures to overcome the financial crisis legacies, such as growing bankruptcy, and as 
a result, such measures had significant effects on credit information management systems. 
One of the measures against bankruptcy was the scrapping of the use of promissory notes
120
 
(7 June 1998). Another measure was to ban the co-signer payment guarantee system
121
 (The 
Kookmin Daily, 25 February 1999).  The last was a credit amnesty which was requested by 
                                                 
120
 Promissory notes rather than cash had been used as the main tool of settling business transactions. However, 
such practice was criticized for negative affects causing profitable companies which held promissory notes 
issued by insolvent firms to go bankruptcy (Korea Times, 19 February 1998). 
121
 In this system, an individual guarantees a repayment of others‘ debts. As a result, the default of a borrower 
can lead to the erosion of wealth of a co-signer. According to a survey, a co-signer had 1.36 cases per person and 
15.1 million KRW (US $14,380) per person on average (Korea Times, 4 February 1999). 
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the ruling party to restore the civil rights of bad credit holders (10 November 1999). Financial 
institutions were forced to exclude bad credit holders from the blacklist of the CCA. This 
credit amnesty was suggested to be granted again on the 20
th
 of April 2001.  
 
These measures provoked pros and cons. In particular, the credit amnesty raised severe 
controversy in civil society. The first two measures seemed to be supported by financial 
institutions. One of the reasons for this was that the first two measures could ultimately result 
in expanding the scope of credit information in the CCA. After the financial crisis, to reduce 
non-performing loans, they attempted to check the state of liabilities per client. For instance, 
banks announced a requirement for borrowers to submit the state of liabilities if 10 million 
KRW or more loans is applied for (14 January 1999). Along the same lines, phasing out a 
settlement system based on promissory notes, or limiting personal loan guarantees, provided 
financial institutions an excuse to collect more credit information. The criterion of 
information on an individual‘s loans lowered gradually from 30 million KRW to 20 million 
KRW (14 January 1998) and to 10 million KRW (20 January 1999). The government allowed 
the CCA to collect information on guaranteed amounts so that financial institutions could 
examine an individual‘s limit of a co-signer payment guarantee (25 February 2000).  
 
In contrast, a credit amnesty faced strong objections from both conservative forces, including 
financial institutions, and liberal forces. The responses of financial institutions to the credit 
amnesty can be summarized into three types. First, they attempted to keep and use the records 
of bad credit holders in the inner database system even though the records were deleted in the 
CCA (The Munhwa Ilbo, 17 January 2000; The Korea Economic Daily, 17 January 2000)
122
. 
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 It made the credit amnesty ineffective, provoking complaints from bad credit holders. Accordingly, the 
Financial Supervisory Service inspected and guided financial institutions‘ follow-up actions, such as the deletion 
of records (The DongA Ilbo, 10 February 2000).  
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Second, the expansion of the scope of credit information in the CCA was promoted 
(Appendix 6-12). For instance, the government declared the establishment of positive credit 
information sharing mechanism and the collection of information held by public 
administrative entities (The Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2000). The KFB also 
announced a plan to collect the records of credit card transactions (The Korea Economic Daily, 
28 January 2000) and to collect information on short-term delinquency of loans (8 October 
2002). Lastly, the KFB announced the plan to revise the existing management system of bad 
credit holders (17 January 2000). The ostensible purposes were the unification of specific 
agreements of each financial sector and the abolition of uniform and compulsory disadvantage 
to bad credit holders (The Centralized Credit Information Collection Agency, 2000). Three 
categories of bad credit holders, based on delinquent amounts and overdue periods
123
, were 
simplified into one group with bank loans overdue for more than three months regardless of 
the amount
124
. In addition, the CIC removed from the unified agreement the regulation on 
compulsory punishment for bad credit holders, such as prohibition on drawing out new loans, 
in order to extend credit to them. However, financial institutions repeated previous practices, 
punishing bad credit holders, even under a new management system, mostly because of 
lasting detrimental effects of the financial crisis and immature credit rating system of financial 
institutions. As a result, the revision of a management system of bad credit holders just led to 
tighter criteria of bad credit holders, shortening the period from six months to three months 
and reducing the amount from 15 million KRW to 1 KRW. The concerns over the 
considerably swelling number of bad credit holders were aggravated.  
 
The following countermeasures by the ruling party and the government were the support 
measures for low-income households including the 2
nd
 credit amnesty, plans to shorten the 
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 See the details in Appendix 6-5. 
124
 For credit card bills, the amount was more than 50,000 KRW. 
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credit information retention period and to weaken the criteria of bad credit holders, and so on 
(20 April 2001, Appendix 6-13). In August and October of 2001, congressmen proposed the 
amendment of the Credit Information Act including a written consent for providing credit 
information to other companies and pre-notification of registration of a bad credit holder. The 
government announced a plan to improve the criteria of bad credit holders (20 February 2002) 
and its criteria of the amount overdue was increased from 1 KRW to 0.3 million KRW (10 
June 2002). In May of 2002, the government decided to postpone the beginning period for 
sharing information on individual loan amounts.  
 
In short, the financial institutions‘ attempt to improve an efficient use of credit information 
faced counteractions by the political party and the government. What is noteworthy is that the 
government policy direction was not totally reversed to prevent an efficient use of credit 
information. Evidence of this is the government‘s announcement to enhance the distribution 
of positive credit information and to promote the establishment of CBs on the 20
th
 of February 
2002. In August of 2002, financial holding company‘s subsidiaries were allowed to provide 
personal credit information to each other. 
 
Apart from the government, political parties and financial institutions, activities of civil 
society organizations became vigorous in this period. Even though seminars and public 
hearings on credit information were held by the KFB and the government, civil society 
organizations participated in the discussions and announced their opinions. Furthermore, they 
stepped onto the stage to require improvements in the management system of bad credit 
holders criticizing financial institutions for abusing the blacklisting system to collect 
delinquent debts. For instance, the People‘s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (hereafter 
PSPD) filed an injunction to halt the sanctions against a registered bad credit holder (Press 
248 
 
release from the PSPD, 11 February 1999). In December of 2001, the PSPD made a petition 
to the National Assembly to specify the criteria of a bad credit holder in the Credit 
Information Act (The Finance and Economy Committee, 2002). Another activity of civil 
society organizations was related to credit information leakage. The YMCA sought 
compensation for damages from credit card companies accused of credit information leakage 
(10 August 2001). The PSPD filed a criminal complaint against an insurance company for an 
illegal distribution of customer‘s information (Press release from the PSPD, 11 April 2002). 
 
From the above, some interesting findings in this period can be summarized as follows. First, 
various arguments about the credit information management system, in particular relating to 
bad credit holders, emerged. Seminars mainly held by the government and the KFB provided 
one of the places for the arguments. Civil society organizations started their activities, such as 
participating in the seminars, filing a complaint, and participating in the amendment process. 
Second, political parties were one of the main discussants in this period. The initial 
involvement was to request financial institutions to revise the agreements relating to bad 
credit holders through a credit amnesty. Their roles as a main actor in the legal amendment 
process were activated by proposing two amendments of the Credit Information Act in this 
period. Lastly, compared to the previous period, the government policy focus seemed to be 
shifted from the use of credit information to the protection of credit information. However, in 
the last year of this period, it is observed that the policies to promote the distribution of credit 






6.3.2. Content of debate 
 
Compared to the previous period, the content of debate seems to expand in this period. One of 
the reasons for this is that policy measures driven by the government and political parties 
provoked heated debates in civil society. In particular, two credit amnesties provided more 
fuel to the debate. Advocates for credit information sharing linked credit information sharing 
to ―credit society‖ and ―benefits to borrowers and contributions to economic growth,‖ 
pursuant to the arguments made in the previous period. Against credit amnesties, they 
attempted to associate credit amnesties with ―against the law‖ and ―infringement on the right 
of property‖. The arguments by proponents of the use of credit information can be 
summarized as follows; i) credit information sharing is a cornerstone of credit society and an 
increase in credit-based loans can be promoted by the use of credit information, which is 
beneficial to borrowers and contributes to economic growth. ii) Credit amnesties destroy the 
rule of law and the right of property, and have no example in developed countries.  
 
First of all, proponents of the use of credit information argued that credit information sharing 
would lead to the establishment of a credit society. For instance, the financial institutions 
attempted to link the submission of the state of liabilities to the idea of a credit society when 
severe criticisms were provoked from reform forces and the ruling party.  
 
(A director of the KFB) ··· the submission of the state of liabilities, most of all, should be 
interpreted in terms of the establishment of credit society. This measure has an advantage 
that an individual can live a stable life and reduces damage caused by co-signer payment 
guarantee because an individual liability is restricted within a personal affordability (The 




Credit information infrastructure was one of the important arguments that the government 
depended on in order to support the expansion of the scope of credit information in the CCA.  
 
 (The Financial Supervisory Service) included, in effect, all loan amounts in the scope of 
credit information of the CCA in order to expand credit information infrastructure (Maeil 
Business Newspaper, 24 June 2001). 
 
In this context, CBs were linked to credit society as follows;  
 
A staff of the Financial Supervisory Service said ―if credit bureaux start to provide credit 
information in earnest, each customer would make a differentiated financial transaction 
based on a credit score which is evaluated by a credit bureau. Hence, it is expected to have a 
momentum to put a developed country-level credit society in place‖ (The Kukmin Daily, 25 
February 2002). 
 
Second, the supporting group for the use of credit information attempted to associate credit 
information sharing with the benefits to borrowers. 
 
A chairman of the KFB said ―(the KFB) is scheduled to manage positive credit information 
such as debt payment history and credit card bill payment.‖ He added ―this will lay a 
foundation for expanding credit-based loans and increase benefits to good credit holders‖ 
(Seoul Economic Daily, 22 January 2002). 
 
Furthermore, they stressed that the improvement of credit information sharing could 




This measure is expected to allow more than 2.5 million bad credit holders with financial 
transaction sanctions to partly access financial services, which will promote financial 
transactions and contribute to the development of national economy (The Herald Business, 
18 November 2000). 
 
In particular, they argued that it is self-regulation in the credit information sharing, such as the 
blacklisting system, which can expand credit-based financial transactions and accordingly 
increase benefits to borrowers including bad credit holders. 
 
The existing criteria of bad credit holders, such as slightly risky borrowers, risky borrowers 
(Yellow) and highly risky borrowers (Red), will be scrapped and financial institutions will 
place financial sanctions on the basis of information on delinquency exchanged among them. 
In this case, financial institutions will be able to extend credit to bad credit holders on their 
own (The Herald Business, 18 November 2000). 
 
Lastly, advocates for the use of credit information objected to two credit amnesties. What is 
interesting is that arguments against credit amnesty were detected to change slightly between 
the two credit amnesties. In the first credit amnesty at the end of 1999, opponents of the credit 
amnesty argued that removal of bad credit records would lead to moral hazard problems, the 
erosion of credit society and economic crisis (The Munhwa Ilbo, 11 November 1999; Maeil 
Business Newspaper, 11 November 1999).  
 
Also requiring review is the plan to reinstate those who were discredited by financial 
institutions for their failure to repay debts. The government, above all, is not in a position to 
decide to pardon those with bad credit records. It should leave the matter to financial 
institutions. Moreover, by doing so, the government may erode the foundation of the credit 
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society, which may increase the chances of another economic crisis in the future (Korea 
Herald, 13 November 1999). 
 
Credit amnesty was criticized that such a case could not be found in developed countries (The 
Korea Economic Daily, 2 December 1999). As such, at that time, they seemed to accept the 
purpose of credit amnesty, but linked credit amnesty to the destruction of the rule of law, as 
shown in the title of an editorial ―credit amnesty is good but the rule of law is to be 
established‖(The Munhwa Ilbo, 11 November 1999). In the second credit amnesty in 2001, 
similar arguments were provided. The credit amnesty was condemned as a counterproductive 
measure and ―the killer of this credit risk management‖ (JoongAng Daily, 17 May 2001). 
However, one of the distinguishing features at the second credit amnesty was that opponents 
seemed to criticize the intention of credit amnesty. For instance, under the title of ‗unpleasant 
generous politics,‘ Seoul Shinmun claimed that.  
 
In the sense that it is not a law but an agreement, it is a matter for financial institutions to 
discuss and revise. It is unpleasant to see another headline-grabbing by politicians (Seoul 
Shinmun, 21 April 2001). 
 
Furthermore, the government was criticized for the political interference of public authorities 
in the financial operations (Gwanchigeumyung). 
 
This step by the government showed that the government has not broken from the 
convention of Gwanchigeumyung. The reason is that this measure indeed is a typical 
Gwanchigeumyung, if Gwanchigeumyung indicates a behaviour using financial institutions 
as a mean to obtain other goals that the government pursues and ignoring financial 




Credit amnesty was condemned as the infringement of the right of property and an 
anachronistic action (Seoul Shinmun, 7 May 2001).  
 
Against the above arguments, opponents intended to connect ―credit information sharing‖ to 
―anti-reform‖ and ―the infringement on privacy‖ and to link ―credit amnesty‖ to 
―reconciliation‖ and ―support for weak people.‖ Their arguments can be summarized as 
follows: i) the request for more credit information sharing can be considered as a kind of anti-
reform and can lead to credit information leakage. ii) The blacklisting system should be 
strictly and legally regulated by the government. iii) Low-middle income people who have 
bad credit history should be supported. 
 
First of all, opponents of credit information sharing intended to link financial institutions to 
anti-reform forces. For instance, they criticized financial institutions‘ request for the 
submission of the state of liabilities for a possible violation of basic legal principles and anti-
reform purposes. 
 
Seokjun Oh, a judge at Seoul District Court, states ―the scope of financial information which 
can be shared between financial institutions is not specified in the Act on Real Name 
Financial Transactions and Guarantee of Secrecy. Causing inconvenience to many good 
customers in order to prevent a few financial transactions by bad credit holders is open to the 
violation of the less restrictive alternative principle from a legal point of view and the 
infringement on privacy. In addition, a member of staff of the ruling party, the National 
Congress for New Politics, said that banks‘ requirement for the submission of the state of 
liabilities in applying for a loan ran counter to the current government‘s resolution for 
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deregulation reform and counter-measures were on the table (Maeil Business Newspaper, 22 
January 1999). 
 
Furthermore, they contended that the expansion of the scope of credit information could 
connote credit information leakage leading to the infringement on privacy.  
 
··· it is a bit too much for financial institutions to have a full knowledge of individual 
information. A staff of the Korea Institute of Financial said ―on the one hand, it is evitable to 
establish a credit society earlier but it is not desirable that information about individual 
private life can be leaked out too much‖ (The DongA Ilbo, 16 December 1999). 
 
The legal activities against financial institutions by civil society organizations, such as the 
YMCA (10 August 2001) and the PSPD (18 July 2002), roused public opinion against credit 
information leakage. In this context, an amendment of the Credit Information Act was 
proposed by a congressman in the conservative opposition party. 
 
This amendment aims to make a legal basis to prevent a wide leakage of credit card 
members‘ information to insurance companies (An Explanatory Statement of an Amendment 
by a proposing congressman, Boo Kyum Kim, 27 August 2001). 
 
The criticism also came from liberal reform forces. For instance, the Hankyoureh, which 
supported the expansion of the use of credit information in the previous period, pointed out 
that CBs could be a major source of concern about information leakage.  
 
As more credit information is collected, financial institutions can reduce risks. However, 
consumers who are targeted may feel like being naked and complain of narrower capability 
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at financial transactions. In addition, as shown in the case concerning a stream of complaints 
about the delivery of unapplied credit cards have still been filed to the Financial Supervisory 
Service, a possible leakage of information is concerned (The Hankyoreh, 10 February 2002).  
 
Second, detractors of credit information sharing attempted to link financial institutions-led 
credit information sharing to the fundamental cause of the bad credit holders‘ problem. For 
instance, the PSPD pointed out that past countermeasures for the credit holders‘ problem, 
such as credit amnesty, were ineffective because financial institutions were actually in charge 
of the blacklisting system. 
 
The existing Credit Information Act allows financial institutions to manage the blacklisting 
system and the government just guides them to delete records and extend the period for 
registering bad credit holders. However, the effectiveness of such a scheme is open to 
question. In fact, credit amnesty this year ··· did not work because financial institutions did 
not delete records (An Explanatory Statement of a Petition to the National Assembly by the 
PSPD, 4 December 2001). 
 
This argument seems to contradict the financial institutions‘ argument that financial 
institutions‘ self regulating system would be beneficial to borrowers. Furthermore, it is argued 
that because the blacklisting system had no legal basis, the criteria for a bad credit holder 
needed to be specified in the Credit Information Act. In other words, it is suggested that more 
direct responsibilities of the management of the blacklisting system should be given to the 
government rather than financial institutions. 
 
Hence, the registration and management of bad credit holders should not be in charge of 
financial institutions. Rather, the details about the registration and management of bad credit 
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holders should be regulated specifically in the Credit Information Act. It is necessary to add 
the clauses that the Financial Services Commission has the legal authority to take an 
administrative disposition about the registration and management of bad credit holders (An 
Explanatory Statement of a Petition to the National Assembly by the PSPD, 4 December 
2001). 
 
Lastly, bad credit holders were described as involuntary delinquents and were connected to 
the weak and the vulnerable that should be supported.  
 
The background of credit amnesty is that more consideration is needed for them to be able to 
take part in normal economic activities because they were only led to commit mistakes 
inevitably due to the financial crisis which can be considered as a kind of natural disaster 
(The Korea Economic Daily, 2 December 1999). 
 
It was pointed out that the criteria of bad credit holders were so unreasonable to increase the 
number of bad credit holders. 
 
··· improving the arrears criteria of bad credit holders lest they should be registered on the 
blacklists unreasonably ··· (Press release from the MOFE, the Financial Services 
Commission and the Bank of Korea, 20 February 2002). 
 
Bad credit holders were redefined as those who need to be protected rather than to be 
punished. In this context, the government contended that the exclusion of bad credit holders 





A staff of the Financial Policy Division at the Ministry of Finance and Economy explained, 
―Comparing economic losses caused by keeping 15 percent of the total economically active 
population (2.3 million) as bad credit holders with losses from damaging the infrastructure of 
civil society, the first would be more serious than the second. This judgement led to the step 
toward credit amnesty‖ (Seoul Shinmun, 7 May 2001). 
 
The ruling party stressed that the request for a large scale amnesty was for the purpose of the 
reconciliation of the nation and the restoration of civil rights suspended due to the financial 
crisis.  
 
The President noted that the presidential pardon was partly motivated to ease the suffering 
Koreans underwent as a result of the 1997 foreign exchange crisis. ―As for those who have 
had sanctions imposed on their financial transactions in the wake of the foreign currency 
crisis, I will ease the sanctions or lift them completely, depending on the degree of their 
wrongdoing,‖ Kim said (Korea Herald, 30 December 1999). 
 
In short, the contents of disputes in this period can be summarised as Table 6-2. 
 
6.4. The reconciliation period of debate (January 2003 ~ December 
2007) 
 
6.4.1. The “Participatory Government” and credit delinquents 
 
Heated debates over credit information in the previous period faced two significant incidents 
in this period: the reform forces succession in the presidential election and a steep increase in 
individual credit defaulters.  
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Table 6-2 The contents about the dispute between advocates and opponents 
 
Against the credit information 
system 
In favour of the credit information 
system 
Actor   
 







Contents   
The submission 
of the state of 
liabilities 
Anti-reform purpose  
Possible violation of basic legal 
principles 
Establish a credit society 
Stable financial life 
 
Credit Bureau 
Credit information leakage leading to 
the infringement on privacy 




Selfish financial institutions 
 
No legal basis  
Necessity of the government’s strict 
regulation 
Beneficial to the borrowers  






Bad credit holders to be supported 
Reconciliation of nation 
Restoration of civil rights suspended  
due to the financial crisis 
 
 
Bad credit holders to be punished 
The erosion of credit society 
Possible economic crisis 
 
Counterproductive 
Infringement on the right of property 
The contents of 
symbolic 
conflicts in civil 
society 
It is anti-reform and violates legal 
principles. 
It will infringe privacy. 
 
Blacklisting system should have a 
legal basis with specified details. 
Bad credit holders are to be 
supported and their civil rights are to 
be restored. 
It creates credit society. 
 
It will lead to developed country -level 
credit society. 
Self-regulating blacklisting system is 
good for borrowers and development. 
Bad credit holders are to be punished 
and a credit amnesty erodes credit 




The reform forces succession as the ―Participatory Government‖ implies that the 
government‘s policies would be very much in line with the previous government‘s ones. For 
instance, the support measures for low-income households during the previous period, such as 
personal credit workouts, expanded to an individual credit recovery program (The Chosun 
Ilbo, 18 July 2002) and a debt rescheduling program (The Chosun Ilbo, 25 August 2003). 
 
These measures had been also promoted particularly due to the increase in the number of bad 
credit holders. The number of debt delinquents almost doubled for the previous period, from 
1.43 million at the end of 1997 to 2.63 million at the end of 2002. The swelling number of bad 
credit holders affected the credit information management system in two ways; one is the 
move to abolish the blacklisting system and the other is to provide a chance to arouse public 
opinion about the protection of credit information. After the presidential election, the 
Presidential Transition Committee declared the abolition of the blacklisting system (7 January 
2003). What is interesting is that the Committee stressed that its abolition did not imply the 
credit amnesty which would lead to the deletion of records of bad credit holders from the 
CCA. One of the reasons was that the Committee wanted to distinguish its policy direction 
from the two credit amnesties which were criticized as actions to aggravate the moral hazard 
of bad credit holders (The Herald Business, 16 January 2003). 
 
However, for six months after the start of the Roh Moo-hyun government, the number of bad 
credit holders soared to 3.23 million in June 2003. As this upsurge became one of the major 
social issues, countermeasures to solve bad credit holders‘ problem were proposed by political 
parties and the government. For instance, a congressman declared an amendment of an 
agreement to alleviate the criteria of bad credit holders (13 June 2003). The government 
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announced a comprehensive plan for bad credit holders including the policy direction of the 
promotion of CBs and the abolition of the management system of bad credit holders in the 
long run (25 August 2003).  
 
Entering into 2004, the move to abolish the blacklisting system accelerated. On the 25
th
 of 
January 2004, an opposition party announced a plan to submit an amendment to the Credit 
Information Act to delete the term, ‗bad credit holder (Shinyongbulrang ja)‘ from the Act125. 
The ruling party also declared a change in the management of bad credit holders into the 
differential management of credit rating (9 March 2004). Finally, on the 3rd of November, 
congressmen submitted an amendment to the Credit Information Act which was passed in the 
plenary session on the 29
th
 of December 2004.  
 
What is noteworthy is that the precondition of abolishing the blacklisting system was the 
expansion of credit information infrastructure.  
 
No matter how much the person‘s overdue amount is, 0.3 million KRW or 300 KRW, if an 
individual is registered as a bad credit holder, it is the same for the person to fail to make a 
financial transaction and to get a job. ··· Prior to the abolition of the concept [a bad credit 
holder (Shinyong bulrang ja)], it is imperative to fully establish credit information 
infrastructure. ··· (The Herald Business, 2 June 2003). 
 
For instance, the Financial Services Commission (hereafter FSC) answered the question of a 
congressman in the ruling party that it aimed to include information on wealth, income and 
loan payment history into the scope of information collected in the CCA (The Korea 
Economic Daily, 21 February 2003). The MOFE announced the plans to create a favourable 
                                                 
125
 It was abrogated due to the expiration of the terms of congressmen. 
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environment for CBs; an amendment of the Credit Information Act to establish a legal basis 
for CBs (The DongA Ilbo, 31 March 2003) and an amendment to the Credit Information Act 
to allow CBs to share individuals‘ information held by public administrative entities (The 
Korea Economic Daily, 24 April 2003). The KFB shortened the period for the registration of 
information to update credit information (16 June 2003). Two think-tanks sponsored by the 
government and financial institutions, the KDI and the KIF, recommended the replacement of 
the uniform and strict management of bad credit holders with the differential management 
based on credit rating. The KFB agreed to the abolition of the blacklisting system but 
announced a plan to collect positive credit information (13 April 2004).  
 
In particular, the KFB and CBs competed for the leading position in collecting more credit 
information. The KFB argued that it would be cost-effective to intensify the CCA and to share 
information because information was already collected into the CCA (The Herald Business, 
16 September 2003). CBs argued that, like the U.S., the management of credit information 
should centre on the CBs (The Herald Business, 16 September 2003). 
 
Meanwhile, the swelling number of bad credit holders promoted the introduction of measures 
to reinforce the protection of credit information which was driven by political parties and the 
government. On the 15
th
 of October 2003, congressmen submitted an amendment of the 
Credit Information Act to enforce financial institutions to notify individuals what information 
is provided and to whom it is provided. The MOFE publicized that it would formulate a plan 
to encourage credit reporting agencies to provide no information about bad credit holders for 
the purpose of the examination of job applications (16 March 2004). This was submitted as an 
amendment of the Credit Information Act by congressmen on the 9
th
 of August 2004.  An 
amendment of the Credit Information Act, including the right to revoke consents to provide 
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and use personal credit information, was submitted (14 September 2005). On the 19
th
 of 
March 2006, the MOFE issued public notices about the amendment of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Credit Information Act including a right to free perusal. On the 31
st
 of May 
2007, it also issued public notices about the amendment of the Credit Information Act to force 
financial institutions to obtain individuals‘ consent when they intend to be provided credit 
rating by CBs.  
 
The participation of the civil society organizations in the debates over credit information 
became more aggressive in this period. For instance, the PSPD shifted its role from a panel in 
a KFB‘s conference to be a host of a conference, holding a discussion meeting for the 
solutions of bad credit holders‘ problem (The People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, 
2004). It attempted to be an agenda-setter rather than an agenda-taker, as shown in the 
announcement of reform agendas to be dealt with in the National Assembly including the 
abolition of the management of bad credit holders (Press release from the PSPD, 11 June 
2004). On the 10
th
 of November 2004, it made a petition to the National Assembly to abolish 
the blacklisting system and furthermore to ban the sharing of credit rating such as good credit 
rating or bad credit rating.  
 
Regarding the public sphere for the debate over credit information, along with the 
development of information communication technology and the diffusion of the Internet, 
many internet cafes for bad credit holders thrived as an alternative public sphere where active 
discussions and discourses on bad credit holders were produced and shared. For instance, in 
the middle of 2003, around 121 cafes relating to bad credit holders at Daum.net were 





The most distinctive feature in this period may be the increase in the number of submissions 
of an amendment by politicians. From 2003 to 2007, 17 amendments were submitted while 7 
amendments were proposed during the previous two periods (1994-2002) (Appendix 6-20). In 
particular, all amendments in this period were proposed by politicians and 44% of them were 
related to the protection of credit information. Another interesting point is that arguments for 
the protection of credit information became more active and direct in terms both of content 
and scope. For instance, compared to indirect measures such as pre-notification of the 
registration of a bad credit holder in the previous period, the protection of credit information 
stretched to the restriction in the purpose of credit information use and to the reduction of 
retention period of credit information to 5 years after a financial or commercial transaction. 
Furthermore, the PSPD proposed restriction in the scope of credit information to be shared by 
making a petition to the National Assembly that sharing credit rating should be banned. 
Another interesting characteristic is that, as indicated by the Presidential Transition 
Committee‘s statement, the abolition of the management of bad credit holders did not lead to 
the deletion of bad credit holders‘ credit information. Rather, the expansion of the scope of 
credit information collected into financial institutions was suggested. The government 
announced the policy direction to promote CBs when the abolition of the blacklisting system 
was reviewed in 2003 (Press release from the MOFE, 10 March 2004). The PSPD also 
suggested that the blacklisting system should be replaced by CBs (An Explanatory Statement 
of a Petition to the National Assembly by the PSPD, 10 November 2004). After its abolition, 
the government extended the retention period of delinquency information from one year to 





6.4.2. Content of debate 
 
As discussed above, the abolition of the existing blacklisting system was at the heart of the 
debate over credit information in this period. Hence, discussants attempted to highlight 
negative aspects of existing credit information management system from their own points of 
views. The advocates of credit information sharing linked credit information to ‗development,‘ 
‗advanced global standard‘ and ‗benefits.‘ Their arguments can be summarized as follows; i) 
the existing blacklisting system hampers economic growth. ii) It is not in accordance with 
practices in advanced countries such as the U.S. iii) Credit information management needs to 
be improved for the users‘ benefits and international competitiveness.  
 
First of all, the proponents for credit information sharing criticized the existing blacklisting 
system for its negative effect on economic growth as follows, 
 
The bad credit holders‘ problem is being a drag on our economy. ··· The number of bad 
credit holders who are restricted in economic activities increased by 0.96 million (around 36 
percent) and has been an important factor to undermine our economic fundamentals ··· (The 
Korea Economic Daily, 27 November 2003). 
 
An amendment of the Credit Information Act proposed by a congressman on the 28
th
 of 
January 2004 was in line with this argument. 
 
Because it caused the reduction of consumption, resulting in an obstacle to economic growth 
at national level, this blacklisting system which restricts bad credit holders‘ economic 
activities needs to be abolished (An Explanatory Statement of an Amendment by a proposing 




Second, the improvement of the credit information system for international competitiveness 
was a consistent argument adapted by the supporting group for the enhancement of the use of 
credit information. For instance, the government propelled regulation reforms including the 
promotion of the use of information held by public entities under the name of the 
enhancement of national competitiveness (Press release from the Regulatory Reform 
Promotion Committee, 5 December 2005). At the same time, the benefits to borrowers were 
stressed as argued in two previous periods.  
 
··· besides the enhancement of users‘ benefits, [it is] for the sake of the development of 
information and communication industry and the reinforcement of international 
competitiveness ··· (An Explanatory Statement of an Amendment by a proposing 
congressman, Jese Oh, 19 July 2007). 
 
Third, the existing system was condemned as a unique and eccentric blacklisting system. 
 
A blacklisting system has been implemented only in Korea. Korea is the only country that 
classifies defaults over a specific period separately and labels them as bad credit holders. 
Even in the U.S. where the distribution of credit information is promoted, no information as 
―a bad credit holder‖ but general information on delinquency is distributed (The Korea 
Economic Daily, 8 January 2003). 
 
The improvement of the credit information system was linked to the system in advanced 
countries (Press release from the Financial Services Commission, 25 August 2003). In a 
similar vein, more expansion of the credit rating system and credit information collection 




The top priority in consumer finance advancement is to get an advanced risk management 
system in consumer credit financial institutions by augmenting financial institutions‘ credit 
rating system and credit information collection agencies which collect information on 
delinquency ··· (The Munhwa Ilbo, 9 January 2004). 
 
A new system after the abolition of existing blacklisting system was described as the one in 
developed countries. 
 
··· while the uniform title of credit defaulter disappears, a new class system or hierarchy 
under the name of "credit classification" is being introduced. Our society is now tasked with 
adapting itself to the sort of financial system they have in developed countries, where 
citizens must manage and take responsibility for their own credit ··· (The Chosun Ilbo, 27 
April 2005). 
 
Lastly, more direct criticism attempted to associate the existing blacklisting system with an 
obstacle to the efficient use of credit information. 
 
The blacklisting system has been blocking effective distribution of credit information 
because its punitive action against bad credit holders such as restriction on financial 
transactions is stressed ··· (Shin I.-s. , 2003). 
 
Meanwhile, the supporting group for the protection of credit information attempted to link the 
existing blacklisting system to ―socio-economic side-effects,‖ ―the social stigma of a financial 
offender,‖ ―misuse‖ and ―the infringement of fundamental rights.‖ Their arguments can be 
summarized as follows; i) the existing blacklisting system produce the social stigma of a 
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financial offender, leading to the restriction to bad credit holders‘ freedom of economic 
activities. ii) It has been misused as a mean to collect debt. iii) It is an infringement of 
fundamental rights. First, the existing blacklisting system was criticized to be harmful to civil 
society. The arguments highlighted socio-economic side-effects such as the restriction to the 
freedom of economic activities and family break-up. For instance, the explanatory statement 
of an amendment of the Credit Information Act to abolish the blacklisting system pointed out 
that the blacklisting system produced social stigma for bad credit holders.  
  
Unlike the original aim, it has been used as a uniform standard to decide whether a financial 
transaction is permitted. In addition, a bad credit holder has the social stigma as a bad 
economic subject. As such, the blacklisting system has produced many socio-economic side-
effects (The National Assembly, 2004). 
 
The bad credit holders‘ problem was linked to an irreparable disaster to economy and society 
(Kim H.-s. , 2003). As such, the appraisal of the blacklisting system‘s side-effects was made 
in terms of a social problem rather than economic development or economic competitiveness. 
 
The person who is classified as a bad credit holder now has many more difficulties in a 
normal economic life and surrenders all hope of recovery, leading to social deviant 
behaviour and accordingly causing family break-up (An Explanatory Statement of an 
Amendment by a proposing congressman, Young-chun Kim, 9 August 2004). 
 
Second, advocates for the protection of credit information attempted to associate the credit 
information system with misuse and abuse. For instance, the PSPD pointed out that the 




The existing blacklisting system is unique in the sense that it polarizes an individual‘s credit 
and does not allow a bad credit holder to make any financial transaction. It is used as a 
means to collect debt rather than to evaluate an individual‘s credit (Press release from the 
PSPD, 30 November 2004). 
 
On the petition to the National Assembly, the PSPD stated that simple credit information can 
be misused as a uniform standard, insisting on the ban of the sharing of credit rating system 
such as good credit rating or bad credit rating.  
 
[While information on delinquency] is simple credit information on an individual in the 
financial sector, the blacklisting system has branded a defaulter as de facto a financial 
offender and has been used as a uniform standard which restricted the defaulter to be 
employed. Hence, in order to abolish the blacklisting system and to establish credit rating-
based loan practice of financial institutions, it is necessary to ··· (An Explanatory Statement 
of a Petition to the National Assembly by the PSPD, 10 November 2004). 
 
Lastly, proponents for the protection of credit information attempted to associate credit 
information with the infringement of fundamental rights. 
 
Regarding this trial, legal experts explain ··· the blacklisting system does not inform an 
individual‘s ability to repay a loan. It threatens an individual‘s social life and accordingly has 
a factor causing the infringement of fundamental rights (The Herald Business, 28 October 
2003). 
 
The reinforcement of the protection of credit information was suggested on the grounds of 




The concerns over damage from the leakage of personal credit information caused by the 
misuse and abuse of personal credit information by credit information industries ··· (An 
Explanatory Statement by an Amendment by a proposing congressman, Young-ju Kim, 15 
November 2006). 
 
In conclusion, the structure of discourse in this period can be summarised as Table 6-3.  
 
Table 6-3 The symbolic system of the dispute over the credit information system: The period of 
reconciliation  
The structure of the dispute about the Credit Information System in civil society 
 The Bad The Good 
Policy 
Blacklisting system 
Sharing of credit rating 
Credit Bureaux 




Infringement of human rights 
Misuse and abuse of credit 
information by financial institutions 
Restriction to freedom of economic 
activities 
 
Protection of credit information 
 
 
Improvement of credit information 
system for international 
competitiveness 
The structure of cultural value system in civil society 









Advanced and Development 





Compared to the structure in the introductory period, it is found that the democratic code as 
well as the developmental code was used to instruct action and speech in civil society. The 
developmental code was used to persuade civil society to support credit information sharing. 
The existing blacklisting system was identified as a barrier to economic growth and the 
improvement of the credit information system was associated with an advanced and 
developed system. What is interesting is that the democratic code was also drawn on to 
criticize the existing credit information system. The arguments in this period were extended to 
the problem of the credit information system, such as infringement on fundamental right 
including freedom of economic activities. It is a distinctive feature of this period in the sense 
that leakage of personal information was used to stress the protection of credit information in 




This chapter was motivated by the question of how the coexistence and the confrontation of 
existing codes have evolved in Korean civil society in the process of democratisation and 
informatization. The answer to the question was examined through the debate about credit 
information in the sense that i) the debate over credit information was conducted for a longer 
period compassing the previous two debates, ii) the previous two debates showed the 
continuous confrontation of two codes for dominance and iii) the debate over credit 
information has an innate tension between the two codes (use vs. protection). 
 
The findings can be summarized as follows. First, the dispute over credit information 
reconfirms that both the democratic code and developmental code are used to instruct action 
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and speech in Korean civil society. Unlike existing theories on the democratic transition and 
consolidation in Korean society, it provides an analytic explanation of how members of 
Korean civil society are divided and integrated over two codes in the transition toward a 
democratic, information society. From the perspective of the social movement approach, the 
move to provide credit information protection, such as a credit amnesty and the abolition of 
the blacklisting system, would result from civil society‘s pressure on the democratic regimes 
to continue economic and social reforms. However, elite choices, such as the request and 
decisions of the ruling party and the Presidential Transition Committee, seemed to play a 
pivotal role in the move. Nonetheless, the elite-oriented theory needs further investigation of 
what made the elites‘ choice. Following a late-Durkheimian framework, I argue that the elites‘ 
choice was motivated by the operation of the democratic code.  
 
Second, the debate over credit information shows that in tandem with the advent of 
democratisation‘s era, the democratic code challenged the developmental code which had got 
embedded in the existing system established in the industrial period. Furthermore, it is found 
that eventually both of them became balanced and coexisted in the transition toward 
democracy. The policy focus of credit information shifted from the credit information use-
oriented ones to the simultaneous promotion of credit information use and protection. As 
shown in the debate over the abolition of blacklisting system, credit information sharing was 
reinterpreted in terms of the democratic code as well as the developmental code. The existing 
credit information system was criticized because of infringement on fundamental rights, 
including freedom of economic activities. 
 
Third, it can be concluded that the developmental code, originating from efficiency rather 
than anti-communism, did not disappear. Even though various measures for credit 
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information protection have been introduced, actions for the promotion of credit information 
use, such as the expansion of the scope of credit information collected and the promotion of 
CBs, have also intensified. The abolition of the blacklisting system did not lead to the ending 
of the collection of bad credit holders‘ information, but to the improvement of the credit 
information system through the development of CBs. It may reaffirm that the development 
code can still be used to instruct action and speech in civil society in the transition toward 
democracy. It seems to be in line with the findings in the debate over the NEIS, even though 
the themes drawn upon in the developmental code are different.  
 
Lastly, the debate over credit information provides evidence that informatization can serve the 
same role in the developmental code as industrialisation in the government-led development 
era. Like the case of electronic ID card and the NEIS, the improvement of existing credit 
information system, such as the transformation into on-line based system, was propelled 
under the name of informatization to promote national competitiveness. However, unlike the 
previous two cases, informatization of the credit information system was accomplished 
without any objection from civil society. The expansion of credit information which was 
linked to the leap into being a developed country was not rejected by Korean civil society. It 
may indicate that the developmental code still has influence in Korean civil society even 














This research has sought to explore discourses of democratisation in Korean civil society 
entering into the information age coincident with democratisation. To do this, a late-
Durkheimian theoretical framework has been used. This framework has provided a clearer 
picture of democratisation than existing studies to explain the democratic transition and 
consolidation in Korea, such as the strategic choice theory and the social movement theory. 
For instance, existing studies have not provided an explanation of i) what made democracy 
fighter-turned-president governments put a priority on national competitiveness over 
democratic rights and ii) why the Korean people accepted the launch of the NEIS, while they 
objected to that of the electronic ID card.  
 
This review of recent debates in South Korea over the implementation of information policies 
suggests the possibility of coexistence and conflict among multiple symbolic codes such as 
the ‗developmental‘ and ‗democratic‘ codes. The former involves authoritarian social values 
based on economic development and anti-communism while the latter is based on the values 
of democracy. It was found that the drive to informatization in South Korea reflected both 
democratic values and developmental values. This leads to one tentative conclusion that 
informatization in South Korea discloses an innate tension between democratic values such as 
human rights and individual privacy, and the developmental and industrial values such as 
efficiency. The above two opposing codes played significant roles in the processes of 
integration and division of a differentiated civil society by being mobilised in the conflicts.  
 
The coexistence and conflicts of both codes were investigated by using three representative 
disputes over information-related polices: i) the controversies over the electronic ID card 
between civil society organizations and the Korean government from 1995 to 1999, ii) the 
controversy over the NEIS from 2000 to 2003, and iii) the debate about credit information 
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from 1995 to 2007. The reason for selecting these three cases is that they reveal significant 
processes where existing values in a civil society are not only clearly exposed but also can 
show processes of change through symbolic conflict over new values. Through the analysis of 
the process of disputes, the research has tried to show how the different codes in Korean civil 
society are used symbolically in the transition toward a democratic and an information society 
and how members of civil society are divided and integrated over them.  
 
Summary of findings from debates over 3 information-related policies and implication 
 
The process of controversy of the electronic ID card was examined in chapter 4 and showed 
how existing codes underwent change at the beginning stage of the transition toward 
democracy and an information society.  
 
First, it was found that the coexistence of multiple codes in civil society involves a potential 
symbolic conflict; the developmental code of efficient administration, convenience of people, 
information and national competitiveness appeared opposed to a democratic code of human 
rights and privacy. Second, another finding was that the classification of the sacred and the 
profane can be subject to change through the process of symbolic conflict. Through the 
process of debate, the symbolic meaning of the electronic ID card changed from a sacred one 
to a profane one. The ID card was signified by the developmental code in the initial stages, 
but a year and a half later became re-signified by the democratic code, losing much of its 
justification. Third, another tentative conclusion was that the democratic code had the 
tendency to be dominant at the early stage of the transition toward democracy in Korea. The 
fourth finding was that the dispute over the electronic ID card provided a decisive moment for 
civil society organization to become more aware of the privacy issue. The indication was that 
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informatization propelled by the government in Korea should depend on the democratic code 
as well as the developmental code and accordingly democratic values should not be sacrificed 
for the sake of developmental value. The last finding was that external factors, such as the 
MacBride Roundtable and financial crisis in 1997, can also play a significant role in symbolic 
conflict. 
 
The dispute over the NEIS was explored in chapter 5. In the debate over the electronic ID 
card, when the first government was elected from the opposition party in 1998, the democratic 
code seemed to be established as the dominant code. This finding was reviewed in the debate 
over the NEIS which hit its stride after the first accession to power by only democratic forces 
without any coalition in 2002.  
 
It was found that, like the debate over the electronic ID card, the controversy over the NEIS 
does not only confirm the coexistence of the democratic code and the developmental code but 
also the contestation for dominance between them. The tentative conclusion was that the 
developmental code did not disappear in the transition toward democracy in Korea. Second, 
unlike the case of the electronic ID card where the developmental code depends on efficiency 
of administration, that of the NEIS showed a distinctive feature that the developmental code 
in Korea is also associated with anti-communism as well as efficiency. As the dispute 
continued, conservative forces attempted to link reform forces with threats to the national 
interest by drawing on anti-communism. The final point is that the main selling point of the 
arguments of civil society organisations is also differentiated in every period of the dispute. In 
this context, the debate over the NEIS suggested that the possible conflicts between the 





Chapter 6 was motivated by the fact that i) the debate over credit information was conducted 
for a longer period encompassing the previous two debates, ii) the previous two debates 
showed the continuous confrontation of the two codes for dominance and iii) the debate over 
credit information has an innate tension between two codes (use vs. protection).  
 
The findings can be summarized as follows. First, the debate over credit information showed 
that in tandem with the advent of democratisation‘s era, the democratic code challenged the 
developmental code which became embedded in the existing system during the 
industrialisation period. Furthermore, it was found that eventually both of them became 
balanced and coexisted in the transition toward democracy. The policy focus of credit 
information shifted from the credit information use-oriented ones to the simultaneous 
promotion of credit information use and protection. As shown in the debate over the abolition 
of the blacklisting system, credit information sharing was reinterpreted in terms of the 
democratic code as well as the developmental code. Another finding was that the 
developmental code, originating from efficiency rather than anti-communism, did not 
disappear, as shown in actions for the promotion of credit information use such as the 
expansion of the scope of credit information collected and the promotion of CBs. The 
abolition of the blacklisting system did not lead to the ending of the collection of bad credit 
holders‘ information, but to the improvement of credit information system through the 
development of CBs. The last point is that the debate over credit information provides 
evidence that informatization can serve the same role in the developmental code as 




The above analyses on three debates over information-related policies shed light on the 
discussion about the dominance of the democratic code in the transition toward a democratic 
and information society. The three debates suggest that the democratic code has a tendency to 
be dominant in Korean civil society. It can be seen from each debate and one narrative 
combined with all three debates. The ID card which drew on the developmental code 
eventually lost much of its justification after it was re-signified by the democratic code. While 
the NEIS was not scrapped, its implementation required a revision of its essential parts, such 
as the removal of sensitive personal information, suggesting the shift from the developmental 
code oriented system to a compromise system depending on both the democratic code and the 
developmental code. The protection of credit information became more influential in public 
voices on the credit information system, which was initially established on the basis of the 
developmental code. It indicates that democratisation and informatization can operate in 
tandem to establish the dominance of the democratic code in discourse in the public sphere. 
 
Considering one narrative constituted with all three debates, the structure of the cultural value 
system at the early stage of informatization and democratisation can be investigated in the 
introductory period of the debate on the electronic ID card (April 1995) and the dispute over 
credit information (January 1995). Tables 4-1 and 6-1 show only the developmental code was 
signified as the sacred at that time. The cultural value system at the next stage of 
informatization and democratisation is shown in the final stage of the electronic ID card 
(February 1999) and the initial stage of the NEIS (January 2000). The coexistence of the 
democratic code and the developmental code is detected (Tables 4-3 and 5-1). The recent 
cultural value system shown in the final stage of the dispute over the credit card (December 
2007) is the coexistence of the democratic code and the developmental code (Table 6-3). 
However, compared to the dominance of the developmental code in the introductory period 
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(Table 6-1), it suggests that the democratic code has a tendency to be dominant in Korean 
civil society.  
   
What is interesting is that the debates also showed that the developmental code does not 
always remain in the ‗residual‘ position. The case of the NEIS revealed that the 
developmental code in South Korean civil society became more powerful when it was related 
to anti-communism. It implies that the developmental code as the amalgamation of efficiency 
and anti-communism in Korea may have a more enduring and pervasive influence on civil 
society in Korea than in other countries. It also provides evidence that anti-communism is still 
one of the influential ideologies in South Korea, despite the breakdown of the cold-war 
system, and the summit meeting in 2000 and ‗Sunshine‘ policy. The controversy over credit 
information also reaffirms the persistent and prevailing influence of the developmental code 
in Korean civil society in the sense that it showed that the developmental code does not 
necessarily depend on anti-communism. It indicates that the developmental code still has 
influence in Korean civil society even though its effect is weaker. It provides a reasonable 
answer to questions of why democratic-fighter-turned governments places an emphasis on 
―economy first‖ over democratic rights and the launch of the NEIS despite the scrapping of 
the electronic ID card. It also would be a possible explanation for a recent phenomenon in 
Korean civil society, namely, nostalgia for the era of the authoritarian developmental state and 
the reappearance of discourses about economic growth having priority over democracy. In 
conclusion, this research argues that the values of a ‗democratic‘ code are becoming more 






Outlines of further research 
 
This research provides a useful framework for the investigation about the coexistence and 
conflicts of cultural codes in the transition toward democracy and information society. Hence, 
it can be extended and applied to further research. For example, one possible application 
would be an analysis on the discourse in informatization driven by the private sector. In this 
research, the government was one of the main participants in the conflicts of cultural codes 
because informatization in Korea was initiated and accelerated by the government. In the 
sense that the recent deepening in informatization has been promoted by various commercial 
companies, debates have flourished concerning privacy infringement by private companies. 
For instance, the recent controversy over the Smartphone‘ location tracking services and their 
collection of geographic data would be a relevant case. They raise an interesting question of 
how the confrontation of existing cultural codes involved in such debates centred on 
commercial companies is resolved. 
 
Further research would be the influence of external factors in cultural codes and their conflicts. 
This research finds that external factors, such as foreign experts and the financial crisis in 
1997, can have an impact upon cultural codes. Recent years have witnessed and increased in 
South Korean civil society in the number of multi-cultural families and people who escaped 
from North Korea. Alexander (2006a) asserts that divisions within society can be 
reconstructed with the idea of civil solidarity which can be broadened through the process of 
civil repair. In this regard, an interesting set of questions would be i) how people from 
different cultures have been integrated in South Korea society, ii) how the process of 
exclusion and inclusion based on solidarity has been and iii) what effects they have on 
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existing cultural codes, such as the relationships between issues on people who escaped from 
North Korea and the developmental code associated with anti-communism. 
 
Other further research would be informatization‘s role in the cultural code of other countries. 
This research shows that informatization can serve the same role in the developmental code as 
industrialisation in Korea. The significant disparities in informatization exist across the world. 
For instance, Latin Americans are reported to spend 7.6 hours per user on social networking, 
while those in the Asia Pacific region spend less than 3 hours (comScore, 2011). In this 
context, further research could focus on the question of how informatization in other countries 
















Appendix 3-1  The timeline of the debates over Information-related policies 
Kim Young-sam government 
(1993-1997) 
Kim Dae-jung government 
(1998-2002) 
Roh Moo-hyun government 
(2003-2007) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  Apr. 1995: the announcement of the ID card plan 
Oct. 1996: the start of main debate 
Feb.1999: the abandonment of the ID card project 
        
       Jul. 2000: the start of the plan of 
constructing NEIS. 
2003: main period of the debate 
Dec. 2003: the agreement of 
mediation 
    
  1995: the enactment of the Use and Protection of Credit Information Act. 
The scope of exchangeable credit information has fluctuated with time and related agreements have been modified according to 
the revision of law. This process of revision has brought constant debates between NGOs and the financial sectors and the 
government. 
The first civilian government but this 
government was established by joining the 
ruling party. 
 
1993-1994: a series of strong political and 
socioeconomic reforms in the name of a total 
globalization policy (sekyewha) 
 
1995: both Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo 
who, on charges of insurrection and corruption 
as previous presidents, were jailed by the 
The first transfer of power between the ruling 
and opposition party; It was achieved by the 
political union. 
The strong demand for democratisation. 
The growth of civil right. 
 
The economic policies based on neo-liberalism 
to recover the financial crisis. 
 
The encouragement of the development of IT 
industry and the supply of networks. 
The first succession of democratic-reform 
force by itself; it caused the severe division 
between the conservative force and the 
liberal reform force, in other words anti-
communism industrial force and peace 
democratic force. 
 
The development of the Internet which led to 
the growth of new media on the Internet and 




people’s strong protest.  
 
1997: The financial crisis-authoritarian force was 
regarded as the cause of financial crisis. 
 
Corruption. 
-the authoritarian industrial force was regarded 
as the reason of the economic crisis. 
 
While the democracy was introduced, the 




The summit conference between South Korea 
and North Korea 
 
The contentious politics were structured; the 
conservative force began to oppose the 
government.  
 
While the government achieved the recovery 
of financial crisis and the improvement of 
relationship with the North Korea, it was also 
faded by the corruption of persons close to 
the President. 
 
According to the diffusion of the Internet, the 
various needs in civil society could emerge.   
 
As the conservative force failed to the 
presidential election again, the social political 
conflict was intensified and the conservative 
has been criticizing the government.  
 
Reform liberal force became disappointed 
about the political ability of democratic force; 
e.g. Sending troops to Iraq and the deepening 
gap between the wealth and the poor.  
 
Although the democratic force succeeded to 
get the power, the public could realize that 
the democratic force would not be the only 
good.   
 
While democratic force decreased, industrial 
force grew. 
The democratic code was strongly regarded as 
the important value in civil society. 
 
In the early stage of the government, the 
democratic code took the superior position 
than the developmental code. 
During the period, the conflict between 
conservative force and reformative force 
accelerated. 
Although the democratic reform force took 
the power, the conflicts were intensifying in 
civil society. 
The developmental code began to re-estimate 
by the public with the disappointment of the 






Appendix 4-1 The chronology of the dispute over the electronic ID card  
Dates Events 
March 1995 Establishing the basic plan for renewal of the residence registration card 
7 April 1995 
Forming the committee for promoting the electronic ID card (17 members from 
15 institutions) 
12 May 1995 Organising the initiative committee for the electronic ID card 
March 1996 
Issuing the pilot electronic ID cards to 1500 citizens in Chungang-dong, Kwacheon 
city  
June 1996 
Establishing the basic Framework for Promotion of Informatization: selecting the 
electronic ID card project as its main task and establishing the plan for Issuance 
of Electronic National ID Card 
August 1996 Discussing the problem of the electronic ID card at the MacBride Roundtable 
14 October 1996 
Forming A Joint Struggle Committee to Protect Privacy Rights and against 
Integrated Electronic National ID Card by 16 civil society organisations 
30 October 1996 The MOHA, holding a roundtable for explaining the electronic ID card project 
2 November 1996 The JSCID, holding a public discussion meeting 
27 February 1997 
The MOHA, adjusting the schedule from starting issuing the electronic ID card to 
all citizens at January 1988 and enforcing it in January 1999 to starting issuing in 
October 1988 and enforcing it in  October 1999  
April 1997 
The JSCID, publishing  a Data Collection, the electronic ID card and the Coming of 
Electronic Surveillance Society  
April 1997 The MOHA, publishing  a booklet, A Guidebook for the Electronic ID Card 
16 June 1997 
The Korean Bar Association, holding a forum: What are the Problems of the 
Electronic ID Card?  
30 June 1997 
The Human Rights Committee of Catholic Church, holding a forum: information 
Society and issues of Human Rights 
14 July 1997 
The Home Affairs Committee in the National Assembly, holding a public hearing 
and presenting a bill for the renewal of the residence registration card 
November 1997 
The JSCID, staging a demonstration in front of the National Assembly and a visit 
to the ruling party, Hannara party  
17 November 1997 





14 December 1997 
Holding a TV forum for the Presidential election: Kim Dae-jung declared the 
objection to the project 
18 December 1997 Kim Dae-jung, winning the presidential election 
30 December 1997 
The JSCID, announcing a manifesto, “the promise of the president-elect that he 
objects to the electronic ID card must be kept.”  
10 February 1998 
The Lawyers for Democratic Society, making a recommendation to abolish the 
electronic ID card project to the president-elect and the Presidential Committee   
February 1998 
The Presidential Committee,  deciding to defer of the project and request the 
audit  
6  April 1998 
The Board of Audit and Inspection, conducting a special audit to the project of 
the electronic ID card  
22 February 1999 
The new ruling Party and the government, agreeing to scrap the plan for the 







Appendix  5-1 The differences between C/S and NEIS 
 C/S NEIS 
Main services 
Limited to school affairs(academic 
affairs, school affairs  administration) 
 
 
Covering overall education 
administration such as academic affairs, 
school affairs, personnel, accounting, 






Education offices in cities and provinces 




Teachers of school 
-operating and managing patch by each 
school 
 
The person in charge of this service at 
education offices in cities and provinces 
-operating and managing patch by 
education offices in cities and provinces  
Data 
management 
Responsibility of each school 
-school teachers 
 
Responsibility of education offices in 
cities and provinces 
-data access is only for school teachers 
Data security 
management 
Independent solution per school 
(ex. Fire-wall) 
Security system by education offices 




Possible for data sharing and utilization 
only if each school submits data to the 
higher institutions.  
- School->data generation->submitting 
data to education offices in cities and 
provinces -> formation of database -> 
the education ministry ->utilization 
Possible for online data processing by 
integrated information system which 
makes data utilization easier. 
- Process in school works -> direct 
generation of information by the 
education ministry -> utilization  
 
Public Service Impossible for real time public services possible for real time public services 
 Reference: Kim J-c. (2003, p. 4). 




Appendix  5-2  27 education information management fields of the NEIS 
Work fields Details 
Teacher HR 
Registered/current No., HR records, hiring, salary step, years of service, 
transfer, employment test, assessment, promotion, training, awards and 
discipline, service, faculty for term, employment of professional position, 
qualification test management 
Staff HR    
Registered/current No., HR records, hiring, salary step, years of service, 
transfer, employment test, assessment, promotion, training, awards, 
reinstatement 
Pay-roll 
Monthly wage, annual salary system, holiday vacation payment, annual 
compensation payment, performance-based bonus, year-end settlement, 
health insurance, national pension, employment insurance 
Administration 
Service 
certificates, civil petition, complaints/suggestions/question, information 
disclosure, status statistics, etc 
Emergency Civil defense drill, training, military personnel for public interests, etc.   
Incorporation Incorporation info, budget/settlement, incorporation ledger, etc.   
Facilities 
Facility building projects, school facilities, maintenance, 
accommodation plan, etc.   
Property 
Management of shared properties, property ledger, reuse of 
properties of closed schools, etc.   
Supplies / Materials   
Acquisition/operation management, survey on goods,  supply plan, 
management of school tools’ standard, management of school tool status, 
management of laboratory practice materials, management of instruments 
and materials’ standard, supply status management, supply statistics 
Budget 
Compilation of the budget, budgetary allocation, budget carried forward, 
budgetary application, budgetary statistics 
Accounting 
Revenue, expenditure, cash other than revenue and expenditure, 
contract/seizure, settlement, fund 
School Accounting 
budget, revenue, expenditure, settlement, cash other than revenue and 
expenditure, development fund 
Life-long Education 
Life-long education facilities management, management of private and 
educational institutes, etc.   





Admission   
statistics, etc.   
Supervision Educational courses, pilot schools, scholarship information, etc.      
Educational 
Statistics 
School status, student status, teacher status, facilities status, etc.   
Property 
Registration 
Property ledger, details management, property report, etc.   
Audit Audit plan, audit status, cyber audit, etc.   
Legal Affairs Legal info, precedent info, interpretation of legal questions, etc.   
Public Release Press releases management, etc.   
School Meals 
Statistics of school meals, management of school meals, other management 
except for school meals, analysis of school meals 
Physical Education 
School physical education facilities management, athletes 
management, statistics, etc.  
Planning  Major work, organization evaluation   
System 
Code management, integration, security, user authorization and authority 
management, log management, interface management, batch work 
management, work processing approval management 
*School / student 
affairs 
Basic school information, educational courses designing, school affairs 
handling, student records management and changes update, 
graduation/grade advance/class organization, student behavior 
management, report cards management, student’s school life record 
management, textbook  
Admission/Admission 
to a School of Higher 
Grade 
Basic data management, admission application management, exam scores 
management (admission to high school), management of admitted students, 
placement management, management of admission to a school of higher 
grade, registration management   
*Student health Basic data management, student health and health statistics, school 
environment management, student health records management  
 * indicates core controversy areas of the NEIS and the bolded items were already dealt in the C/S.  
 Reference: Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development (2005), Chang (2004, p. 169). 




Appendix 5-3 The chronology of the debate over the NEIS 
Period Details 
January 2000 Announcing New Year Policy Address 
October 2000  
- March 2001 
Conducting task analyses (research Projects for Business Process Re-
engineering and Information Strategy Planning) 
May 2001 
Selected as one of 11 major government initiatives by the Special Committee 
for E-government 
July  
Establishing the Plan for a Nationwide Educational Administration 
Information System for the Promotion of E-government 
24 November  Instituting the basic plan for National Education Information System 
March 2002 - Conducting system design 
June 2002 
- September 2002 
16 July 2002 
Conducting S/W development H/W & Infrastructure Building  
 
Establishing the Action Plan for the Promotion of E-government 
August 2002 - 
20 & 27 August 2002 
September 2002  
Starting user Training 
Starting a talk between the KTU and the MOE 
Announcing the KTU’s manifesto for implementation after revision 
September 2002  
-February 2003 
12 September 2002 
4 November  
Implementing a Pilot test at the 267 schools 
 
The MOE, announcing to postpone 3 categories 
Launching system with the exception of 3 categories 
3 March 2003 
 
6 March 







26 May    
Opening the system for 3 categories   
The KTU, launching a sit-in protest 
New Minister of the MOU inauguration 
Establishing the EIC 
The KTU, leave of absence 
An elementary school principal’s suicide 
The NHRC, holding public hearing 
The KFTA, launching anti-KTU rally 
The NHRC, making Policy recommendation 
The KTU, staging a hunger strike 
Starting negotiation between the MOE and the KTU 
1 June  
 
The MOE, announcing the implementation of the NEIS in full depending on 













25 & 27 June 
The KTU, filing a criminal complaint against the MOE 
The KFTA, filing a criminal complaint against the KTU 
Prime Minister, deciding the establishment of the EIC under the Prime 
Minister 
The KTU, announcing no participation in the EIC and staging a hunger strike 
The KTU, launching a nationwide rally 
Civil society organizations,  visiting the MOE 
Civil society organizations , holding a press conference “Special week of Big 
Brother” 
Civil society organizations, holding a press conference relating to the EIC 
7 July 2003 
8 July 
17 July 
The EIC, holding the first meeting 
Civil society organizations, forming the JSCNEIS 
Police, arresting the KTU’s chairman 
8 September  
September   
17 September 
The KTU, participating in the 3rd meeting of the EIC 
The JSCNEIS, organizing a candlelight vigil protest 
The EIC, holding a public debate 






The MOE, announcing the use of the NEIS for applicants to universities and 
the manufacture of CD-ROMs storing personal profile and academic records 
Universities, deciding to accept both the NEIS and C/S based applicants 
The KTU, filing provisional disposition petition for the ceasing of production 
and distribution of CD-ROMs 





Universities, requiring CD-ROMs storing personal profile and academic 
records 
The Court, approving the petition for the ceasing  production and distribution 
of CD-ROMs 




The EIC, holding the 6th meeting 
The EIC, adopting the final plan at the 7th meeting 
Resignation of the Minister of Education 
The EIC, failing to reach the final agreement at the 8th meeting  
February 2004 
23 September  
The EIC, dismantling and suggesting an intermediary alternative 













Appendix 6-2 Brief history of the credit information sharing system in Korea 



























The Agreement on Liquidation of Loans Arrears was made. 
The Agreement on Credit Delinquency Information Sharing between Financial 
Institutions was signed.  
The Office of Bank Supervision in the Bank of Korea started to operate the Corporate 
Loans Information Collection and Management System. 
The Agreement on Business Credit Information Collection and Management was made. 
The Agreement on Individual Credit Information Collection and Management was 
signed. 
The KFB absorbed the function of credit information management business from the 
Bank of Korea 
The KFB established the credit delinquency information sharing system including non-
banking institutions as well as banks. 
The Ministry of Finance announced the Guideline for Exchange and Use of Credit 
Information. The System for individuals’ credit information and that for Corporate’ 
credit information were combined under the KFB.  
The Act of Use and Protection of Credit Information was enacted and the KFB was 
designated as ‘the Centralized Credit Information Collection Agency.’ 
The KFB launched on-line based CISS for banks 
The KFB launched comprehensive on-line based CISS including both banks and non-
bank financial institutions 
The Credit Information Services Management Regulation was enacted and was 
enforced by the Financial Services Commission.  
The first credit amnesty was granted. 
The KFB unified agreements into one agreement on credit information management. 
The second credit amnesty was granted. 
A credit bureau was established. 
The registration system of bad credit holders was abolished. 









1. Identifiable information Name, Address, Resident registration number, Foreigner 
registration number 
2. Information on Credit 
transactions  
 Details of loans including the date of extension, the loan amount, 
whether secured cash advance of credit card, etc. 
 Details of guarantees including the date of guarantee, the 
guarantee amount, etc. 
 Status of opening and closing of current accounts and household 
current accounts. 
 Status of credit cards including issuance, cancellation, and 
settlement amount (the settlement amount of credit cards shall 
be registered only if a credit card company holding the relevant 
credit information gives its content).  
3. Information on 
determination of credit 
rating 
 Status of delinquency of loans, etc. 
 Details of subrogation and substitute payment. 
 Status of default in payment of non-guaranteed bonds 
 Status of suspension of transactions in bills of checks or 
transactions in dishonoured bills or checks. 
 Information on disturbance of financial order 
 
 
2. Enterprises and Corporations 
Category Contents 
1. Identifiable information Name of a company and a juristic person, Name and Resident 
registration number of representative, Corporate registration 
number, Taxpayer identification number, location of head office. 
2. Information on Credit 
transactions 
 Status of credit extension including security, revolving 
transaction, credit extension period, etc. 
 Status of opening and closing of household current accounts or 
checking accounts 




settlement amount, delinquency, etc.(the settlement amount of 
credit cards shall be registered only if a credit card company 
holding the relevant credit information gives its consent). 
3. Information on 
determination of credit 
rating 
 Status of delinquency of loans, etc. 
 Details of subrogation and substitute payment. 
 Status of default in payment of non-guaranteed bonds 
 Status of suspension of transactions in bills of checks or 
transactions in dishonoured bills or checks. 
 Information on disturbance of financial order 
4. Information on Credit 
Capacity 
 Information on final plan in capital increase and bond issuance 
 General condition of company, content of business, financial 
matters, auditor’s opinion, tax payment records, etc. 
 
3. Public information 
  Violation of economic Acts and subordinate statutes. 
 Information on employment insurance, industrial accident compensation insurance, national health 
insurance and national pension insurance, that on the payment of premiums, business registration 
numbers of insured entrepreneurs (limited to the insured having not less than five (5) employees), 
and the number of such employees. 
 Information on the use of electricity that on power consumption and on the full payment of electric 
charges. 
 Actual delivery of goods to the Government and the amount of such delivery. 
 Information on the dead and that on changes in resident registration numbers or names. 
 Information on reports on emigration and abandonment 
 Information on court judgement and decision, including a decision on rehabilitation on, those on 
bankruptcy or exemption, rectification of registration of defaulters of indebtedness, etc. 
 Information on delinquency in payment of national taxes, local taxes, or customs duties 
 Information on delinquency in payment of fines for negligence, social insurance premiums, public 
utility charges, etc. 
 Information on credit recovery support which is finally determined in accordance with a credit 
recovery support agreement of the Credit Counselling and Recovery Service 
 Information on the adjustment of indebtedness which is finally determined in accordance with the 





Appendix 6-4 The main contents about the Credit Information Act (1995) 
 
 Contents and Features 
Definitions  Credit information, credit information business, credit 
information provider and user, CCA, bad credit holder (Shinyong 
bulrang ja), etc. 
 Plan for promotion of credit information business 
Credit information business  License, capital requirement, personnel and material facilities, 
requirements for major investors, activities, etc. 
Collection, investigation and 
processing of credit 
information 
 Collection and investigation limitation principle 
 Requests for inspection and provision of credit information held 
by public institutions 
 Restrictions on collection and investigation of information 
concerning individual political ideas, religious beliefs, uncertain 
personal credit information, etc. 
Distribution, use and 
management of credit 
information 
 CCA 
 Data quality principle 
Protection of credit 
information 
 Consent regarding provision and use of personal credit 
information 
 Use limitation principle 
 Right of inspection and correction of credit information 
 Prohibition of disclosure outside business purpose 






Appendix 6-5 Standards for registration and use of credit information through the CCA (1995) 
 
1. Information on Credit Transactions 
(1) Individuals 
Information to be 
Registered 
Registration Institutions Standards for Registration 
Details of loans 
(including the date of 
extension, the loan 
amount). 
Banks (including agricultural cooperatives 
and fisheries cooperatives), saving banks, 
specialized credit financial business 
companies, insurance companies. 
Individuals with a loan of more 
than 30 million Korean won 
from one financial institution. 
Status of opening and 
closing of household 
current accounts 
Banks (including agricultural cooperatives 
and fisheries cooperatives) 
Individual concerned 
Status if credit cards 
(including issuance 
and cancellation) 
Banks (including agricultural cooperatives 
and fisheries cooperatives) and 




(2) Enterprises and Corporations 
Information to be 
Registered 
Registration Institutions Standards for Registration 
Status of credit 
extension (including 
security, guarantee 
and facilities rental) 
 Banks (including agricultural 
cooperatives and fisheries 
cooperatives), merchant banking 
corporations, savings banks, insurance 
companies, leasing companies, etc. 
 Enterprises with credit extension of 
more than 20 billion Korean won or 
loans of more than 10 billion Korean 
won 
 Enterprises with more than 0.5 billion 
Korean won from one financial 
institution 





designated by the office of Bank 
supervision 




 Banks (including agricultural 
cooperatives and fisheries 
cooperatives), merchant banking 
corporations, savings banks, insurance 
companies, leasing companies, etc. 
 Enterprises in affiliated 
business group designated by 
the office of Bank supervision 
Status of opening and 
closing of household 
current accounts of 
checking accounts 
 Banks (including agricultural 
cooperatives and fisheries 
cooperatives). 
 Private enterprises, 
corporations, and persons 
concerned therein. 
Status of credit cards 
(including issuance 
and cancellation) 
 Banks (including agricultural 
cooperatives and fisheries 
cooperatives) and specialized credit 
financial business companies. 
 Private enterprises, 
corporations, and persons 
concerned therein. 
 
2. Information on delinquency 
Information to be 
Registered 













(banks, saving banks, 
credit card companies, 
insurance companies, etc) 
Borrowers that had loans of less than 15 
million Korean won in arrears for more than 
6 months. 
Those with credit card payments of more 
than 50 thousand to 5 million Korean won in 
arrears for more than 6 months. 




Same as the above Borrowers that had loans of more than 15 
million Korean won that were more than 3 
months overdue. 
Persons with credit card payments of more 
than 5 million Korean won in arrears for 
more than 3 months. 








Same as the above Borrowers with loans of more than 15 
million Korean won that were more than 6 
months overdue. 
Persons with credit card payments of more 
than 5 million Korean won that were more 
than 6 months overdue. 
Persons that dishonoured promissory notes 
or checks 







Appendix 6-6 The chronology of the controversy over credit information system 
Period Details 







Kim Young-sam, addressing presidential special message “new leap toward a 
new economy” 
The Ministry of Finance, declaring the improvement of the CISS in the 
financial sector plan of a five-year programme for New Economy 
The Ministry of Finance, announcing  the enactment of the Credit Information 
Management Act 
The Presidential Commission on Administrative Reform, recommending the 




A series of murders with information from a department store 
Submitting a draft of Credit Information Act to the National Assembly  
The National Assembly, passing the Credit Information Act 







Promulgating the Credit Information Act 
Ducksan conglomerate, filing bankruptcy  
A Deputy Prime Minister, declaring a plan of the establishment of the CISS 
including banks and non-bank financial institutions 
The MOFE, publicising a draft of the Enforcement Decree of the Credit 
Information Act 
Enforcing the Credit Information Act 
The MOFE, deciding  the collection of loans amount of more than 30 million 
KRW each individual and more than 0.5 million KRW each company  











Announcing a policy focus on the efficient use of credit information in 
Economic Policy Directions in 1996 
A CEO of the First Bank, arrested for a ‘bad loans scandal’ 
Deputy Prime Minister, declaring the establishment of a comprehensive on-
line based CISS 
The MOFE, publicising  a plan for the amendment of the Enforcement Decree 
including the establishment of a CIC in the CCA 
A public hearing on strategies for enhancing the competitiveness of financial 
industries, such as expanding the scope of credit information in the CCA  
The MOFE, announcing deregulations of financial sector including the 






















The KFB, launching on-line based CISS for banks 
Hanbo Steel, filing bankruptcy 
The PCFR, declaring objectives of sub commissions including the convenient 
use of financial information 
The PCFR, suggesting the establishment of comprehensive CISS including 
banks and non-bank financial institutions 
The PCFR, publicising interim report including the enhancement of 
distribution of credit information 
The MOFE, announcing a draft of the amendment of the Credit Information 
Act to enhance the distribution of credit information 
The MOFE, publicising an action plan for financial reform including the 
expansion of the scope of credit information in the CCA 
The MOFE, announcing a strengthening plan for the CISS 
The National Assembly, passing the amendment of the Credit Information Act 
 The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of the Enforcement 
Decree and the Enforcement rule of the Credit Information Act including the 
collection of loans amount without borrowers’ consent 
The MOFE, revising the Credit Information Services Management Guideline to 
expand the scope of credit information in the CCA 
5 February 1998 
 







The KFB, launching comprehensive on-line based CISS including banks and 
non-bank financial institutions 
The Presidential transition committee, announcing new government’s 100 
tasks including the improvement of credit information distribution system 
Informatization strategy meeting, reporting to the president informatization 
promotion policies including the expansion of credit information network 
The ruling party (the National Congress for New Politics), designed the 
improvement measure about promissory note 
The State Council, amending the Enforcement Decree to allow foreign 
financial institutions to operate credit information business 





Banks, requiring borrowers to submit the state of liabilities if 10 million KRW 
or more loans is applied 
The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of the Enforcement 
Decree and the Enforcement rule of the Credit Information Act including the 
















The PSPD, filing an injunction to halt the sanctions against a bad credit holder 
The FSC, declaring the policy objectives for 1999 including the establishment 
of on-line based CISS for non-bank financial institutions 
The FSC, announcing the plan to scrap personal loan guarantee system 
YMCA, criticizing credit card terms for the use of credit information for 
commercial purposes and reporting to the Fair Trading Commission 
The KFB, holding a public hearing on personal loan guarantee system 
The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of Credit Information 
Act including the request for inspection of credit information via the Internet 
The ruling party, planning credit amnesty 
President statement, announcing presidential pardon including easing or 
lifting economic and administrative sanction 













The KFB, deleting records of slightly risky borrowers who were registered 
between November 1997 and December 1999 and paid off arrears 
The KFB, announcing the plan to revise the criteria of a bad credit holder and 
to shorten a grace period 
The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of the Enforcement 
Decree and the Enforcement rule of the Credit Information Act including the 
collection of guarantee amount into the CCA 
The FSC, amending the Regulation on Credit Information Business to put in a 
clause for the unification of specific agreements of each financial sector 
The Financial Supervisory Service (hereafter FSS), staging a workshop with 
credit information companies 
The KFB, holding a seminar regarding consumer credit information 
The KFB, unifying agreements into a unitary agreement on credit information 
management 








The FSS, publicizing the measure to promote credit-information-based 
lending 
The FSC, holding a public hearing on credit rating and credit information 
system 
The government, holding a policy coordination meeting with the ruling party 
and announcing the support measures for low-income households including 
the 2nd Credit Amnesty 






























The FSC, amending regulation on supervision of credit information business 
including pre-notification and the expansion of the scope of credit 
information into the CCA 
YWCA, seeking compensation for damages from credit card companies 
accused of credit information leakage 
Congressmen, submitting the amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
require a written consent for providing credit information to other companies 
The government, holding a policy coordination meeting with the ruling party 
and announcing the 2nd financial regulation reform 
Civil society organizations, announcing the plan to urge the enactment of 
Privacy Act 
Congressmen, submitting the amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
notify people in advance to be registered as a bad credit holder 
Consumers Union of Korea, holding a seminar about the counter-measures 
against the increase in bad credit holders 
The PSPD, making a petition to the National Assembly to specify the criteria 
of a bad credit holder in the Credit Information Act 
The KFB, amending the agreements to expand the scope of collection of 
individual loans amount from 10 million KRW to 1 KRW (effective from 1 July 
2002) 
The National Assembly, passing the amendment of the Credit Information Act 
including a written consent for providing credit information to other 
companies and pre-notification of registration of a bad credit holder 
A meeting of economy-related Ministers, announcing the measures for 
supporting the wealth formation of middle class and the stable livelihood of 
low-income households 







The Korea Consumer Protection Board, announcing complaints cases about 
credit information 
The Democratic Labour Party, insisting the amendment of the Credit 
Information Act 
The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, criticizing credit cards companies 
for the increase in bad credit holders 



































consumers’ rescue program, the enhancement of distribution of positive 
credit information and the promotion of establishing credit bureaux 
The PSPD, insisting the enactment of a law to restrict excessive interest rate. 
The Korea Information Service, establishing the first CB in Korea 
A financial policy consultation meeting, announcing the measures to curb the 
increasing household debts including the exclusion of borrowers with small 
loans in arrears from black lists 
The PSPD, filing a criminal complaint against Samsung insurance company for 
the illegal distribution of customer’s information 
The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of the Enforcement 
Decree and the Enforcement rule of the Credit Information Act including pre-
notification 
The PSPD, filling a criminal against an insurance company for an illegal 
distribution of customer’s information 
The CIC, lowering the criteria for the registration of a bad credit holder 
A financial policy consultation meeting, rescheduling the beginning period for 
sharing information on individual loan amounts 
The Fair Trading Commission, ordering credit cards companies to modifying 
the contractual terms regarding the provision of credit information to 
business partner companies 
The FSS, amending the Regulation on Supervision of Credit Information 
Business to formulate a legal framework for financial institution’s credit 
recovery procedures for bad credit holders and collect information on cash 
advance of credit card into the CCA 
The PSPD, requesting the enactment of a law to support credit recovery of 
individuals 
The KFB, holding a public hearing on credit recovery programs for individuals 
The MOFE, amending the Enactment Decree of the Financial Holding 
Companies Act to allow financial holding company’s subsidiaries to provide 
personal credit information to each other 
The KFB, announcing a plan to collect information on short-term delinquency 
of loans 
7 January 2003 
 
The Presidential Transition Committee, announcing  the direction of 






































Citizens Action Network, insisting the introduction of a supervision system for 
personal information protection 
The FSC, suggesting the collection of information on wealth, income loan 
payment history and so on into the CCA 
The MOFE, announcing the plan to amend the Credit Information Act to 
establish a legal basis for credit bureaux 
Korea Progressive (Jinbo) Network, filing a criminal complaint against the 
Ministry of Information and Communication, Association of Information & 
Telecommunication and Korea Information Service 
The MOFE, announcing the plan to amend the Credit Information Act to allow 
credit bureaux to share individuals’ information held by public administrative 
entities and to introduce the right to revoke consent to provide and use 
personal credit information 
A congressman, declaring an amendment of an agreement to alleviate the 
criteria of bad credit holders 
The government, announcing a comprehensive plan for bad credit holders 
including the abolition of the management system of bad credit holders in the 
long run 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
allow individuals’ consent to be obtained by electronic documents 
Congressmen, proposing an amendment of the  Credit Information Act to 
force public administrative entities to provide personal information to credit 
information business if possible 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
enforce financial institutions to notify individuals what information is 
provided and to whom it is provided  
An individual, filing a petition for constitutional complaint about the 
management system of bad credit holders 
A chairman of the FSC, declaring that the FSC will develop the plan for the 
promotion of CB’s function and the improvement of individual credit 
evaluation system in financial institutions 
LG credit card, facing liquidity problem 
A Seoul district court, adjudicating an insurance company to be guilty of using 






The government, holding a conference about a plan for the enhancement of 
individual credit risk rating capability 
































The MOFE, declaring a plan to collect information on deposits to promote the 
role of CBs 
An opposition party, announcing a plan to submit an amendment of the 
Credit Information Act to delete the term, ‘bad credit holder (shin yong 
bulrang  ja) from the Act and submitting it on the 28th of January 
The KDI and the KIF, recommending the abolition of the management of bad 
credit holders and the expansion of the scope of credit information collected 
The ruling Uri Party chairman, declaring the change of the management of 
bad credit holders into the differential management of credit rating 
The MOFE, announcing ‘bad credit holders: current status and counter 
measures’ to support bad credit holders credit recovery 
A deputy prime minister and Minister of Finance and Economy, declaring the 
promotion of CBs 
The National Assembly, voting to impeach President Rho and suspending 
Roh’s executive power 
The MOFE, formulating more detailed plan to encourage CBs to provide no 
information about bad credit holders for the purpose of the examinations of 
job applications 
The KFB, agreeing the abolition of the management of bad credit holders and 
announcing the plan to collect positive credit information 
The MOFE, announcing an amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the 
Credit Information Act to notify a customer of the details about the provision 
of credit information 
The Credit Finance Association, announcing the expansion of the scope of 
information shared between credit card companies 
The opposition party,  announcing that it will put the highest priority in 
passing the Credit Information Act including the abolition of the management 
of bad credit holders 
The PSPD, holding a conference about the solution of bad credit holders’ 
problem  
The MOFE, publicizing the Enforcement Rule of the Credit Information Act to 























A deputy prime minister and Minister of Finance and Economy, announcing 
the Plan to abolish the management of bad credit holders within the year 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to ban 
the provision  of the credit information for the purpose of the examination of 
job applications 
The MOFE, publicizing a plan to reform the management of bad credit holders 
8 financial institutions, deciding the establishment of a new CB 
The ruling party and the government, discussing the abolition of the 
management of bad credit holders within the year 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
abolish the management of bad credit holders 
The PSPD, appealing the National Assembly to abolish the blacklisting system 
and to ban sharing credit rating such as good credit rating or bad credit rating 
The Finance and Economy Committee, passing the amendment of the Credit 
Information Act 
The plenary session, passing the amendment 
4 March 2005 
 
 
28 March  
 











Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act 
including a legal basis of the Credit Information Counselling and Recovery 
Service 
The KFB, increasing the criteria of delinquency of loans shared from 0.3 
million KRW to 0.5 million KRW  
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act 
including a right to revoke consent to provide and use personal credit 
information 
The Regulatory Reform Promotion Committee, planning an amendment of 
the Credit Information Act including the allowance of financial institutions to 
transfer information to other financial institution 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act 
including provision credit information to a prosecutor or judicial police officer 
in the event of occurrence of an emergency  
The FSC, publicizing the plan to revise the regulation to extend the retention 




10 November The FSS, announcing the introduction of the best practice in the management 
and protection of personal credit information 








The KFB, announcing the plan to expand the scope of credit information 
provided to financial institutions 
The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Credit Information Act including a right to free perusal 
A Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economy, announcing 
the plan to allow financial institutions to use information held by public 
institutions 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
force financial institutions to delete personal credit information clearly within 
5 years after a financial or commercial transaction 







The MOFE, issuing public notices about the amendment of the Credit 
Information Act to force financial institutions to obtain individuals’ consent 
when they intend to be provided credit rating by CBs 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
allow individuals’ consent to be obtained through wire or wireless 
communications 
Congressmen, submitting an amendment of the Credit Information Act to 
restrict the use of information on illness to the purpose of an insurance 




Appendix 6-7 Credit information-related policies in 1995 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions 
 Credit card companies participated in the CCA (8 Feb. 1995) 
 Banks + non-bank financial institutions (A Deputy Prime Minster, 18 Mar. 1995) 
 Banks + Saving banks + insurance + credit cards (Guideline, 6 Jul. 1995) 
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Newly collect an individual’s loan amounts of more than 30 million Korean won per financial institution 
with a personal consent (6 Jul. 1995) 
Registration Process  
Credit information 
retention period 
 Delete records immediately when an individual pays loans of less than 5 million KRW or credit card 
payment of less than 0.5 million KRW in arrears (Agreements, 27 Dec. 1995)  
 Exclude an individual from “black lists” if ‘slightly risky borrowers’ or ‘ risky borrowers’ pay loans or credit 
card payments in arrears within 15 days after overdue(Agreements, 27 Dec. 1995) 




Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 Notify the relevant individual 15 days prior to the registration when the individual would be registered as 
a bad credit holder (Agreements, 27 Dec. 1995) 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  





Appendix 6-8 Credit information-related policies in 1996 
USE 
Credit Information Business 
 Give licence of credit information business to non-financial companies (6 Jan. 1996 → Amendment of the 
Act, 28 Aug. 1997) 
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Collect information on delinquency in payment of taxes, fines and public utility charges (6 Jan. 1996 → the 
National Collection Act, 30 Dec. 1996) 
 Collect information on loans without consents (13 May 1996 → Amendment of Enforcement Decree, 27 
Dec. 1997) 
 Lower the criteria of information on corporate loans collected from 0.5 billion KRW to 0.1 billion KRW (the 
KFB , 4 May 1996 → Guideline, 9 May 1997) 
Registration Process  On-line based CISS (A Deputy Prime Minister, 4  May 1996 → 15 Jan. 1997) 
Credit information 
retention period 
 Extend  the period from 15 days to 30 days when records are deleted immediately if ‘slightly risky 
borrowers’ or ‘risky borrowers’ pay off arrears after overdue (Agreements, 30 Oct. 1996) 
Other CISSs  Allow for the establishment of individual CISSs (25 Jul. 1996 → Amendment of the Act, 28 Aug. 1997) 
Others 
 Establishment of the CIC comprised of financial institutions in the CCA (12 May 1996 → Amendment of the 
Act, 28 Aug. 1997) 
Pro-
tection 
Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  





Appendix 6-9 Credit information-related policies in 1997 
USE 
Credit Information Business 
 Permit a licence to non-financial companies (the PCFR, 14 Apr. 1997) 
 Permit a licence to a juristic person in which fifty percents or more of the capital are invested by financial 
institutions (Amendment of the Act, 28 Aug. 1997) 
CCA 
Registration Institutions 
 Include instalment finance companies (5 Jun. 1997 → Amendment of the Enforcement Decree and 
Guideline, 27 Dec. 1997) 
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Lower the criteria of information on individual’s loans from 30 million KRW to 20 million KRW (The MOFE, 
26 Mar. 1997 → Guideline, 30 Dec. 1997) 
Registration Process 
 Launch on-line based CISS including only banks (15 Jan. 1997) 








Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle 
 Not to be considered to be the acts of disclosing or using credit information for purposes other than 
business purposes if credit information providers or users provide credit information providers or users or 
credit dealers in accordance with contracts (7 May 1997 → Amendment of the Act, 28 Aug. 1997) 





Appendix 6-10 Credit information-related policies in 1998 
USE 
Credit Information Business 
 Allow foreign financial institutions to operate credit information business (Enforcement Decree, 9 Jul. 
1998) 
 Lower capital requirement from 10 billion KRW to 5 billion KRW (26 Nov. 1998 → Amendment of the Act, 
29 Jan. 1999) 
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Lower the criteria of information on individual’s loans from 30 million KRW to 20 million KRW 
(Agreements, 14 Jan. 1998 → Implement, 1 Mar. 1998) 
Registration Process   
Credit information 
retention period 
 Extend the period from 30 days to 60 days when records are deleted immediately if ‘slightly risky 
borrowers’ or ‘risky borrowers’ pay off arrears after overdue (Agreements, 8 Jun. 1998) 
Other CISSs  Credit cards companies aim to establish the CISS starting from September 1998. 
Others 




Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  






Appendix 6-11 Credit information-related policies in 1999 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Lower the criteria of information on individual’s loans from 20 million KRW to 10 million KRW and 
corporate loans from 0.5 billion KRW to 0.3 billion KRW starting from July (The KFB, 20 Jan. 1999) 
 Include credit extension in the collection of the CCA (Enforcement Decree, 4 Feb. 1999) 
Registration Process  
Credit information 
retention period 
 Credit amnesty (The ruling party, 10 Nov. 1999 → Presidential Pardon, 30 Dec. 1999 → The KFB, 16 Jan. 
2000) 
Other CISSs  
Others 
 Lower the criteria of borrowers submitting the state of liabilities from 10 million KRW to 5 million starting 
from July (Feb. 1999) 
Pro-
tection 
Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction 
 Allow people to request financial institutions to provide them with their credit information via the 
Internet (14 Oct. 1999 → 21 Jan. 2000) 
Use limitation principle  






Appendix 6-12 Credit information-related policies in 2000 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Strengthen the criteria of delinquency from 3 months to 2 months (The KFB, 17 Jan. 2000) 
 Revise and unify agreements to tighten the criteria of bad credit holders (The KFB, 22 Mar. 2000 → 
Agreement, 10 Dec. 2000 → 1 Apr. 2001) 
 Attempt to include credit card transaction (28 Jan. 2000) 
 Collect guarantee amount (Enforcement Decree, 25 Feb. 2000 → Regulation, 23 Jun. 2000  → 2 Apr. 2001) 
 Lower the criteria of corporate loans from 0.5 billion KRW to 0.1 billion KRW starting from July (17 Apr. 
2000) 








Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  





Appendix 6-13 Credit information-related policies in 2001 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Easing the criteria of a bad credit holder (20 Apr.2001) 
 Lower the criteria of information on corporate loans from 0.1 billion KRW to 1 KRW (23 May 2001) 
 Lower the criteria of information on individual’s loans from 10 million KRW to 1 KRW (Regulation, 13 Jul. 
2001 → Agreements, 11 Dec. 2001) 
 Expand the scope of a corporate information (Regulation, 13 Jul. 2001) 
Registration Process  
Credit information 
retention period 
 Delete records immediately when an individual pays loans of less than 10 million KRW or credit card 
payment of less than 2 million KRW in arrears (20 Apr. 2001 → Agreements, 1 May 2001) 
 Shorten retention period of delinquency records (20 Apr. 2001 → Agreements, 1 May 2001) 
 Credit amnesty (20 Apr. 2001 → The KFB, 1 May 2001) 




Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 Require a written consent for providing credit information to other companies (27 Aug. 2001 → 
Amendment of the Act, 31 Dec. 2001) 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 Notify the relevant individual from 45 days to 15 days prior to the registration of a bad credit holder 
(Regulation, 13 Jul. 2001) 
 Pre-notify the registration of a bad credit holder (22 Oct. 2001 → Amendment of the Act, 31 Dec. 2001) 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  





Appendix 6-14 Credit information-related policies in 2002 
USE 
Credit Information Business  Establishing credit bureaux (28 Feb. 2002, Sep. 2002) 
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Improve the criteria of a bad credit holder (20 Feb. 2002 → Agreements, 10 June 2002) 
 Delay the beginning period for sharing information on individual loan amounts (22 May 2002) 
 Decide to lower the criteria of information on corporate loans to 1 KRW (The CIC, Jun. 2002) 
 Collect information on cash advance of credit card (Regulation, 28 Jun. 2002) 




Other CISSs  
Others 
 Exchange between financial institutions information on small loan amounts in arrears (May 2002) 
 Allow financial holding company’s subsidiaries to provide personal credit information to each one 
(Enforcement Decree of the Financial Holding Company Act, 2 Aug. 2002) 
Pro-
tection 
Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 Consider the right to revoke consent to provide personal credit information (4 Sep. 2002) 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 Pre-notification of the registration of a bad credit holder (Enforcement Decree,20 May 2002) 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  





Appendix 6-15 Credit information-related policies in 2003 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Announce the direction of abolishing the registration of bad credit holders (The Presidential Transition 
Committee, 7 Jan. 2003 →Amendment of the Act, an opposing party, 28 Jan. 2004 → 3 Nov. 2004 → 
Amendment of the Act, 29 Dec. 2004) 
 Force Public administrative entities to provide personal information to credit information business if 
possible (14 Oct. 2003 →Amendment of the Act, 23  Dec. 2003) 
Registration Process 
 Shorten the period for the registration of information on credit transaction from within 15 days after the 
transaction to within 10 days and that of information on credit capacity from within 30 days to within 20 








Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 Allow individuals’ consent to be obtained by electronic documents (1 Oct. 2003 → Amendment of the Act, 
23 Dec. 2003) 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 Enforce financial institutions to notify individuals what information provided and to whom it is provided 
(15 Dec. 2003 →Amendment of the Act, 23 Dec. 2003) 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  





Appendix 6-16 Credit information-related policies in 2004 
USE 
Credit Information Business  Decide the establishment of a new CB (8 financial institutions, 29 Sep. 2004 →Feb. 2005) 
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Expand the scope of information shared between credit card companies (21 Apr. 2004) 








Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 Encourage CBs to provide no information about bad credit holders for the purpose of the examinations of 
job applications (16 Mar. 2004 →9 Aug. 2004 →Amendment of the Act, 29 Dec. 2004)  
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 Notify a customer of the details about the provision of credit information (14 Apr. 2004 → Enforcement 
Decree, 24 Jul. 2004) 
 Charge a fine of one million KRW for negligence in notification of provision of credit information (6 Jul. 
2004 → Enforcement Rule, 30 Jul.2004) 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  






Appendix 6-17 Credit information-related policies in 2005 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Increase the criteria of delinquency of loans shared from 0.3 million KRW to 0.5 million KRW (28 Mar. 
2005) 
Registration Process  
Credit information 
retention period 
 Extend the retention period of delinquency information from one year to five years (23 Oct. 2005 → 
Regulation, 3  Nov. 2005) 




Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 Give a right to revoke consent to provide and use personal credit information (29 Aug. 2005 →abrogated 
due to the expiration of the term of congressmen) 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 Provide credit information to a prosecutor or judicial police officer in the event of occurrence of an 
emergency (13 Sep. 2005 →Amendment of the Act, 2  Mar. 2006) 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  






Appendix 6-18 Credit information-related policies in 2006 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 Expand the scope of credit information provided to financial institutions (24  Jan. 2006) 
Registration Process  
Credit information 
retention period 
 Force financial institutions to delete personal credit information clearly within 5 years after a financial or 
commercial transaction (15 Nov. 2006 → abrogated due to the expiration of the term of congressmen) 




Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  Give a right to free perusal (19 Mar. 2006 → Enforcement Decree, 1 Jul. 2006) 
Use limitation principle  






Appendix 6-19 Credit information-related policies in 2007 
USE 
Credit Information Business  
CCA 
Registration Institutions  
The Scope of credit 
information 
 








Consent to provision and use of 
credit information 
 Force financial institutions to obtain individuals’ consent when they intend to be provided credit rating by 
CBs (31 May 2007 →28 Nov. 2008 →Amendment of the Act, 3 Mar. 2009) 
 Allow individuals’ consent to be obtained through wire or wireless communications (19 Jul. 2007 
→Amendment of the Act, 23 Nov. 2007) 
Restrictions on provision and use 
of information 
 Restrict the use of information on illness to the purpose of an insurance contract or insurance payment (5 
Dec. 2007 →abrogated due to the expiration of the term of congressmen) 
Notification of facts of providing 
credit information 
 
Request for correction  
Use limitation principle  






Appendix 6-20 The number of submission of amendment by proposer and by policy focus 










1 1         
protection           
others   1 1       
total 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Congress 
use       2  1  1 
protection      2 1 3 2 1 1 
others         5   
total 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 8 1 2 
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